{"id":4737,"date":"2021-03-02T14:19:58","date_gmt":"2021-03-02T12:19:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=4737"},"modified":"2025-01-20T14:30:21","modified_gmt":"2025-01-20T12:30:21","slug":"nato-duhet-te-perballet-koke-me-koke-me-kinen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/analize\/nato-duhet-te-perballet-koke-me-koke-me-kinen\/","title":{"rendered":"NATO duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrballet kok\u00eb m\u00eb kok\u00eb me Kin\u00ebn"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
\n
\n

Aleanca per\u00ebndimore \u00ebsht\u00eb e pap\u00ebrgatitur p\u00ebr sfid\u00ebn gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe dhe t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb q\u00eb paraqet Kina.<\/em><\/p>\n

Udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit e 30 vendeve t\u00eb NATO-s do t\u00eb mblidhen k\u00ebt\u00eb pranver\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb samit jo t\u00eb zakont\u00eb. Sekretari i p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i aleanc\u00ebs Jens Stoltenberg ka vendosur t\u00eb ardhmen e NATO-s n\u00eb agjend\u00eb. Ky do t\u00eb jet\u00eb samiti i par\u00eb nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar i k\u00ebtyre p\u00ebrmasave p\u00ebr presidentin amerikan Joe Biden, i cili ka th\u00ebn\u00eb se p\u00ebrforcimin e aleancave e ka prioritet t\u00eb politik\u00ebs s\u00eb tij t\u00eb jashtme. Vendimet e marra n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb takim do t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktojn\u00eb planet dhe prioritetet e NATO-s p\u00ebr nj\u00eb koh\u00eb t\u00eb gjat\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Prandaj \u00ebsht\u00eb jetike q\u00eb samiti t\u00eb adresoj\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt tem\u00ebn kryesore dhe me implikimet m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha gjeopolitike p\u00ebr dhjet\u00ebvje\u00e7arin e ardhsh\u00ebm: Kin\u00ebn. I inkurajuar nga Uashingtoni dhe kryeqendrat tjera, Stoltenberg tashm\u00eb ka shtyer aleanc\u00ebn q\u00eb t\u00eb merret m\u00eb seriozisht me k\u00ebt\u00eb sfid\u00eb. Problemi \u00ebsht\u00eb se disa aleat\u00eb nuk e shohin Kin\u00ebn si \u00e7\u00ebshtje t\u00eb NATO-s, nd\u00ebrsa t\u00eb tjer\u00ebt kan\u00eb frik\u00eb se vendosja e saj n\u00eb agjend\u00ebn e aleanc\u00ebs do t\u00eb armiq\u00ebsoj\u00eb nj\u00eb partner t\u00eb fuqish\u00ebm tregtar.<\/p>\n

T\u00eb dy brengat jan\u00eb pa vend. Vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr shkak se Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb fuqi aziatike, nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se aktivitetet e saj shtrihen jasht\u00eb sfer\u00ebs s\u00eb aleanc\u00ebs per\u00ebndimore. \u00cbsht\u00eb e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb se garancia e nidhm\u00ebs s\u00eb nd\u00ebrsjell\u00eb n\u00eb rast t\u00eb sulmit ushtarak, e shprehur n\u00eb nenin 5 t\u00eb NATO-s, vlen p\u00ebr hap\u00ebsir\u00ebn euro-atlantike q\u00eb shtrihet n\u00eb veri t\u00eb Tropikut t\u00eb Kancerit. Por, Kina tashm\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb aktive n\u00eb po k\u00ebt\u00eb zon\u00eb gjeografike, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyra q\u00eb ndikojn\u00eb thell\u00ebsisht n\u00eb sigurin\u00eb e aleanc\u00ebs. Kontrolli gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb i madh i nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme t\u00eb infrastruktur\u00ebs europiane nga Kina \u2013 q\u00eb prej rrjet\u00ebve t\u00eb telekomunikimit deri te portet \u2013 ndikon drejtp\u00ebrdrejt n\u00eb gatishm\u00ebrin\u00eb, nd\u00ebrveprimin dhe komunkimin e sigurt t\u00eb NATO-s.<\/p>\n

Prania e Kin\u00ebs nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm komerciale. P\u00ebrmes strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb p\u00ebrzier ushtarako-civile\u00a0 – e cila synon t\u00eb mbreh\u00eb sistematikisht teknologjin\u00eb p\u00ebr q\u00ebllime ushtarake \u2013 Pekini po nxjerr teknologji t\u00eb sektorit privat dhe talent prej shteteve an\u00ebtare t\u00eb NATO-s p\u00ebr shfryt\u00ebzim nga Ushtria \u00c7lirimtare e Popullit t\u00eb\u00a0Kin\u00ebs. Anijet dhe aeoroplan\u00ebt ushtarak kinez\u00eb jan\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb aktiv n\u00eb Mesdheun lindor, Atlantikun verior, dhe Oqeanin Arktik. N\u00eb t\u00eb njejt\u00ebn koh\u00eb, Kina po zhvillon fushata agresive dhe t\u00eb sofistikuara t\u00eb informacionit p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndikuar mbi popullatat dhe opinionb\u00ebr\u00ebsit e an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb NATO-s \u2013 p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebr\u00e7ar\u00eb aleanc\u00ebn nga brenda.<\/p>\n

N\u00ebse ndokush mendon se mosv\u00ebmendja ndaj k\u00ebtyre dhe t\u00eb tjerave dimensione t\u00eb siguris\u00eb t\u00eb aktivitetit kinez do ta b\u00ebj\u00eb shoq\u00ebrin\u00eb e tyre m\u00eb t\u00eb sigurt e m\u00eb t\u00eb past\u00ebr, e kan\u00eb gabim. Si\u00e7 tregon sjellja kineze ndaj nj\u00eb numri n\u00eb rritje t\u00eb vendeve n\u00eb Europ\u00eb dhe m\u00eb tej, strategjia e parap\u00eblqyer e Pekinit p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjeruar ndikimin global \u00ebsht\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrdor pushtet dhe pasuri t\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonshme kundrejt shteteve m\u00eb t\u00eb vogla e m\u00eb t\u00eb izoluara. Sa m\u00eb e madhe asimetria e pushtetit, aq m\u00eb mir\u00eb p\u00ebr Pekinin. Prandaj, sa ma \u00eb shum\u00eb q\u00eb shtetet per\u00ebndimore t\u00eb p\u00ebrparojn\u00eb s\u00eb bashku interesat e tyre, aq m\u00eb mir\u00eb do t\u00eb jen\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrgatitur p\u00ebr t\u00eb prishur ekulibrin e asaj asimetrie.<\/p>\n

Hap\u00ebsira q\u00eb NATO t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb n\u00eb raport me Kin\u00ebn \u00ebsht\u00eb e konsiderueshme \u2013 dhe e pazhvilluar. Ndon\u00ebse Kina paraqitet gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb n\u00eb proceset e brendshme dhe komisionet e NATO-s, mund t\u00eb duket e papritur q\u00eb p\u00ebr momentin nuk ka strategji p\u00ebr Kin\u00ebn, nuk ka grup t\u00eb rregullt pune apo ndonj\u00eb trup tjet\u00ebr p\u00ebrbrenda aleanc\u00ebs, q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb i p\u00ebrqendruar n\u00eb Kin\u00ebn, dhe nuk ka mekaniz\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur aleat\u00ebt kundrejt programit t\u00eb p\u00ebrzier ushtrako-civil t\u00eb Pekinit, apo sfidave t\u00eb tjera kineze ndaj siguris\u00eb s\u00eb NATO-s.<\/p>\n

Pik\u00ebrisht p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb arsye, nj\u00eb grup ekspert\u00ebsh i mbledhur nga Stoltenberg-u p\u00ebr t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb rishikim strategjik p\u00ebr aleanc\u00ebn, e vuri Kin\u00ebn n\u00eb ball\u00eb t\u00eb rekomandimeve t\u00eb tyre.\u00a0N\u00eb raportin e tyre final<\/a>\u00a0vitin e kaluar, grupi (n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin b\u00ebm\u00eb pjes\u00eb edhe ne) shkruan: \u201cNATO duhet t\u2019i p\u00ebrkushtoj\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb koh\u00eb, resurse politike dhe vepra, sfidave t\u00eb siguris\u00eb q\u00eb paraqet Kina \u2013 bazuar n\u00eb vler\u00ebsimin e aft\u00ebsive, pesh\u00ebs ekonomike, dhe q\u00ebllimeve ideologjike t\u00eb udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsve t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs.\u201d<\/p>\n

Q\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebhet m\u00eb serioze karshi Kin\u00ebs dhe t\u00eb p\u00ebrshtatet ndaj shum\u00eb ndryshimeve gjeopolitike q\u00eb kan\u00eb ngjar\u00eb n\u00eb dhjet\u00ebvje\u00e7arin e fundit, NATO duhet q\u00eb urgjentisht t\u00eb plot\u00ebsoj\u00eb Konceptin Strategjik t\u00eb vitit 2010. Versioni i tanish\u00ebm i atij dokumenti, i cili p\u00ebrcakton q\u00ebllimet dhe prioritetet e aleanc\u00ebs, pasqyron nj\u00eb bot\u00eb para gar\u00ebs s\u00eb fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha. Madje fare nuk e p\u00ebrmend Kin\u00ebn. Ato prioritete jan\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00eb aleance q\u00eb supozon me siguri t\u00eb plot\u00eb se nuk ka garues serioz. Edhe pse NATO ka b\u00ebr\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb plot\u00ebsuar vetveten q\u00eb prej daljes s\u00eb atij dokumenti \u2013 posa\u00e7\u00ebrisht duke p\u00ebrforcuar aft\u00ebsit\u00eb mbrojt\u00ebse dhe parandaluese ndaj Rusis\u00eb pas sulmit t\u00eb saj n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb m\u00eb 2014 \u2013 ende i mungon nj\u00eb plan gjith\u00ebp\u00ebrfshir\u00ebs q\u00eb pasqyron realitetin gjeopolitik.<\/p>\n

Bashk\u00ebrisht me plot\u00ebsimin e konceptit t\u00eb saj strategjik, NATO duhet t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb hapa konkret\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb adresuar sfid\u00ebn e Kin\u00ebs. Raporti yn\u00eb rekomandon themelimin e nj\u00eb trupi k\u00ebshillues, i modeluar sipas Komisionin Koordinues p\u00ebr Kontrollet Shum\u00ebpal\u00ebshe t\u00eb Eksportit, i cili mbyk\u00ebqyrte kufizimet n\u00eb transferin teknologjis\u00eb p\u00ebr n\u00eb Bashkimin Sovjetik gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb \u2013 dhe gjithashtu p\u00ebrfshirjen e K\u00ebshillit t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs sipas nevoj\u00ebs. Kjo do t\u00eb krijonte m\u00eb n\u00eb fund nj\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrkushtuar institucionale p\u00ebr aleat\u00ebt q\u00eb t\u00eb diskutoj\u00eb me Kin\u00ebn dhe t\u00eb koordinoj\u00eb politikat.<\/p>\n

Mbase m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishmja nga k\u00ebto \u00ebsht\u00eb se NATO-s i duhet nj\u00eb strategji gjith\u00ebp\u00ebrfshir\u00ebse p\u00ebr Kin\u00ebn q\u00eb p\u00ebrcakton m\u00ebnyrat se si p.sh. do t\u00eb monitoroj\u00eb dhe mbroj\u00eb aleanc\u00ebn nga aktivitetet kineze q\u00eb ndikojn\u00eb negativisht n\u00eb gatishm\u00ebrin\u00eb dhe qendrueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e NATO-s n\u00eb rajonin euro-atlantik. Gjithashtu, kjo do t\u00eb identifikonte dob\u00ebsit\u00eb e sektor\u00ebve ky\u00e7 dhe zinxhir\u00ebve t\u00eb furnizimit, dhe do t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshinte masa p\u00ebr t\u00eb ruajtur kohezionin e NATO-s kundrejt ndikimit kinez p\u00ebrmes Nism\u00ebs Rrip dhe Rrug\u00eb (BRI).<\/p>\n

NATO duhet t\u00eb poashtu luaj\u00eb rol p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar q\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebt jan\u00eb n\u00eb p\u00ebrpar\u00ebsi sa i p\u00ebrket teknologjive t\u00eb reja, q\u00eb do t\u00eb nevojiten n\u00eb vitet n\u00eb vazhdim, p\u00ebr t\u00eb ruajtur avantazhet ushtarake dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur privacin\u00eb e qytetar\u00ebve t\u00eb tyre. Kjo duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshij\u00eb mekanizma m\u00eb t\u00eb mir\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb shmangur konflikitin me rregullimet e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian, kur b\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb. Aleanca duhet gjithashtu t\u00eb themeloj\u00eb versionin e saj t\u00eb Agjencis\u00eb amerikane t\u00eb Projekteve t\u00eb K\u00ebrkimit t\u00eb Avancuar t\u00eb Mbrotjtjes, p\u00ebr t\u00eb nxitur dhe financuar k\u00ebrkimet dhe zhvillimin e kapaciteteve mbrojt\u00ebse t\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb saj.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb fund fare, NATO mund t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrforcuar partneritetet n\u00eb rajonin e indo-paq\u00ebsorit. Kjo mund t\u00eb b\u00ebhet duke thelluar bashk\u00ebpunimin p\u00ebrmes formatit ekzistues NATO+4 \u2013 ku nata angazhohet me Australin\u00eb, Japonin\u00eb, Zeland\u00ebn e Re dhe Koren\u00eb e Jugut \u2013 ose p\u00ebrmes angazhimit t\u00eb NATO-s me Dialog\u00ebn Kat\u00ebrpal\u00ebsh t\u00eb Siguris\u00eb, e cila p\u00ebrfshin Australin\u00eb, Indin\u00eb, Japonin dhe Shtetet e Bashkuara. K\u00ebtu duhet t\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rregullisht dialog, shk\u00ebmbim informatash, dhe bashk\u00ebpunim teknologjik. P\u00ebrve\u00e7 k\u00ebtyre formateve, NATO duhet t\u00eb zgjeroj\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt ofert\u00ebn p\u00ebr partneritet formal me Indin\u00eb.<\/p>\n

A \u00ebsht\u00eb jorealiste t\u00eb mendohet se NATO do t\u00eb veproj\u00eb ndaj sfid\u00ebs q\u00eb paraqet Kina? Nuk besojm\u00eb ashtu. Disa v\u00ebzhgues pretendojn\u00eb se Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe Europa jan\u00eb n\u00eb rrug\u00eb t\u00eb ndara kur vjen puna te Kina, por t\u00eb dy an\u00ebt e Atlantikut kan\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb interesa dhe vlera pa\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta n\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtjet themelore t\u00eb siguris\u00eb komb\u00ebtare, se sa ka secila ve\u00e7 e ve\u00e7 me Partin\u00eb Komuniste t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs. Mbase kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb arsye pse shumica d\u00ebrrmuese e qeverive t\u00eb 30 vendeve an\u00ebtare t\u00eb NATO-s t\u00eb cilat u k\u00ebshilluan me grupin ton\u00eb, i vler\u00ebsuan m\u00eb s\u00eb larti sfidat e siguris\u00eb q\u00eb vijn\u00eb nga Kina.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb adresimin e sfidave q\u00eb vijn\u00eb nga Kina, NATO gjen nj\u00eb argument bind\u00ebs, mandat organizativ, dhe plot rekomandime t\u00eb veprueshme. N\u00ebn udh\u00ebheqjen e Stoltenberg-ut, aleanca ka nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb hapat e par\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm n\u00eb ballafaqimin e k\u00ebsaj sfide, k\u00ebshtu q\u00eb d\u00ebshtimi p\u00ebr t\u00eb vepruar tash, do t\u00eb ishte hap prapa. T\u00eb veprohet n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb drejtim k\u00ebrkon lidership politik n\u00eb rangjet m\u00eb t\u00eb larta. Koha p\u00ebr t\u00eb vepruar \u00ebsht\u00eb tash.<\/p>\n

Autor\u00ebt jan\u00eb bashk\u00ebkryesues t\u00eb Grupit t\u00eb Reflektimit NATO 2030<\/em><\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

Artikulli origjinal n\u00eb\u00a0Foreign Policy<\/a>, m\u00eb 23 shkurt 2021.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Ky artikull\u00a0mb\u00ebshtetet nga “Sbunker” p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit\u00a0dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Aleanca per\u00ebndimore \u00ebsht\u00eb e pap\u00ebrgatitur p\u00ebr sfid\u00ebn gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe dhe t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb q\u00eb paraqet Kina. Udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit e 30 vendeve t\u00eb NATO-s do t\u00eb mblidhen k\u00ebt\u00eb pranver\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb samit jo t\u00eb zakont\u00eb. Sekretari i p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i aleanc\u00ebs Jens Stoltenberg ka vendosur t\u00eb ardhmen e NATO-s n\u00eb agjend\u00eb. Ky do t\u00eb jet\u00eb samiti […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":642,"featured_media":12314,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1240,637],"ppma_author":[2431,2430],"class_list":["post-4737","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-kina","tag-nato"],"authors":[{"term_id":2431,"user_id":642,"is_guest":0,"slug":"uess-micel","display_name":"A. Wess Mitchell","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/A-Wess-Mitchell.png","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/A-Wess-Mitchell.png"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Mitchell","first_name":"A. Wess","description":"Aaron Wess Mitchell \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb ekspert amerikan i politik\u00ebs s\u00eb jashtme dhe ish-diplomat i cili ishte Ndihm\u00ebs Sekretari i Shtetit p\u00ebr \u00c7\u00ebshtjet Evropiane dhe Euroaziatike nga tetori 2017 deri n\u00eb shkurt 2019."},{"term_id":2430,"user_id":641,"is_guest":0,"slug":"thomas-maiziere","display_name":"Thomas de Maizi\u00e8re","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/2017-09-24_Thomas_de_Maiziere_by_Sandro_Halank\u20131.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/2017-09-24_Thomas_de_Maiziere_by_Sandro_Halank\u20131.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"de Maizi\u00e8re","first_name":"Thomas","description":"Karl Ernst Thomas de Maizi\u00e8re is a German politician of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) who served as Federal Minister of the Interior from 2009."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4737","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/642"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4737"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4737\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12316,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4737\/revisions\/12316"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12314"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4737"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4737"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4737"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=4737"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}