{"id":4207,"date":"2018-05-03T11:48:36","date_gmt":"2018-05-03T09:48:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=4207"},"modified":"2024-11-20T11:50:32","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T09:50:32","slug":"cfare-duhet-te-dime-rreth-marreveshjes-mes-korese-se-veriut-dhe-korese-se-jugut","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/uncategorized\/cfare-duhet-te-dime-rreth-marreveshjes-mes-korese-se-veriut-dhe-korese-se-jugut\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00c7far\u00eb duhet t\u00eb dim\u00eb rreth marr\u00ebveshjes mes Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut dhe Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Jugut?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/div>\n
\n
\n

T\u00eb premten q\u00eb lam\u00eb pas, Korea e Veriut dhe Korea Jugore adoptuan \u201cDeklarat\u00ebn e Panumnjomit p\u00ebr Paqe\u201d q\u00eb ndalon luft\u00ebn dhe q\u00eb premton \u201cnj\u00eb epok\u00eb t\u00eb re t\u00eb paqes\u201d dhe \u201cdenuklearizim t\u00eb plot\u00eb\u201d. Lideri Suprem i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, Kim Jong dhe Presidenti i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Jugut, Moon Jae, shtr\u00ebnguan duart dhe u p\u00ebrqafuan n\u00eb dy an\u00ebt e kufirit mes dy shteteve n\u00eb fjal\u00eb. Takimi n\u00eb dukje shum\u00eb emocional p\u00ebr\u00e7oi nj\u00eb mesazh pozitiv n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjet p\u00ebr t\u00eb gjetur zgjidhje t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme p\u00ebr problemin e atij regjioni dhe m\u00eb gjer\u00eb. Deklarata parasheh edhe bashk\u00ebpunim ekonomik midis dy vendeve.<\/p>\n

Kjo marr\u00ebveshje ka edhe r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare. Evitimi i nj\u00eb lufte mes tyre \u00ebsht\u00eb shmangie e nj\u00eb kataklizme b\u00ebrthamore. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb regjion pleksen shum\u00eb interesa strategjik\u00eb t\u00eb fuqive regjionale, si Japonia dhe t\u00eb super-fuqive bot\u00ebrore, si ShBA, Kina e Rusia. Edhe pse nj\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim i till\u00eb nuk ishte realisht gjithnj\u00eb iminent, testet e koh\u00ebpaskohshme b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut mjaftonin sa p\u00ebr t\u00eb pasur kujdes t\u00eb shtuar rreth problemit n\u00eb fjal\u00eb. Megjithat\u00eb, nuk duhet entuziazmuar edhe aq shum\u00eb p\u00ebr ato p\u00ebrqafime. P\u00ebrkund\u00ebr faktit q\u00eb kjo ngjarje \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb pozitive, duhet t\u00eb kemi rezerva p\u00ebr efektin afatgjat\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Historiku dhe gjeopolitika e problemit<\/strong><\/p>\n

Programi i saj b\u00ebrthamor ishte ideuar n\u00eb vitet \u201860 t\u00eb shek. t\u00eb kaluar. Puna efektive p\u00ebr prodhimin e arm\u00ebve nukleare kishte filluar n\u00eb vitet \u201980. Me r\u00ebnien e Bashkimit Sovjetik (BS), Korea e Veriut humbi nj\u00eb aleat t\u00eb fort\u00eb. N\u00eb vend se t\u2019i n\u00ebnshtrohej nj\u00eb tranzicioni t\u00eb thell\u00eb politiko-ekonomik, regjimi i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut zgjodhi t\u00eb mbetej diktatur\u00eb komuniste.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb vitin 1990 Rusia normalizoi marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Koren\u00eb e Jugut. M\u00eb 1992 k\u00ebt\u00eb e b\u00ebri Kina. Kjo r\u00ebnie e mb\u00ebshtetjes e shtyri Koren\u00eb e Veriut q\u00eb t\u00eb frik\u00ebsohej m\u00eb shum\u00eb nga nj\u00eb invazion i mundsh\u00ebm amerikan. Kjo p\u00ebr shkak q\u00eb ShBA-ja ka prani t\u00eb theksuar ushtarake n\u00eb at\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb bot\u00ebs. Bazuar n\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e Departamentit Amerikan t\u00eb Mbrojtjes, q\u00eb nga p\u00ebrfundimi i Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Dyt\u00eb Bot\u00ebrore (LDB), ShBA-ja n\u00eb Japoni ka stacionuar 39.345 ushtar\u00eb n\u00eb 112 baza. Nuk ka asnj\u00eb vend tjet\u00ebr n\u00eb bot\u00eb ku ShBA-ja ka d\u00ebrguar nj\u00eb num\u00ebr t\u00eb till\u00eb t\u00eb trupave. M\u00eb tej, pas Gjermanis\u00eb q\u00eb mban 34.805 ushtar\u00eb amerikan\u00eb, Korea e Jugut \u00ebsht\u00eb mikprit\u00ebsi i tret\u00eb m\u00eb i madh i ushtar\u00ebve amerikan\u00eb, me 23.468 sosh, n\u00eb 83 baza ushtarake. Aty ka edhe arsenal t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00eb ushtarak. Poashtu, nga aty mund t\u00eb kryhen sulme b\u00ebrthamore. Bazat jan\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrqendruara n\u00eb ishujt af\u00ebr Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut dhe jan\u00eb t\u00eb gatshme t\u2019u p\u00ebrgjigjen sulmeve eventuale t\u00eb saj ndaj Japonis\u00eb dhe Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Jugut. Trupa dhe baza tjera amerikane ka edhe n\u00eb Tailand\u00eb, Filipine, Singapor dhe Guam, nj\u00eb ishull n\u00eb oqeanin paq\u00ebsor, rreth 2000 milje larg Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, q\u00eb sh\u00ebrben si stacion p\u00ebr avion\u00ebt luftarak\u00eb amerikan\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Raportet e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut me SHBA-n\u00eb<\/strong><\/p>\n

M\u00eb 1993, Korea e Veriut k\u00ebrc\u00ebnoi se do t\u00eb braktiste \u201cTraktatin p\u00ebr Mos-Zgjerimin Nuklear\u201d dhe p\u00ebrshpejtoi pun\u00ebn e prodhimit t\u00eb arm\u00ebve b\u00ebrthamore. Kjo sjellje agresive e Kores\u00eb e Veriut e alarmoi ShBA-n\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb luft\u00eb potenciale. P\u00ebr t\u00eb shmangur rrezikun, m\u00eb 1994 ShBA-ja n\u00ebnshkroi nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje me Koren\u00eb e Veriut p\u00ebr t\u00eb mos braktisur traktatin dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrprer\u00eb planet b\u00ebrthamore n\u00eb k\u00ebmbim t\u00eb sasive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb naft\u00ebs dhe nd\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb dy reaktor\u00ebve b\u00ebrthamor\u00eb p\u00ebr p\u00ebrdorime civile. N\u00eb an\u00ebn tjet\u00ebr, Korea e Jugut n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb zbutur vrazhd\u00ebsin\u00eb e verior\u00ebve, ndihmoi programet p\u00ebr zhvillim ekonomik n\u00eb Koren\u00eb e Veriut me m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 8 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00eb. Korea e Veriut p\u00ebrmes k\u00ebsaj marr\u00ebveshje thithi resurset e nevojshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb zhvilluar m\u00eb shum\u00eb ekonomin\u00eb e saj. Presidenti i at\u00ebhersh\u00ebm jug-korean, Kim Dae, kishte fituar \u00c7mimin Nobel p\u00ebr Paqe p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjeve t\u00eb tij pozitive p\u00ebr t\u00eb ulur nivelin e kanosjes.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrderisa dukej se shkonte mir\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimi, n\u00eb vitin 2002, George Bush e kuptoi q\u00eb Korea e Veriut po e mashtronte ShBA-n\u00eb sepse kapacitetet nukleare i kishte kanalizuar n\u00eb drejtim t\u00eb sektorit militar. M\u00eb pas, Bush e futi Koren\u00eb e Veriut n\u00eb mesin e shteteve q\u00eb b\u00ebnin pjes\u00eb n\u00eb \u201cBoshtin e s\u00eb Lig\u00ebs\u201d. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb periudha kur fillon t\u00eb implementohet narrativi i sekuritizimit t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. Kjo doktrin\u00eb konsideron q\u00eb shtetet jodemokratike jan\u00eb vatra konstante t\u00eb rreziqeve dhe e vetmja m\u00ebnyr\u00eb efikase p\u00ebr t\u00eb eliminuar riskun \u00ebsht\u00eb riorganizimi i brendsh\u00ebm shtet\u00ebror n\u00eb linja t\u00eb demokracis\u00eb liberale. Kjo kredo ishte p\u00ebrpiluar kryesisht nga ideolog\u00eb neo-konservativ\u00eb si Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle e John Bolton, q\u00eb kishin kritikuar ashp\u00ebr marr\u00ebveshjen q\u00eb Clinton e b\u00ebri n\u00eb vitin 1994.<\/p>\n

Kjo shkoll\u00eb e mendimit vler\u00ebson se Korea e Veriut nuk duhet t\u00eb pranohet si pal\u00eb legjitime negociuese, por duhet trajtuar si shtet risk q\u00eb duhet t\u00eb ridizajnohet n\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00ebsi p\u00ebrmes p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb forc\u00ebs dhe p\u00ebrmes nd\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb regjimi t\u00eb ri kushtetues. Formula e tyre thot\u00eb se problemi i \u201cshteteve t\u00eb boshtit t\u00eb s\u00eb lig\u00ebs\u201d mund t\u00eb zgjidhet vet\u00ebm n\u00ebse ka nd\u00ebrrim t\u00eb regjimit e jo thjesht p\u00ebrmes konservimit t\u00eb rrezikut regjional e nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar. Kjo teori e ashp\u00ebr diplomatike e trembi Koren\u00eb e Veriut dhe disa shkollar\u00eb e kan\u00eb kritikuar at\u00eb duke th\u00ebn\u00eb se kjo qasje ka p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsuar gj\u00ebrat dhe ka pamund\u00ebsuar dialog efektiv p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur mosmarr\u00ebveshjen. Van Jackson, ekspert n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, thot\u00eb se kjo qasje e ka b\u00ebr\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb jorealistik denuklearizimin e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, duke \u00e7uar tensionet n\u00eb maksimum. K\u00ebshtu edhe kishte ndodhur. Kjo strategji strikte dogji urat e komunikimit mes dy shteteve dhe intensifikoi p\u00ebrpjekjet e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut n\u00eb planet e saj b\u00ebrthamore. Kjo qasje, sipas Jackson, i solli Koren\u00eb e Veriut dhe ShBA-t\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb pik\u00eb ku kan\u00eb konflikt t\u00eb pareduktuesh\u00ebm t\u00eb interesit.<\/p>\n

Sanksionet<\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb vitin 2006 Korea e Veriut kreu testin e saj t\u00eb par\u00eb b\u00ebrthamor. Nga ai moment, ShBA-ja dhe nj\u00eb num\u00ebr i aleat\u00ebve t\u00eb saj vendos\u00ebn sanksione kund\u00ebr Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. Poashtu, OKB-ja kaloi 9 runde t\u00eb sanksioneve kund\u00ebr Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, shumica e tyre t\u00eb propozuara nga ShBA-ja. M\u00eb 2012, Korea e Veriut dhe ShBA-ja arrit\u00ebn prap\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndaluar programet p\u00ebr arm\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore. N\u00eb k\u00ebmbim, amerikan\u00ebt do t\u00eb vazhdonin me ndihm\u00eb ekonomike p\u00ebr koreano-verior\u00ebt. Vet\u00ebm 6 jav\u00eb m\u00eb von\u00eb, Korea e Veriut e prishi marr\u00ebveshjen.<\/p>\n

Sanksionet e para t\u00eb vendosura n\u00eb vitin 2006, bllokuan furnizimin e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut me armatim t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00eb, teknologji raketore dhe t\u00eb mira tjera. Me kalimin e koh\u00ebs sanksionet u b\u00ebn\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnda. Nga viti 2017, sanksionet e OKB-s\u00eb i ndalonin Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut importin e ujit, metalit, produkteve t\u00eb agrikultur\u00ebs dhe k\u00ebrkonin deportimin e pun\u00ebtor\u00ebve koreano-verior\u00eb q\u00eb punonin n\u00eb shtete t\u00eb ndryshme t\u00eb bot\u00ebs. Megjith\u00ebse k\u00ebto sanksione ishin iniciativa t\u00eb administrat\u00ebs Trump, ishte roli i rritur i Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb k\u00ebto sanksione ai q\u00eb goditi m\u00eb s\u00eb r\u00ebndi ekonomin\u00eb e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb partneri m\u00eb i madh i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. M\u00eb shum\u00eb se 90% e totalit t\u00eb importeve t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut vjen nga Kina. Para vitit 2017, Kina edhe pse nuk kishte bllokuar me veto rezolutat p\u00ebr sanksionet kund\u00ebr Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, nuk kishte respektuar ato rezoluta dhe kishte vazhduar eksportin n\u00eb Kore t\u00eb Veriut. Relacionet e mira me Kin\u00ebn ishin infuzion p\u00ebr Koren\u00eb e Veriut t\u00eb ngujuar n\u00eb embargo. Megjithat\u00eb, q\u00eb nga viti 2017, Kina kishte zbatuar sanksionet. Kjo ndodhi edhe pse Kina ka qen\u00eb historikisht aleati m\u00eb i madh i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut.<\/p>\n

Raportet historike t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut me Kin\u00ebn<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pas grusht-shtetit t\u00eb suksessh\u00ebm t\u00eb 16 majit t\u00eb vitit 1961 n\u00eb Kore t\u00eb Jugut, lideri i ri i Kores\u00eb Jugut, Park Chung-Hee, rriti shpenzimet ushtarake dhe k\u00ebrc\u00ebnonte me luft\u00eb Koren\u00eb e Veriut. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb situat\u00eb, Korea e Veriut k\u00ebrkoi ndihm\u00eb nga Kina dhe po at\u00eb vit dy vendet n\u00ebnshkruan \u201cTraktatin p\u00ebr Ndihm\u00eb t\u00eb Nd\u00ebrsjell\u00eb dhe Bashk\u00ebpunim Miq\u00ebsor\u201d. Traktati forconte jo vet\u00ebm relacionet ekonomike, por edhe parashihte q\u00eb dy vendet t\u00eb mbronin nj\u00ebra-tjetr\u00ebn \u201cn\u00eb rast t\u00eb agresionit t\u00eb paprovokuar nga jasht\u00eb\u201d. Traktati \u00ebsht\u00eb ende n\u00eb fuqi dhe automatikisht p\u00ebrdit\u00ebsohet \u00e7do 20 vite, si\u00e7 ka ndodhur m\u00eb 1981 dhe 2001, dhe sikur q\u00eb pritet t\u00eb rip\u00ebrt\u00ebrihet n\u00eb vitin 2021. Mao, pas k\u00ebtij traktati, duke lirikizuar raportet mes dy vendeve, pati th\u00ebn\u00eb se \u201cKina dhe Korea e Veriut jan\u00eb t\u00eb bashkuara si buz\u00ebt dhe dh\u00ebmb\u00ebt\u201d.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb k\u00ebtyre dekadave Kina ka qen\u00eb e vetmja fuqi q\u00eb p\u00ebrkrahte Koren\u00eb e Veriut n\u00eb ambiciet e veta p\u00ebr arm\u00eb nukleare. Kina ka qen\u00eb huazuesi m\u00eb i madh financiar i saj, duke i huazuar fonde p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuar rrug\u00eb e hekurudha. Poashtu, Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb furnizuesi i saj kryesor me naft\u00eb dhe arm\u00eb. Kina gjithashtu ka trajnuar haker\u00ebt koreano-verior\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb forcuar Koren\u00eb e Veriut n\u00eb luft\u00ebn kibernetike. K\u00ebta haker\u00eb jan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim p\u00ebr komunitetin nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb vet\u00eb Kin\u00ebn. Kjo ushtri kibernetike kishte kryer sulme n\u00eb sistemet kompjuterike n\u00eb 17 shtete t\u00eb bot\u00ebs, si n\u00eb ShBA, Britani t\u00eb Madhe, Gjermani, Japoni, Turqi e Rusi, duke shkaktuar d\u00ebme q\u00eb kushtuan me miliarda dollar\u00eb. K\u00ebto sulme n\u00eb cak kishin server\u00ebt q\u00eb rregullojn\u00eb infrastruktur\u00ebn, spitalet, bankat, si dhe organizata t\u00eb ndryshme financiare n\u00eb k\u00ebto vende. N\u00eb k\u00ebmbim, Kina gjat\u00eb k\u00ebsaj kohe shfryt\u00ebzonte fuqin\u00eb e lir\u00eb pun\u00ebtore nga Korea e Veriut.<\/p>\n

Presioni i Kin\u00ebs<\/strong><\/p>\n

Por ngadal\u00eb Kina ia ktheu shpin\u00ebn \u201cmotr\u00ebs s\u00eb vog\u00ebl\u201d. Viteve t\u00eb fundit, Partia Komuniste Kineze ka qen\u00eb m\u00eb pak e interesuar n\u00eb shp\u00ebrndarjen e komunizmit n\u00ebp\u00ebr bot\u00eb dhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb n\u00eb konsolidimin e saj si fuqi globale n\u00eb ekonomi dhe politik\u00eb. Bashk\u00ebpunimi i ngusht\u00eb me Koren\u00eb e Veriut ishte shnd\u00ebrruar n\u00eb penges\u00eb p\u00ebr ta realizuar k\u00ebt\u00eb projekt. Kur n\u00eb shkurt t\u00eb vitit 2017 Korea e Veriut kreu nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr test b\u00ebrthamor, u kritikua ashp\u00ebr nga Kina. Ndryshimin e qasjes s\u00eb Kin\u00ebs e kishte ndihmuar edhe interesimi q\u00eb t\u00eb thelloj\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimin me SHBA-t\u00eb, sidomos p\u00ebr t\u00eb zbutur tensionet me administrat\u00ebn e Trumpit. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb mjedis, Kina tha q\u00eb \u201cdo t\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunonte me imperialist\u00ebt q\u00eb t\u2019i jepte fund kriz\u00ebs koreano-veriore\u201d. Korea e Veriut u kund\u00ebrp\u00ebrgjigj duke th\u00ebn\u00eb q\u00eb \u201cKina duhet t\u00eb ket\u00eb kujdes q\u00eb t\u00eb mos e rr\u00ebnoj\u00eb shtyll\u00ebn e miq\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb tyre\u201d, por Kina reagoi me k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim se \u201cmund t\u2019i jepte fund traktatit t\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimit mes dy vendeve\u201d.<\/p>\n

Sanksionet, sidomos ato t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, e kan\u00eb zhytur Koren\u00eb e Veriut n\u00eb nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb humanitare. 2 n\u00eb 5 koreano-verior\u00eb vuajn\u00eb nga ushqimi i pamjaftuesh\u00ebm. Situata alarmante e dob\u00ebsoi pozicionin negociues t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut dhe k\u00ebshtu u detyrua t\u00eb k\u00ebrkoj\u00eb zgjidhje p\u00ebr kriz\u00ebn ekonomike, duke n\u00ebnshkruar k\u00ebt\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje me Koren\u00eb e Jugut. Duke shfryt\u00ebzuar vakumin e krijuar mes Kin\u00ebs dhe Kores\u00eb, Rusia nd\u00ebrhyri si mb\u00ebshtet\u00ebse e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, duke furnizuar k\u00ebt\u00eb t\u00eb fundit me vaj p\u00ebr avion\u00eb, gj\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebn Kina e kishte b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb her\u00ebt. Por p\u00ebrpjekjet e Rusis\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar raporte solide diplomatike me Koren\u00eb e Veriut mor\u00ebn fund kur kjo e fundit kreu nj\u00eb test militar n\u00eb af\u00ebrsi t\u00eb kufirit rus.<\/p>\n

Sa u p\u00ebrket arsyeve ushtarako-politike t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb ushtruar trysni mbi Koren\u00eb e Veriut n\u00eb krye t\u00eb tyre \u00ebsht\u00eb efekti regjional dhe global i arm\u00ebve nukleare t\u00eb cilat i posedon Korea e Veriut. Korea e Veriut qysh tash ka kapacitet q\u00eb t\u00eb godas\u00eb me arm\u00eb nukleare Japonin\u00eb e Koren\u00eb e Jugut. Kjo i ka shtyr\u00eb k\u00ebto t\u00eb fundit q\u00eb t\u00eb intensifikojn\u00eb programet e militarizimit t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00eb, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb at\u00eb nuklear, q\u00eb t\u00eb jen\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb mbrohen nga ndonj\u00eb sulm eventual koreano-verior. Kjo gar\u00eb e armatimit do t\u2019i forconte ushtarakisht rival\u00ebt e Kin\u00ebs, di\u00e7ka jo shum\u00eb e d\u00ebshirueshme n\u00eb Pekin. Gjithashtu, Korea e Veriut tashm\u00eb ka zhvilluar arm\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore q\u00eb mund t\u00eb mb\u00ebrrijn\u00eb edhe bregun lindor t\u00eb ShBA-s\u00eb dhe ve\u00e7se \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb fuqi e plot\u00eb nukleare. Rreziku i Kores\u00eb Veriore n\u00ebnkupton m\u00eb shum\u00eb prani agresive amerikane n\u00eb regjion, kurse Kina nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e interesuar q\u00eb t\u00eb ket\u00eb ushtrin\u00eb amerikane af\u00ebr kufirit t\u00eb vet dhe k\u00ebrkon t\u00eb evitohet konflikti.<\/p>\n

Megjith\u00ebse Kina e ka p\u00ebrkrahur Koren\u00eb e Veriut n\u00eb programin e saj b\u00ebrthamor p\u00ebr t\u00eb kund\u00ebrbalancuar ndikimin amerikan n\u00eb regjion, ajo nuk mund t\u00eb rrezikoj\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb lejoj\u00eb nj\u00eb Kore t\u00eb Veriut shum\u00eb t\u00eb rrezikshme. P\u00ebrve\u00e7 arsyeve ushtarake, arsyet ekonomike jan\u00eb poashtu t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar presionin e Kin\u00ebs mbi Koren\u00eb e Veriut. Eskalimi i situat\u00ebs nuk u sh\u00ebrben p\u00ebrpjekjeve t\u00eb saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb rritur edhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb fuqin\u00eb e saj globale. Efektet e luft\u00ebs do t\u00eb ndjeheshin shum\u00eb n\u00eb Kin\u00eb, q\u00eb ka nj\u00eb rrjet t\u00eb madh tregtar n\u00eb at\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb bot\u00ebs. Gary Haufbauer, ekspert ekonomik, mendon se \u00e7far\u00ebdo lloj lufte n\u00eb at\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb bot\u00ebs do t\u00eb prodhoj\u00eb pasoja afatgjate ekonomike. Ai thot\u00eb se shum\u00eb kompani do t\u00eb largoheshin nga ai regjion dhe disa prej tyre do t\u00eb synonin Meksik\u00ebn, q\u00eb t\u00eb transportonin m\u00eb leht\u00eb produktet n\u00eb ShBA. Sipas tij, shum\u00eb korporata n\u00eb situata t\u00eb tilla nuk zgjedhin rrug\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb lir\u00eb, por m\u00eb t\u00eb sigurt\u00ebn. Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe partneri m\u00eb i madh ekonomik i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Jugut dhe nuk mund t\u00eb rrezikoj\u00eb t\u00eb prish\u00eb k\u00ebto marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie. Refugjat\u00ebt koreano-verior\u00eb q\u00eb ve\u00e7 jan\u00eb problem p\u00ebr Kin\u00ebn do t\u00eb shum\u00ebfishoheshin dhe ky \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr shkas pse Kina nuk d\u00ebshiron kaos.<\/p>\n

Kin\u00ebs nuk do t\u2019i konvenonte nj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb mes Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut dhe ShBA-s\u00eb, por as nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb lev\u00ebrdin\u00eb e saj nj\u00eb Kore e Veriut q\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnon gjith\u00eb regjionin me luft\u00eb. K\u00ebsisoj, Kina nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e interesuar q\u00eb ta zgjidh\u00eb plot\u00ebsisht problemin, por as nuk mund t\u00eb lejoj\u00eb eskalimin n\u00eb luft\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Trump<\/strong><\/p>\n

Duke par\u00eb mosgatishm\u00ebrin\u00eb e Kin\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur Koren\u00eb e Veriut, Trump ashp\u00ebrsoi ligj\u00ebrimin e tij me Koren\u00eb e Veriut. Ai e dinte q\u00eb kjo e fundit, duke mos pasur aleat\u00eb, nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb shtyhet me ShBA-t\u00eb, dhe n\u00eb fund do t\u00eb heqte dor\u00eb nga programet nukleare. Roli i Trump ka qen\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm q\u00eb nga koha q\u00eb kishte marr\u00eb drejtimin e ShBA-s\u00eb. Derisa n\u00eb fushat\u00eb zgjedhore Trump premtonte se do t\u00eb prishte marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Kin\u00ebn, gatishm\u00ebria e tij p\u00ebr t\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunuar me k\u00ebt\u00eb t\u00eb fundit pasi mori mandatin e Presidentit ndikoi q\u00eb Kina t\u00eb ushtroj\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb presion mbi Koren\u00eb e Veriut. Ardhja e Trump n\u00eb krye t\u00eb shtetit amerikan alarmoi bot\u00ebn dhe fillimisht krijoi p\u00ebrshtypjen q\u00eb nga ai moment e tutje bota do t\u00eb hynte n\u00eb spiralen e destabilizimit. Trump premtonte q\u00eb do t\u00eb t\u00ebrhiqej nga NATO-ja, se do t\u00eb anulonte aleanc\u00ebn politiko-ushtarake me Japonin\u00eb, se do t\u00eb anulonte Marr\u00ebveshjen Nukleare me Iranin dhe se do t\u00eb sulmonte Koren\u00eb e Veriut. Asnj\u00ebra nga k\u00ebto nuk ndodhi. N\u00eb mas\u00eb t\u00eb konsiderueshme Trump vazhdoi linj\u00ebn q\u00eb ShBA-ja kishte ndjekur para ardhjes s\u00eb tij n\u00eb pushtet.<\/p>\n

Arsye p\u00ebr t\u00eb qen\u00eb skeptik\u00eb<\/strong><\/p>\n

K\u00ebt\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje duhet ta marrim me rezerva. Korea e Veriut kishte n\u00ebnshkruar disa marr\u00ebveshje p\u00ebr denuklearizim edhe m\u00eb her\u00ebt, por nuk i kishte respektuar. Tani ekziston frika se ajo mund t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn. Skeptik\u00ebt me t\u00eb drejt\u00eb dyshojn\u00eb se Korea e Veriut e ka b\u00ebr\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje vet\u00ebm sa p\u00ebr t\u00eb hequr sanksionet. Interesi i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut p\u00ebr t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruar k\u00ebt\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb i natyr\u00ebs ekonomike dhe m\u00eb pak rezultat i nj\u00eb transformimi vleror autentik n\u00eb drejtim t\u00eb kultivimit t\u00eb paqes dhe vlerave liberale. Pasi ka nd\u00ebrtuar nj\u00eb shtet solid ushtarak, Kim Jong tash \u00ebsht\u00eb i interesuar q\u00eb t\u00eb tejkaloj\u00eb kriz\u00ebn ekonomike q\u00eb t\u00eb leht\u00ebsoj\u00eb barr\u00ebn e qytetar\u00ebve t\u00eb vet. Sanksionet e para nuk e ndal\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb zhvilluar kapacitetet b\u00ebrthamore, por ato t\u00eb m\u00ebvonshmet e gjymtuan makin\u00ebn ekonomike t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. Gjendja ekonomike n\u00eb Kore t\u00eb Veriut \u00ebsht\u00eb aq e r\u00ebnd\u00eb sa as nuk mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrdor\u00eb kompjuter\u00ebt jasht\u00eb nd\u00ebrtesave t\u00eb Ministris\u00eb s\u00eb Jashtme p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb problemeve t\u00eb furnizimit me energji elektrike. Heqja e sanksioneve do t\u00eb shtendos\u00eb gjendjen ekonomike.<\/p>\n

Skepktik\u00ebt mendojn\u00eb se Korea e Veriut me k\u00ebt\u00eb akt e zbut\u00eb ShBA-n\u00eb dhe Koren\u00eb e Jugut, e n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn i ruan arm\u00ebt nukleare. Korea e Veriut qysh tash ka diku mes 10 dhe 20 arm\u00eb nukleare dhe ka mjaftuesh\u00ebm material p\u00ebr t\u00eb prodhuar 30 deri n\u00eb 60 koka b\u00ebrthamore. \u00cbsht\u00eb joreale t\u00eb pritet q\u00eb Korea e Veriut do t\u2019i dor\u00ebzoj\u00eb frytet e p\u00ebrpjekjeve shum\u00eb vje\u00e7are b\u00ebrthamore. Fakti q\u00eb deklarata nuk parasheh themelimin e ndonj\u00eb komisioni p\u00ebr verifikim t\u00eb procesit t\u00eb denukleraizimit forcon bindjet se Korea e Veriut nuk do t\u00eb dor\u00ebzoj\u00eb arsenalin nuklear. Arsyeja kryesore pse Marr\u00ebveshja Nukleare me Iranin funksionon \u00ebsht\u00eb ajo ka formuar nj\u00eb komision q\u00eb p\u00ebrcjell\u00eb dhe vler\u00ebson respektimin e saj. Zyrtar\u00ebt koreano-verior\u00eb nuk jan\u00eb t\u00eb bindur q\u00eb denuklearizimi e d\u00ebbon n\u00eb plotni rrezikun nga ndonj\u00eb sulm amerikan. Libia kishte hequr dor\u00eb nga programi b\u00ebrthamor, por pak koh\u00eb m\u00eb pas regjimi i Gadafit ishte p\u00ebrmbysur. Korea e Veriut ka frik\u00eb se nj\u00eb gj\u00eb e till\u00eb mund t\u00eb ngjaj\u00eb edhe n\u00eb vendin e tyre. Ata jan\u00eb t\u00eb bindur se doktrina e nd\u00ebrrimit t\u00eb regjimit \u00ebsht\u00eb ende paradigma kryesore e diplomacis\u00eb amerikane. K\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi i Trump p\u00ebr t\u00eb prishur marr\u00ebveshjen me Iranin \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr arsye p\u00ebr t\u00eb dyshuar q\u00eb Korea e Veriut do t\u00eb dor\u00ebzoj\u00eb arm\u00ebt e saj b\u00ebrthamore sepse betonon iden\u00eb se amerikan\u00ebt nuk respektojn\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjet.<\/p>\n

Sidoqoft\u00eb, nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje e till\u00eb s\u00eb paku p\u00ebr disa vite do t\u00eb qet\u00ebsoj\u00eb situat\u00ebn. Kritik\u00ebt mund t\u00eb ken\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00eb n\u00eb v\u00ebrejtjet e tyre, por kjo marr\u00ebveshje \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e mir\u00eb sesa nj\u00eb luft\u00eb shfaros\u00ebse. Marr\u00ebveshja nuk do t\u00eb ndikoj\u00eb as n\u00eb demokratizimin e brendsh\u00ebm t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. P\u00ebrmir\u00ebsimi i t\u00eb drejtave t\u00eb njeriut n\u00eb Kore t\u00eb Veriut, sado i drejt\u00eb, mbetet nj\u00eb synim shum\u00eb i larg\u00ebt. N\u00eb situata t\u00eb rrezikshme \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e arsyeshme q\u00eb Korea e Veriut t\u00eb trajtohet ashtu si \u00ebsht\u00eb, rrezik nuklear, sesa ashtu si\u00e7 ne do t\u00eb d\u00ebshironim t\u00eb ishte, nj\u00eb shtet demokratik e racional q\u00eb respekton ligjin nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar.<\/p>\n

Arsye p\u00ebr t\u00eb qen\u00eb optimist\u00eb<\/strong><\/p>\n

Joseph Nye, ekspert amerikan i diplomacis\u00eb, thot\u00eb q\u00eb ShBA-ja duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb e durueshme dhe t\u00eb shpresoj\u00eb se Korea e Veriut do t\u00eb ndryshohet nga brenda. Victor Cha, Drejtori p\u00ebr Marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie me Azin\u00eb n\u00eb Sht\u00ebpin\u00eb e Bardh\u00eb, thot\u00eb q\u00eb qytetar\u00ebt e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut ve\u00e7 kan\u00eb filluar t\u00eb distancohen nga regjimi i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. Ai i referohet nj\u00eb sondazhi t\u00eb fsheht\u00eb t\u00eb kryer nga Qendra p\u00ebr Studime Strategjike dhe Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare bashk\u00eb me disa OJQ q\u00eb operojn\u00eb af\u00ebr kufirit t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs me Koren\u00eb e Veriut. N\u00eb at\u00eb sondazh, 85% e respondent\u00ebve kan\u00eb deklaruar se m\u00eb shum\u00eb fitojn\u00eb nga tregjet joqeveritare sesa nga programet qeveritare. Sipas Cha, kjo tregon q\u00eb qytetar\u00ebt jan\u00eb duke u b\u00ebr\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb pak t\u00eb varur nga regjimi i Kim Jongut. Gjithashtu, sipas Reuters, m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 3 milion\u00eb koreano-verior\u00eb posedojn\u00eb telefona mobile dhe mund t\u00eb komunikojn\u00eb me nj\u00ebri-tjetrin. Cha thot\u00eb se k\u00ebto tregje dhe mjete t\u00eb komunikimit kan\u00eb krijuar baz\u00ebn p\u00ebr nd\u00ebrtimin e nj\u00eb shoq\u00ebrie civile. Sfida \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb mendohen m\u00ebnyra se si t\u00eb influencohet forcimi i k\u00ebtyre tregjeve n\u00eb Koren\u00eb e Veriut.<\/p>\n

N\u00ebse ShBA-ja e mposhti p\u00ebr tri dekada BS-n\u00eb, thot\u00eb Nye, nuk ka ndonj\u00eb arsye t\u00eb fort\u00eb q\u00eb nj\u00eb skenar i ngjash\u00ebm t\u00eb mos p\u00ebrs\u00ebritet edhe n\u00eb Koren\u00eb e Veriut. Duke qen\u00eb nj\u00ebri nga ideolog\u00ebt q\u00eb k\u00ebshilloi Presidentin Bill Clinton p\u00ebr t\u00eb meanxhuar problemin e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut p\u00ebrmes dialogut dhe ndihm\u00ebs ekonomike, ai \u00ebsht\u00eb kritik i shkoll\u00ebs neo-konservative q\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimin e forc\u00ebs e sheh si nj\u00eb nd\u00ebr opsionet e para t\u00eb politikb\u00ebrjes. Nye \u00ebsht\u00eb i mendimit se kompasi diplomatik i diplomacis\u00eb amerikane duhet t\u00eb orientohet n\u00eb strategji afatgjate. Ai thot\u00eb q\u00eb zgjidhjet radikale n\u00eb situatat e tilla vet\u00ebm mund t\u00eb prishin prospektet p\u00ebr zgjidhje afatgjate. Edhe pse \u00ebsht\u00eb her\u00ebt p\u00ebr t\u00eb pritur q\u00eb gj\u00ebrat t\u00eb ndryshojn\u00eb nga brenda, ajo mbetet zgjidhja e vetme e q\u00ebndrueshme afatgjat\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Van Jackson vler\u00ebson q\u00eb kjo nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb q\u00eb Korea e Veriut me arsenalin e vet nuklear duhet t\u00eb pranohet si e till\u00eb. M\u00eb shum\u00eb, kjo marr\u00ebveshje \u00ebsht\u00eb ruajtje e stabilitetit regjional dhe global, deri sa t\u00eb krijohen shtigje t\u00eb reja diplomatike. Por q\u00eb t\u00eb pamund\u00ebsohet konflikti, shton Jackson, ShBA-ja duhet t\u00eb braktis\u00eb metod\u00ebn e \u201cpresionit maksimal\u201d sepse pamund\u00ebsohen kushtet p\u00ebr dialog efektiv. Kjo metod\u00eb nuk ka qen\u00eb shum\u00eb e suksseshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb stopuar k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimet b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut. Nga viti 1994 deri n\u00eb vitin 2007, Korea e Veriut kreu 16 teste raketore dhe nj\u00eb test nuklear. Prej vitit 2008 deri n\u00eb vitin 2016, Korea e Veriut ka kryer 80 teste raketore dhe kat\u00ebr teste nukleare. N\u00eb muajt e par\u00eb q\u00eb kur Trump erdhi n\u00eb pushtet, Korea e Veriut ka kryer 23 teste raketore dhe 1 test b\u00ebrthamor.<\/p>\n

Mund t\u00eb thuhet se n\u00ebnshkrimi i marr\u00ebveshjes \u00ebsht\u00eb sukses i ashp\u00ebrsis\u00eb s\u00eb Trump, por pa rolin e Kin\u00ebs gj\u00ebrat do t\u00eb rridhnin m\u00eb ndryshe. Me mb\u00ebshtetjen potenciale t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, Korea e Veriut do t\u00eb ishte m\u00eb e trim\u00ebruar, m\u00eb e p\u00ebrgatitur dhe m\u00eb e ashp\u00ebr n\u00eb qasjen e saj. K\u00ebshtuq\u00eb kjo marr\u00ebveshje nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb direkt rezultat i ashp\u00ebrsis\u00eb s\u00eb Trumpit, por produkt i nj\u00eb procesi kompleks diplomatik. Megjith\u00ebse sipas t\u00eb gjitha gjasave nuk do t\u00eb sjell\u00eb denuklerazimin e Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, marr\u00ebveshja e s\u00eb premtes \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb hap pozitiv drejt konservimit t\u00eb m\u00ebtutjesh\u00ebm t\u00eb tensioneve. K\u00ebto marr\u00ebveshje ekonomike do t\u00eb jen\u00eb t\u00eb pamjaftueshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuar nj\u00eb ekonomi t\u00eb fort\u00eb dhe t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme n\u00eb Koren\u00eb e Veriut. Ky fakt i kombinuar me munges\u00ebn e legjitimitetit demokratik, ashtu si n\u00eb Bashkimin Sovjetik, mund t\u00eb \u00e7oj\u00eb Koren\u00eb e Veriut n\u00eb nj\u00eb transformim t\u00eb brendsh\u00ebm.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n

\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

T\u00eb premten q\u00eb lam\u00eb pas, Korea e Veriut dhe Korea Jugore adoptuan \u201cDeklarat\u00ebn e Panumnjomit p\u00ebr Paqe\u201d q\u00eb ndalon luft\u00ebn dhe q\u00eb premton \u201cnj\u00eb epok\u00eb t\u00eb re t\u00eb paqes\u201d dhe \u201cdenuklearizim t\u00eb plot\u00eb\u201d. Lideri Suprem i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, Kim Jong dhe Presidenti i Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Jugut, Moon Jae, shtr\u00ebnguan duart dhe u p\u00ebrqafuan n\u00eb […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":415,"featured_media":10512,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1899,1898,1521],"ppma_author":[778],"class_list":["post-4207","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-korea-e-jugut","tag-korea-e-veriut","tag-marreveshje"],"authors":[{"term_id":778,"user_id":415,"is_guest":0,"slug":"shkodran-ramadani","display_name":"Shkodran Ramadani","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/shkodran-e1729253403162.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/shkodran-e1729253403162.jpeg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Ramadani","first_name":"Shkodran","description":"Shkodran Ramadani \u00ebsht\u00eb hulumtues n\u00eb Institutin \u201cCompass\u201d n\u00eb Prishtin\u00eb. Ai ka p\u00ebrfunduar studimet Bachelor n\u00eb Shkenca Politike n\u00eb Universitetin e Evrop\u00ebs Juglindore n\u00eb Tetov\u00eb t\u00eb Maqedonis\u00eb dhe studimet Master n\u00eb Sociologji n\u00eb Universitetin e Prishtin\u00ebs. Shkodrani \u00ebsht\u00eb aktiv n\u00eb fush\u00ebn e hulumtimeve t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, drejt\u00ebsis\u00eb tranzicionale, marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, populizmit, sekularizmit, demokracis\u00eb konsociacionale dhe autonomis\u00eb."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4207","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/415"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4207"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4207\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10513,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4207\/revisions\/10513"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10512"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4207"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4207"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4207"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=4207"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}