{"id":2504,"date":"2021-06-11T10:55:41","date_gmt":"2021-06-11T08:55:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=2504"},"modified":"2024-10-16T10:58:01","modified_gmt":"2024-10-16T08:58:01","slug":"si-te-mos-besh-aleate-dhe-te-ndikosh-gjeopolitiken-i","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/analize\/si-te-mos-besh-aleate-dhe-te-ndikosh-gjeopolitiken-i\/","title":{"rendered":"Si t\u00eb mos b\u00ebsh aleat\u00eb dhe t\u00eb ndikosh gjeopolitik\u00ebn (I)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Qeverisja vet\u00ebshkat\u00ebrruese ekonomike e Kin\u00ebs.<\/em><\/p>\n

Shpesh thuhet se Kina e ka p\u00ebrsosur artin e qeverisjes ekonomike. V\u00ebzhguesit brengosen vazhdimisht se duke u b\u00ebr\u00eb arrogante me fuqin\u00eb e saj ekonomike gjithjn\u00eb n\u00eb rritje e sip\u00ebr, vendi po ia arrin t\u00eb blej\u00eb vullnetin e mir\u00eb dhe ndikimin. Gjat\u00eb pandemis\u00eb COVID-19, Pekini ka eksploatuar dominanc\u00ebn e tij n\u00eb zinxhirin e furnizimit t\u00eb tekstilit p\u00ebr t\u00eb fituar favore duke dhuruar maska dhe vaksina p\u00ebr vendet e huaja. Gjithashtu, ka koh\u00eb q\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzon subvencionet e padrejta shtet\u00ebrore p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndikuar q\u00eb fusha e loj\u00ebs t\u00eb jet\u00eb n\u00eb dobi t\u00eb firmave kineze.<\/p>\n

Pekini gjithashtu ka armatosur marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet e zgjeruara tregtare. M\u00eb 2013, Kina tejkaloi Shtetet e Bashkuara si tregtarja m\u00eb e madhe globale dhe tash \u00ebsht\u00eb burimi kryesori i importit p\u00ebr 35 vende dhe destinacioni kryesor i eksportit p\u00ebr rreth 25 vende. Qeveria kineze nuk ka ngurruar t\u00eb ofroj\u00eb qasje n\u00eb tregun e saj t\u00eb konsumator\u00ebve n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb presion te qeverit\u00eb dhe firmat e huaja q\u00eb t\u2019i binden d\u00ebshirave t\u00eb saj.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebr shembull m\u00eb 2019, ajo anuloi vizit\u00ebn e nj\u00eb delegacioni tregtar n\u00eb Suedi pasi q\u00eb shoqata letrare e Suedis\u00eb e nderoi me \u00e7min nj\u00eb librashit\u00ebs t\u00eb burgosur kinez. Vitin e kaluar, Kina u hakmor ndaj thirrjeve t\u00eb Australis\u00eb p\u00ebr hetim t\u00eb pavarur n\u00eb zanafill\u00ebn e pandemis\u00eb COVID-19 duke vendosur tarifa mbi nj\u00eb varg produktesh australiane. Ka shum\u00eb q\u00eb frik\u00ebsohen se l\u00ebvizje t\u00eb tilla jan\u00eb vet\u00ebm shenj\u00eb se \u00e7far\u00eb do t\u00eb ngjaj\u00eb p\u00ebrderisa Kina mundohet shum\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzoj\u00eb ndikimin e saj ekonomik p\u00ebr t\u00eb n\u00ebp\u00ebrk\u00ebmbur vendet tjera.<\/p>\n

Pjesa m\u00eb e madhe e tmerrit p\u00ebrqendrohet te Nisma Rrug\u00eb dhe Rrip [BRI], nj\u00eb koleksion masiv i projekteve infrastrukturore t\u00eb financuara nga kinez\u00ebt, q\u00eb nga hekurudhuat te portet, t\u00eb cil\u00ebn kritik\u00ebt e portretizojn\u00eb si sip\u00ebrmarrje imperialiste e koh\u00ebve moderne. Duke iu referuar BRI-s\u00eb, zyrtar\u00ebt amerikan\u00eb kan\u00eb akuzuar Kin\u00ebn p\u00ebr p\u00ebrfshirje n\u00eb \u201cdiplomaci t\u00eb borxhit\u201d [\u201cdebt-trap diplomacy\u201d], ku gjoja ngarkon vendet me hua shum\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha dhe pastaj nxjerr koncesione strategjike kur ato nuk jan\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb paguajn\u00eb. Shum\u00eb prej k\u00ebtyre zyrtar\u00ebve brengos\u00ebn se n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn koh\u00eb q\u00eb Kina po mpreh\u00eb veglat e saj ekonomike, veglat e Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara kan\u00eb filluar t\u00eb topiten, duke harruar se si t\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzoj\u00eb fuqin\u00eb ekonomike p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrfitime strategjike.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb analiz\u00eb m\u00eb e thell\u00eb zbulon se performanca e Kin\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb pak mbres\u00ebl\u00ebn\u00ebse se sa mendohet shpesh. Pik\u00eb s\u00eb pari, p\u00ebrpjekjet e saj p\u00ebr qeverisje ekonomike kan\u00eb hasur shpesh n\u00eb rezistenc\u00eb. N\u00eb shum\u00eb prej 60 vendeve q\u00eb kan\u00eb pranuar investime nga BRI-ja, madje edhe ato vende q\u00eb kan\u00eb pasur m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr investime kineze, zyrtar\u00ebt jan\u00eb ankuar p\u00ebr nd\u00ebrtime t\u00eb dob\u00ebta, kosto t\u00eb fryra dhe degradim t\u00eb ambientit. Pekini \u00ebsht\u00eb detyruar t\u00eb mbrohet, me presidentin kinez Xi Jinping q\u00eb me u p\u00ebrpoq me shum\u00eb mund t\u00eb v\u00ebj\u00eb theksin te projektet e \u201ccil\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb lart\u00eb\u201d dhe \u201cme \u00e7mime t\u00eb arsyeshme\u201d. Shum\u00eb vende kan\u00eb k\u00ebrkuar qasje reciproke n\u00eb tregun kinez; t\u00eb tjerat kan\u00eb vendosur t\u00eb t\u00ebrhiqen plot\u00ebsisht prej nismave kineze dhe po k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb financim tjet\u00ebrkund.<\/p>\n

Kina ka arritur t\u00eb zgjeroj\u00eb masivisht pranin\u00eb e saj ekonomike p\u00ebrtej kufijve t\u00eb saj, por deri m\u00eb tash ka d\u00ebshtuar q\u00eb ta kthej\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb prani n\u00eb ndikim strategjik afatgjat\u00eb. Ekonomia kineze ka t\u00ebrheqje t\u00eb fort\u00eb gravitacionale, por si\u00e7 \u00ebsht\u00eb duke kuptuar Pekini, kjo nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb doemos se vendet tjera po ndryshojn\u00eb orbit\u00ebn e tyre politike.<\/p>\n

\u00c7far\u00eb do Kina<\/strong><\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb dy dhjet\u00ebvje\u00e7ar\u00ebve t\u00eb fundit, ndikimi global ekonomik i Kin\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb rritur pa mas\u00eb. M\u00eb 1995, Kina p\u00ebrb\u00ebnte vet\u00ebm tre p\u00ebrqind t\u00eb tregut global, por fal\u00eb rritjes s\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonshme ekonomike, m\u00eb 2018 p\u00ebrb\u00ebnte 12 p\u00ebrqind \u2013 m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti prej t\u00eb gjitha vendeve. M\u00eb 2020, pjes\u00ebrisht p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb pandemis\u00eb, Kina u b\u00eb partneri m\u00eb i madh tregtar i BE-s\u00eb, duke i z\u00ebn\u00eb vendin Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara.<\/p>\n

Investimet e huaja kineze jan\u00eb rritur shpejt\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb bot\u00eb n\u00eb zhvillim, ku firmat dhe bankat kineze kan\u00eb derdhur para n\u00eb Azin\u00eb Juglindore, Afrik\u00eb dhe Amerik\u00eb Latine. Pekini ka nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb gjithashtu rol udh\u00ebheq\u00ebs aktiv n\u00eb qeverisja globale ekonomike, ku vet\u00ebbesimi u rrit nga ballafaqimi i suksessh\u00ebm me kriz\u00ebn globale financiare m\u00eb 2008. M\u00eb 2014, Kina p\u00ebruroi Bank\u00ebn e Investimeve n\u00eb Infrastruktur\u00ebn Aziatike, nj\u00eb bank\u00eb zhvillimore shum\u00ebpal\u00ebshe me kapitalizimin fillestar prej $100 miliard\u00ebsh, dhe q\u00eb prej at\u00ebher\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb rritur me p\u00ebrfshirjen e m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 100 vendeve. Shum\u00eb prej tyre jan\u00eb partnere tradicionale dhe aleate t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb q\u00eb u bashkuan p\u00ebrkund\u00ebr kund\u00ebrshtimeve t\u00eb Uashingtonit.<\/p>\n

\u00c7far\u00eb d\u00ebshiron t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb Kina me k\u00ebt\u00eb fuqi t\u00eb re ekonomike? Patejdukshm\u00ebria e sistemit politik t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs e shtyn shum\u00ebk\u00eb q\u00eb t\u2019ia atribuoj\u00eb sjelljen e saj nj\u00eb procesi vendimmarrjeje t\u00eb centralizuar q\u00eb ndjek\u00eb nj\u00eb strategji koherente, por politikat kineze jan\u00eb n\u00eb fakt shpesh produkt i gar\u00ebs dhe kompromisit mes nj\u00eb s\u00ebr\u00eb aktor\u00ebsh \u2013 qeverit\u00eb lokale, burokracit\u00eb e nivelit t\u00eb lart\u00eb, nd\u00ebrmarrjet shtet\u00ebrore, firmat private, etj. Merrni p\u00ebr shembull BRI-n\u00eb. \u00c7far\u00eb filloi si plan i turbullt dhe i shkap\u00ebrderdhur, tash ka marr\u00eb nj\u00eb form\u00eb krejt tjet\u00ebr, ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb i rr\u00ebmbyer nga qeveritar\u00eb oportunist\u00eb dhe firma q\u00eb orvaten t\u00eb mbushin xhepat e tyre. Shum\u00eb prej projekteve p\u00ebrb\u00ebr\u00ebse motivohen m\u00eb pak prej ndonj\u00eb plan t\u00eb madh strategjik, e m\u00eb shum\u00eb prej tekave t\u00eb aktor\u00ebve individual.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr gabim \u00ebsht\u00eb supozimi se veprimet e Kin\u00ebs nxiten nga nj\u00eb d\u00ebshir\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb eksportuar sistemin politik autokratik dhe sistemin ekonomik etatist. V\u00ebrtet q\u00eb Xi \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb shtyp\u00ebs brenda dhe m\u00eb i vendosur jasht\u00eb vendit, por Kina ende shqet\u00ebsohet m\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebr mbrojtjen e interesave t\u00eb saj se sa p\u00ebr q\u00eb t\u00eb transformoj\u00eb vendet tjera sipas imazhit t\u00eb vet. Ndon\u00ebse Kina k\u00ebrkon t\u00eb transformoj\u00eb sistemin nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar ashtu q\u00eb t\u00eb pasqyroj\u00eb prioritetet e saj, kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb larg p\u00ebrpjekjes p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrmbysur rendin n\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi.<\/p>\n

Ajo \u00e7far\u00eb e shtyn v\u00ebrtetqeverisjen ekonomike kineze nuk jan\u00eb planet e m\u00ebdha strategjike apo impulse autokratike, por di\u00e7ka shum\u00eb m\u00eb praktike dhe e menj\u00ebhershme: stabiliteti dhe mbijetesa. Q\u00ebllimi kryesor i Partis\u00eb Komuniste t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb prezervoj\u00eb legjitimitetin e sundimit t\u00eb saj. Prandaj, qeverisja ekonomike e Kin\u00ebs shpesh p\u00ebrdoret p\u00ebr t\u00eb shuar zjarret dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur imazhin vendor dhe nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar t\u00eb PPK-s\u00eb. Kina d\u00ebshiron t\u00eb shkel\u00eb me k\u00ebmb\u00eb kritik\u00ebn dhe t\u00eb shp\u00ebrblej\u00eb ata q\u00eb p\u00ebrkrahin politikat e saj. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb posa\u00e7\u00ebrisht e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb kur \u00ebsht\u00eb puna te \u00e7\u00ebshtjet q\u00eb kan\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb me sovranitetin komb\u00ebtar dhe integritetin territorial (sikurse Tajvani, Tibeti, dhe Det\u00ebrat e Kin\u00ebs Jugore dhe Kin\u00ebs Lindore) dhe pun\u00ebt e brendshme (si\u00e7 \u00ebsht\u00eb trajtimi i ujgur\u00ebve n\u00eb Xinjiang dhe menaxhimi i pandemis\u00eb COVID-19).<\/p>\n

Pekini i qaset n\u00eb disa m\u00ebnyra t\u00eb ndryshme p\u00ebrpjekjeve p\u00ebr t\u00eb konvertuar aft\u00ebsit\u00eb ekonomike n\u00eb ndikim gjeopolitik. Kina ka p\u00ebrdorur shpesh madh\u00ebsin\u00eb e tregut t\u00eb saj vendor p\u00ebr t\u00eb imponuar kufizimet tregtare mbi vendet q\u00eb d\u00ebshiron t\u2019i nd\u00ebshkoj\u00eb, por k\u00ebt\u00eb e b\u00ebn me cak dhe n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb simbolike p\u00ebr t\u00eb minimizuar d\u00ebmin n\u00eb ekonomin\u00eb e saj. Qeveria kineze vendosi sanksione mbi eksportet e salmonit norvegjez pas pranimit t\u00eb \u00e7mimit Nobel p\u00ebr Paqe q\u00eb mori disidenti Liu Xiaobo, si dhe bllokoi eksportet e banan\u00ebs filipinase pas ngritjes s\u00eb tensioneve n\u00eb Detin e Kin\u00ebs Jugore, q\u00eb t\u00eb dyja rastet gjoja p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb siguris\u00eb s\u00eb ushqimit.<\/p>\n

Ajo gjithashtu ka shfyt\u00ebzuar madh\u00ebsin\u00eb e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb inkurajuar bojkote \u2013 duke nxitur konsumator\u00ebt kinez\u00eb, p\u00ebr shembull, q\u00eb t\u00eb mos patronizoj\u00eb nj\u00eb zinxhir supermarketesh jugkoreane n\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb zhbindur Seulin q\u00eb t\u00eb pozicionoj\u00eb sistemin raketor mbrojt\u00ebs t\u00eb udh\u00ebhequr nga SHBA-ja. Duke shfryt\u00ebzuar pozicionin e Kin\u00ebs si investori dhe prodhuesi i teknologjis\u00eb m\u00eb i madh i huaj, qeveria dhe firmat kineze kan\u00eb luajtur rol aktiv n\u00eb trupat nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare q\u00eb vendosin standardet dhe kan\u00eb promovuar eksportin e pajisjesve kineze, posa\u00e7\u00ebrisht t\u00eb teknologjive t\u00eb reja \u2013 ku disa prej tyre kan\u00eb implikime n\u00eb sigurin\u00eb komb\u00ebtare, sikurse 5G-ja dhe inteligjenca artificiale.<\/p>\n

Mbase vetia m\u00eb e spikatur e qeverisjes ekonomike t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimi i shtysave pozitive. K\u00ebto shtysa vijn\u00eb n\u00eb dy forma: n\u00ebn tavolin\u00eb, ku Pekini blen lider\u00ebt politik\u00eb p\u00ebrmes marr\u00ebveshjeve t\u00eb jasht\u00ebligjshme dhe p\u00ebrmes rrug\u00ebve t\u00eb ligjshme, ku fuqizon grupet e interesit p\u00ebr t\u00eb lobuar te qeverit\u00eb e tyre p\u00ebr marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie m\u00eb t\u00eb af\u00ebrta me Kin\u00ebn.<\/p>\n

Metoda Subversive<\/strong><\/p>\n

Kina shpesh ofron shtysa ekonomike n\u00eb m\u00ebnyra t\u00eb turbullta dhe t\u00eb jasht\u00ebligjshme q\u00eb shmangin proceset dhe institucionet politike. P\u00ebrderisa firmat kineze investojn\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb jasht\u00eb vendit, nd\u00ebrmarrjet shtet\u00ebrore dhe firmat private, ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb me miratimin e heshtur t\u00eb zyrtar\u00ebve kinez\u00eb, kan\u00eb ofruar ryshfet elitave n\u00eb vendet q\u00eb pranojn\u00eb investimet ose projektet e ndihm\u00ebs n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb lyr\u00ebsojn\u00eb rrotat e burokracis\u00eb. Herave tjera, firmat kineze kan\u00eb anashkaluar procesin e ofert\u00ebs garuese dhe miratimit rregullativ p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar kontrat\u00eb, shpesh me kosto t\u00eb fryra, duke gjeneruar profit shtes\u00eb si p\u00ebr aktor\u00ebt kinez\u00eb ashtu edhe p\u00ebr elitat lokale.<\/p>\n

K\u00ebto shtysa i quaj \u201ckarrota subversive\u201d. N\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00ebnyra, p\u00ebrdorimi i tyre pasqyron ekonomin\u00eb politike vendore t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, ku bizneset varen nga lidhjet zyrtare, ku korrupsioni \u00ebsht\u00eb i gjithansh\u00ebm dhe ku ka shum\u00eb pak rregulla q\u00eb qeverisin investimet dhe ndihmat e huaja. Hulumtimi im tregon se kjo metod\u00eb funksionon m\u00eb s\u00eb miri n\u00eb vendet t\u00eb cilat kan\u00eb pak llogaridh\u00ebnie publike \u2013 ku rrjedhja e informacionit \u00ebsht\u00eb e kufizuar, dhe ku lider\u00ebt politik\u00eb nuk kan\u00eb nevoj\u00eb t\u00eb brengosen p\u00ebr opinionin publik apo sundimin e ligjit.<\/p>\n

Kamboxha \u00ebsht\u00eb rast i till\u00eb. Kryeministri i kahersh\u00ebm Hun Sen dhe familja e tij kontrollojn\u00eb ushtrin\u00eb, policin\u00eb dhe pjes\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb ekonomis\u00eb. Mediat jan\u00eb mir\u00ebnhjoh\u00ebse ndaj qeveris\u00eb dhe gazetar\u00ebt, aktivist\u00ebt e politikan\u00ebt e opozit\u00ebs censurohen vazhdimisht p\u00ebrmes k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit dhe dhun\u00ebs. P\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, detajet e ndihm\u00ebs kineze dhe projekteve t\u00eb investimit n\u00eb Kamboxha jan\u00eb t\u00eb turbullta, por ato pak informata q\u00eb kan\u00eb rrjedhur l\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb kuptojn\u00eb se qeveria \u00ebsht\u00eb e korruptuar prej ndikimit kinez.<\/p>\n

Projektet e financuara nga Kina priren t\u00eb pasurojn\u00eb elitat nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb d\u00ebbojn\u00eb t\u00eb varf\u00ebrit dhe shkat\u00ebrrojn\u00eb ambientin. N\u00eb provinc\u00ebn juglindore t\u00eb Koh Kong, nj\u00eb grup kinez investimesh po nd\u00ebrton nj\u00eb kompleks masiv zhvillimi q\u00eb do t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshij\u00eb nj\u00eb resort, nj\u00eb port, nj\u00eb aeroport, termocentrale, zona prodhimtarie dhe rrug\u00eb e autostrada \u2013 ku t\u00eb gjitha kapin vler\u00ebn prej $3.8 miliard\u00eb. P\u00ebrderisa elitat kamboxhiane kan\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzuar projektin p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbushur xhepat e tyre, nd\u00ebrtimi ka shkat\u00ebrruar zonat e ndjeshme ekologjike dhe ka detyruar banor\u00ebt t\u00eb largohen nga sht\u00ebpit\u00eb e tyre. Pekini mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrfitoj\u00eb nga kjo: resorti duket tep\u00ebr i madh p\u00ebr numrin e turist\u00ebve q\u00eb mund t\u00eb t\u00ebrheq\u00eb kjo zon\u00eb, por aeroporti dhe porti duken t\u00eb dizajnuara mir\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u shfryt\u00ebzuar ushtarakisht nga Kina.<\/p>\n

Bujaria e till\u00eb i ka b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb mundur Kin\u00ebs q\u00eb t\u00eb blej\u00eb avokimin e Kamboxh\u00ebs n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb tyre \u2013 n\u00eb ve\u00e7anti, p\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket pretendtimeve agresive ujore n\u00eb Detin e Kin\u00ebs Jugore. N\u00eb nj\u00eb samit t\u00eb 2012 t\u00eb Asociacionit t\u00eb Kombeve t\u00eb Azis\u00eb Juglindore, Kamboxha p\u00ebrdori pozit\u00ebn e saj si kryesuese e diskutimeve p\u00ebr mosmarr\u00ebveshjet rreth Detit t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs Jugore dhe p\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb n\u00eb historin\u00eb e ASEAN-it, organizata nuk qe n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb l\u00ebshoj\u00eb nj\u00eb deklarat\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt. N\u00eb nj\u00eb moment, ministri i jasht\u00ebm i Kamboxhas nd\u00ebrpreu delegat\u00ebt q\u00eb u p\u00ebrpoq\u00ebn t\u00eb ngrinin \u00e7\u00ebshtjen, nd\u00ebrsa n\u00eb nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr, ai u largua me vrull nga dhoma kur ata propozuan nj\u00eb deklarat\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb but\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Zyrtar\u00ebt qeveritar\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebt i kam intervistuar n\u00eb rajon e kan\u00eb p\u00ebrshkruar sjelljen e Kamboxhas n\u00eb samit si pasoj\u00eb e nj\u00eb\u00a0 \u201cujdie t\u00eb past\u00ebr monetare\u201d n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebn Pekini ka bler\u00eb qeverin\u00eb kamboxhase n\u00eb k\u00ebmbim t\u00eb p\u00ebrkrahjes s\u00eb saj. N\u00eb muajt para takimit, udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit e lart\u00eb kinez\u00eb vizituan Pnom Penin, duke ofruar grante dhe hua shtes\u00eb p\u00ebr infrastruktur\u00eb dhe projekte zhvillimore q\u00eb kapin vler\u00ebn prej qindra miliona dollar\u00ebsh. Investimi \u00ebsht\u00eb shpaguar mjaft mir\u00eb: q\u00eb prej 2012, ASEAN \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb e p\u00ebr\u00e7ar\u00eb dhe jokoherente, duke lejuar Pekinin q\u00eb t\u00eb konsolidoj\u00eb pozicionin n\u00eb Detin e Kin\u00ebs Jugrore, si retorikisht edhe ushtarakisht.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb dinamik\u00eb e ngjashme po zhvillohet n\u00eb Europ\u00ebn lindore. Qeverit\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb joliberale n\u00eb Hungari dhe Serbi kan\u00eb pranuar me qejf para n\u00eb k\u00ebmbim t\u00eb promovimit t\u00eb pozicioneve t\u00eb politik\u00ebs s\u00eb jashtme kineze. Nj\u00eb hekurudh\u00eb e shpejt\u00eb q\u00eb kalon p\u00ebrmes t\u00eb dy vendeve, p\u00ebr shembull, mbetet e zhytur n\u00eb paqart\u00ebsi, madje edhe p\u00ebrderisa kostot jan\u00eb fryr\u00eb dhe dyshimet jan\u00eb ngritur p\u00ebr q\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e saj ekonomike. Nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e projektit po nd\u00ebrtohet nga nd\u00ebrmarrja shtet\u00ebrore kineze q\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb ka qen\u00eb n\u00eb list\u00eb t\u00eb zez\u00eb nga Banka Bot\u00ebrore p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb parregullsive, nd\u00ebrkaq pjesa tjet\u00ebr prej nj\u00eb aleati t\u00eb korruptuar t\u00eb kryeministrit hungarez. Si k\u00ebmbim, Hungaria dhe Serbia jan\u00eb sjell\u00eb me padurim ndaj Kin\u00ebs.<\/p>\n

Hungaria ka nxjerr\u00eb deklarata zyrtare q\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebrisin pozicionin e Pekinin n\u00eb Detin e Kin\u00ebs Jugore, nd\u00ebrsa presidenti i Serbis\u00eb, p\u00ebrve\u00e7 puthjes s\u00eb flamurit kinez si fal\u00ebnderim p\u00ebr pranimin e furnizmeve mjek\u00ebsore n\u00eb fillim t\u00eb pandemis\u00eb COVID-19, ka shprehur mb\u00ebshtetjen p\u00ebr ligjin shtyp\u00ebs t\u00eb siguris\u00eb komb\u00ebtare t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb Hong Kong. N\u00eb Europ\u00eb, Kina ka shfryt\u00ebzuar rastet e tilla si deklaratat publike dhe vetot p\u00ebrbrenda BE-s\u00eb dhe asnj\u00eb vend n\u00eb rajon nuk ka ndryshuar radikalisht orientimin e politik\u00ebs s\u00eb tyre t\u00eb jashtme. Prap\u00ebseprap\u00eb, Pekini ka arritur t\u00eb pres\u00eb hovin e kritik\u00ebs nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare dhe t\u00eb nxis\u00eb p\u00ebr\u00e7arje turp\u00ebruese publike p\u00ebr \u00e7\u00ebshtjet rreth t\u00eb cilave vendet europiane dikur ishin t\u00eb bashkuar.<\/p>\n

Subversioni kinez nuk ka b\u00ebr\u00eb pun\u00eb aq mir\u00eb n\u00eb vendet me transparenc\u00eb dhe mbik\u00ebqyrje m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe. P\u00ebr shembull, Filipinet n\u00ebn qeverisjen e presidentes Gloria Arroyo, e cila sh\u00ebrbeu prej 2001 deri m\u00eb 2010 \u2013 periudh\u00eb kur vendi pati nj\u00eb sektor t\u00eb gjall\u00eb t\u00eb medias dhe sistem garues politik, p\u00ebrkund\u00ebr nivelit t\u00eb lart\u00eb t\u00eb korrupsionit. N\u00ebn Arroyo-n, Kina u pajtua t\u00eb financoj\u00eb dhe nd\u00ebrtoj\u00eb nj\u00eb projekt me vler\u00eb prej $1.6 miliard\u00ebsh t\u00eb infrastruktur\u00ebs hekurudhore dhe t\u00eb telekomunikacionit.<\/p>\n

Shum\u00eb prej projekteve u dhan\u00eb p\u00ebrmes kontratave pa tender\u00eb me \u00e7mim shum\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb. Nj\u00eb hekurudh\u00eb udh\u00ebtar\u00ebsh e quajtur Northrail, p\u00ebr shembull, dukej se po b\u00ebhej hekurudha m\u00eb shtrenjt\u00eb n\u00eb bot\u00eb p\u00ebr milje. Kostot p\u00ebr rrjetin komb\u00ebtar telefonik, q\u00eb do t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtohej prej nd\u00ebrmarrjes shtet\u00ebrore kineze ZTE, u rrit prej $130 milion\u00eb n\u00eb $329 milion\u00eb p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb rezistenc\u00ebs s\u00eb lojtar\u00ebve kryesor\u00eb politik\u00eb, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb kryetarin e komisionit zgjedhor t\u00eb Filipineve dhe bashk\u00ebshortit t\u00eb presidentes. Thua se p\u00ebr t\u00eb goditur n\u00eb shenj\u00eb, m\u00eb 2005 firma shtet\u00ebore e naft\u00ebs e Filipineve, n\u00ebnshkroi nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje p\u00ebr eksplorimin e resurseve q\u00eb legjitimoi pretendimet ujore t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs.<\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, t\u00eb gjitha keqp\u00ebrdorimet u ekspozuan n\u00eb media dhe publiku reagoi. P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb viteve 2007 dhe 2008, Senati i Filipineve mbajti 13 d\u00ebgjime publike, q\u00eb kulminuan me nj\u00eb raport t\u00eb gjat\u00eb q\u00eb b\u00ebri p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebs politikan\u00ebt filipinas dhe firmat kineze p\u00ebr korrupsion. Politikan\u00eb, aktivist\u00eb, dhe grupe t\u00eb shoq\u00ebris\u00eb civile organizuan protesta kund\u00ebr qeveris\u00eb n\u00eb Manila dhe qytete t\u00eb tjera. Si kund\u00ebrp\u00ebrgjigje, qeveria suspendoi dhe rishikoi nj\u00eb varg projektesh t\u00eb financuara nga Kina dhe disa prej elitave t\u00eb implikuara u akuzuan dhe u soll\u00ebn para gjyqit.<\/p>\n

Do t\u00eb ishte e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb q\u00eb fushata e Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb Fillipine t\u00eb konsiderohej si sukses. M\u00eb 2010, Benigno Aquino III u zgjodh president p\u00ebrmes nj\u00eb platforme kund\u00ebr korrupsionit dhe u d\u00ebshmua t\u00eb ishte m\u00eb dyshues ndaj Pekinit se sa paraardh\u00ebsja e tij. Ndon\u00ebse presidenti i tash\u00ebm Rodrigo Duterte ka qen\u00eb m\u00eb i gatsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr investimet kineze, ai ende \u00ebsht\u00eb pjes\u00ebrisht i kufizuar nga ligjv\u00ebn\u00ebsit t\u00eb cil\u00ebt kan\u00eb k\u00ebrkuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb transparenc\u00eb dhe nga agjencit\u00eb qeveritare q\u00eb kan\u00eb miratuar procedura m\u00eb t\u00eb rrepta t\u00eb mbik\u00ebqyrjes. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, politika e vendit ndaj Detit t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs Jugore, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn Kina interesohet m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti ka mbetur e pandryshuar: Filipinet kan\u00eb k\u00ebmb\u00ebngulur n\u00eb pretendimet e veta territoriale.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb prishje e till\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniesh \u00ebsht\u00eb e zakonshme. N\u00eb Australi, Pekini ka p\u00ebrdorur biznesmen\u00ebt kinez\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb donacione n\u00eb fushata dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb financuar institute akademike n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb bindur politikan\u00ebt dhe z\u00ebrat e tjer\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtesin pozicionet e Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb Detin e Kin\u00ebs Jugore dhe t\u00eb drejtat e njeriut. Kund\u00ebrp\u00ebrgjigjja qe e shpejt\u00eb: m\u00eb 2017, nj\u00eb politikan i spikatur i cili u akuzua se pranoi fonde kineze dhe i cili u pa si z\u00ebdh\u00ebn\u00ebs i q\u00ebndrimit kinez, u detyrua t\u00eb dor\u00ebhiqej, nd\u00ebrkaq vitin tjet\u00ebr, Parlamenti i Australis\u00eb forcoi ligjet e vendit ndaj nd\u00ebrhyrjes s\u00eb huaj politike. M\u00eb 2015, presidenti i Shri Lank\u00ebs u rr\u00ebzua pas dh\u00ebnies s\u00eb lejes p\u00ebr projekte t\u00eb paqendrueshme dhe t\u00eb korruptuara infrastrukturore kineze me vler\u00eb prej miliarda dollar\u00ebsh dhe pas tre vitesh, fatin e nj\u00ebjt\u00eb e pati edhe presidenti i Maldiveve.<\/p>\n

Di\u00e7ka e ngjashme ngjau n\u00eb Malajzi m\u00eb 2018. Kryeministri i at\u00ebhersh\u00ebm Najib Razak, u zhyt n\u00eb skandale korruptive rreth keqmenaxhimit t\u00eb fondit shtet\u00ebror t\u00eb investimeve, disa prej t\u00eb cilave implikonin investimet e financuara nga Kina n\u00eb t\u00eb cilat kostot e kontratave u fryn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb fshehur borxhet e fondit. Votuesit i dhan\u00eb partis\u00eb s\u00eb tij nj\u00eb disfat\u00eb t\u00eb madhe n\u00eb zgjedhjet e atij viti, duke e detyruar q\u00eb t\u00eb largohej nga pozita dhe duke sh\u00ebnuar fitoren e par\u00eb opozitare n\u00eb Malajzi, 61 vite pas pavar\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb vendit. Pasardh\u00ebsi i tij Mahathir Mohamad shum\u00eb shpejt suspendoi nj\u00eb varg projektesh, duke rinegociuar planet p\u00ebr nj\u00eb hekurudh\u00eb madhore dhe foli z\u00ebsh\u00ebm kund\u00ebr veprimeve t\u00eb Pekinit n\u00eb Detin e Kin\u00ebs Jugore \u2013 ndryshe prej Najib-it, i cili u d\u00ebnua m\u00eb 12 vjet\u00eb burgim. P\u00ebrs\u00ebri e p\u00ebrs\u00ebri, qeverisja subversive e Kin\u00ebs ka r\u00ebn\u00eb p\u00ebrtok\u00eb n\u00eb cek\u00ebtinat e sistemeve politike llogaridh\u00ebn\u00ebse.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

Artikulli origjinal n\u00eb\u00a0Foreign Affairs<\/a>, edicioni maj\/qershor 2021.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

\"Image\"<\/div>\n

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Ky artikull\u00a0mb\u00ebshtetet nga “Sbunker” p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit\u00a0dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Qeverisja vet\u00ebshkat\u00ebrruese ekonomike e Kin\u00ebs. Shpesh thuhet se Kina e ka p\u00ebrsosur artin e qeverisjes ekonomike. V\u00ebzhguesit brengosen vazhdimisht se duke u b\u00ebr\u00eb arrogante me fuqin\u00eb e saj ekonomike gjithjn\u00eb n\u00eb rritje e sip\u00ebr, vendi po ia arrin t\u00eb blej\u00eb vullnetin e mir\u00eb dhe ndikimin. Gjat\u00eb pandemis\u00eb COVID-19, Pekini ka eksploatuar dominanc\u00ebn e tij n\u00eb […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":491,"featured_media":8343,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1297],"ppma_author":[1312],"class_list":["post-2504","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-dragoi-i-zgjuar"],"authors":[{"term_id":1312,"user_id":491,"is_guest":0,"slug":"audrye-wong","display_name":"Audrye Wong","avatar_url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/9986c459c64a85899cc76bcd5d0d3177e9ecbc4c1a3a58178224887aa6e93ba7?s=96&d=mm&r=g","user_url":"","last_name":"Wong","first_name":"Audrye","description":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2504","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/491"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2504"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2504\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2505,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2504\/revisions\/2505"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8343"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2504"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2504"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2504"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2504"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}