{"id":4828,"date":"2021-01-03T11:55:49","date_gmt":"2021-01-03T09:55:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=4828"},"modified":"2024-11-06T12:22:36","modified_gmt":"2024-11-06T10:22:36","slug":"vendimet-e-gjykates-kushtetuese-qe-formesuan-sistemin-politik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/analize\/vendimet-e-gjykates-kushtetuese-qe-formesuan-sistemin-politik\/","title":{"rendered":"Vendimet e Gjykat\u00ebs Kushtetuese q\u00eb form\u00ebsuan sistemin politik"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"news-left\">\n<p>Aktgjykimi i Gjykat\u00ebs Kushtetuese (i 28 majit 2020) mbi dekretin e Presidentit q\u00eb e mandaton t\u00eb propozuarin e LDK-s\u00eb p\u00ebr krijimin e nj\u00eb qeverie t\u00eb re pas mocionit t\u00eb mosbesimit dhe vendimi (i 21 dhjetorit 2020) mbi kushtetutshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e zgjedhjes s\u00eb qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb koalicionit LDK-AAK-Srpska-NISMA\/AKR jan\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsis\u00eb p\u00ebr form\u00ebsimin e sistemit politik dhe forcimin institucional n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb. K\u00ebto vendime e forcojn\u00eb presidencializmin, si dhe konsociacionalizmin etnik dhe fuqin\u00eb e partive t\u00eb vogla. N\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn koh\u00eb ato e forcojn\u00eb pushtetin e partive politike n\u00eb d\u00ebm t\u00eb vet\u00eb Kuvendit.<\/p>\n<p><strong>P\u00ebrbirimet institucionale<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Fillimisht t\u00eb shohim risit\u00eb e vendimit mbi zgjedhjen e qeveris\u00eb, pastaj do t\u00eb kthehemi te vendimi i par\u00eb mbi dekretin e Presidentit. Zgjedhja e qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb koalicionit LDK-AAK-Srpska-NISMA\/AKR dhe debati publik e ligjor mbi t\u00eb i shp\u00ebrfaqi shum\u00eb mang\u00ebsi n\u00eb funksionimin e institucioneve t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs. Nj\u00eb person i d\u00ebnuar p\u00ebr vep\u00ebr penale kishte arritur t\u00eb p\u00ebrbirohet n\u00ebp\u00ebr ligjet e institucionet e vendit p\u00ebr t\u00eb marr\u00eb pjes\u00eb n\u00eb zgjedhje, p\u00ebr t\u2019u zgjedhur e konfirmuar deputet si dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb marr\u00eb pjes\u00eb n\u00eb votimin e qeveris\u00eb dhe n\u00eb pun\u00ebt e komisioneve t\u00eb Kuvendit. Kjo flet p\u00ebr l\u00ebshime nga disa institucione si\u00e7 jan\u00eb KQZ e Kuvendi por edhe Gjykatat. Prandaj \u00ebsht\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm neni 16 i vendimit t\u00eb Kushtetueses q\u00eb thot\u00eb se \u201cGjykata potencon nevoj\u00ebn q\u00eb Kuvendi i Republik\u00ebs s\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs me komisionet e tij, n\u00eb bashk\u00ebveprim me institucionet gjegj\u00ebse, duke p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb edhe KGJK-n\u00eb dhe KQZ-n\u00eb, t\u00eb qart\u00ebsojn\u00eb dhe konsolidojn\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimin nd\u00ebrinstitucional dhe aspektet normative q\u00eb kan\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb me kandidimin n\u00eb zgjedhje parlamentare dhe ushtrimin e mandatit t\u00eb deputetit, nga ana e personave t\u00eb d\u00ebnuar p\u00ebr vepra penale.\u201d Ky nen mund t\u00eb rezultoj\u00eb n\u00eb forcimin e bashk\u00ebpunimit nd\u00ebrinstitucional dhe efektivitetin e institucioneve t\u00eb shtetit. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb me r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi sepse institucionet e shtetit zakonisht funksionojn\u00eb si ishuj t\u00eb ndar\u00eb nga nj\u00ebri-tjetri pa bashk\u00ebpunim mes vete. Nj\u00eb nga problemet kryesore q\u00eb kam hasur n\u00eb studimet e mia mbi institucionet e vendit \u00ebsht\u00eb se krer\u00ebt i shohin institucionet si feude t\u00eb tyre dhe kan\u00eb frik\u00eb se nd\u00ebrveprimi me institucione tjera e zvog\u00eblon pushtetin e tyre. Kjo praktik\u00eb feudaliste duhet t\u00eb eliminohet p\u00ebr t\u00eb forcuar funksionimin institucional shtet\u00ebror.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Nd\u00ebrrimet qeveritare<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Pyetja kryesore para Gjykat\u00ebs n\u00eb pranver\u00ebn e 2020-\u00ebs ishte \u00e7ka ndodh\u00eb pas mocionit t\u00eb mosbesimit, shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrja e Kuvendit dhe zgjedhjet, apo fillimi i procedurave p\u00ebr formimin e qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb re? Nj\u00eb dispozit\u00eb kushtetuese e cila kishte p\u00ebr q\u00ebllim t\u00eb tregonte ep\u00ebrsin\u00eb e parlamentit mbi presidentin, duke pasur parasysh q\u00eb Kosova \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb demokraci parlamentare, ka krijuar konfuzion dhe i ka lejuar Presidentit t\u00eb p\u00ebrdor\u00eb diskrecionin e tij. Ky \u00ebsht\u00eb neni 82.2 i cili thot\u00eb se Presidenti &#8220;mund&#8221; t\u00eb shp\u00ebrndaj\u00eb parlamentin pas nj\u00eb mocioni t\u00eb mosbesimit. Deklaratat e p\u00ebrpiluesve t\u00eb kushtetut\u00ebs dhe praktika e m\u00ebparshme (p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjtin President) sugjerojn\u00eb se kjo &#8220;mund&#8221; duhet t\u00eb interpretohet si dh\u00ebnie leje nga parlamenti Presidentit p\u00ebr ta shp\u00ebrndar\u00eb zyrtarisht at\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb mund t\u00eb zhvillohen zgjedhje t\u00eb reja. Sidoqoft\u00eb, Gjykata e interpretoi k\u00ebt\u00eb &#8220;mund&#8221; n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb kreative, ku presidentit i jepet diskrecion q\u00eb n\u00eb konsultim me partit\u00eb politike, p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbajtur zgjedhje t\u00eb reja ose t\u00eb filloj\u00eb procedur\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb formuar nj\u00eb qeveri t\u00eb re pa zgjedhje. N\u00ebse mocioni i mosbesimit ka m\u00eb pak se votat e dy t\u00eb tretat e deputet\u00ebve at\u00ebher\u00eb presidenti dhe partit\u00eb vendosin p\u00ebr qeveri t\u00eb re, kurse n\u00ebse mocioni ka votat e dy t\u00eb tretat e deputet\u00ebve presidenti me krer\u00ebt e partive mund t\u00eb vendos\u00eb se a shkohet n\u00eb zgjedhje a jo. Pra, p\u00ebr t\u2019u shp\u00ebrb\u00ebr\u00eb Kuvendi duhet t\u00eb thuhet n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb eksplicite n\u00eb k\u00ebrkes\u00ebn e mocionit, p\u00ebrndryshe vendosin Presidenti me krer\u00ebt e partive.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Afati i p\u00ebrcaktimit t\u00eb mandatarit nga partia e par\u00eb<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\u00c7\u00ebshtja dyt\u00ebsore \u00ebsht\u00eb afati i formimit t\u00eb qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb re sipas nenit 95. Aty flitet p\u00ebr krijimin e qeveris\u00eb pas zgjedhjeve, pas dor\u00ebheqjes s\u00eb kryeministrit, ose pas paaft\u00ebsimit t\u00eb tij p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer detyrat (p.sh. vdekjes, s\u00ebmundjes s\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00eb etj.), por jo pas mocionit t\u00eb mosbesimit. Pastaj, procedurat p\u00ebr t\u00eb formuar nj\u00eb qeveri t\u00eb re i japin hap\u00ebsir\u00eb politike subjektit t\u00eb par\u00eb, sepse Kushtetuta nuk cakton afat p\u00ebr ta paraqitur emrin e mandatarit. Pra dekreti i Presidentit e ka anashkaluar nenin 82 duke u thirr\u00eb n\u00eb nenin 95. Gjykata vendosi se kjo ka qen\u00eb n\u00eb rregull, duke i dh\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00eb Presidentit ta p\u00ebrcaktoj\u00eb afatin kohor t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigjes nga subjekti i par\u00eb dhe ta mandatoj\u00eb nj\u00eb kandidat p\u00ebr formimin e qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb re.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Forcimi i presidentit<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Ky aktgjykim ka pasoja t\u00eb m\u00ebdha p\u00ebr sistemin politik. S\u00eb pari, efektivisht sistemi politik shnd\u00ebrrohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem me presidencializ\u00ebm t\u00eb sforcuar, ku Presidenti do t\u00eb kishte fuqi p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuar se \u00e7ka ndodh\u00eb n\u00eb rast t\u00eb nj\u00eb mocioni mosbesimi, a shkohet n\u00eb zgjedhje apo formohet qeveri e re var\u00ebsisht nga numri i deputet\u00ebve q\u00eb e votojn\u00eb at\u00eb mocion. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, arsyetimi i dekretit duke u thirrur n\u00eb \u201cfunksionimin e institucioneve\u201d mund t\u00eb krijoj\u00eb precedent t\u00eb rreziksh\u00ebm, ku Presidenti merr fuqi p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuar se kur zbatohet nj\u00eb nen i Kushtetut\u00ebs e kur jo. Dhe me k\u00ebt\u00eb arsyetim mund t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb hapa q\u00eb nuk parashihen fare n\u00eb Kushtetut\u00eb, si n\u00eb rastin e p\u00ebrcaktimin t\u00eb koh\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigjes s\u00eb partis\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe p\u00ebr mandatar.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Faktorizimi i \u201ckryetar\u00ebve t\u00eb partive\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>S\u00eb dyti, m\u00ebnyra sesi \u00ebsht\u00eb mb\u00ebrritur te dekreti p\u00ebrmes bisedave me kryetar\u00ebt e partive politike \u00ebsht\u00eb problematike. Aktgjykimi, de facto i b\u00ebn kryetar\u00ebt e partive politike kategori kushtetuese q\u00eb mund ta imponojn\u00eb vullnetin mbi institucionet n\u00eb m\u00ebnyra jasht\u00ebkushtetuese. Pra mund t\u00eb kemi nj\u00eb situat\u00eb kur kreu i nj\u00eb partie, edhe n\u00ebse nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb fare i zgjedhur n\u00eb Kuvend nga qytetar\u00ebt, rekomandon rrug\u00eb veprimi n\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtim me shumic\u00ebn e deputet\u00ebve t\u00eb zgjedhur t\u00eb asaj partie. Ngjash\u00ebm krer\u00ebt e partive n\u00eb konsultim me Presidentin mund t\u00eb rekomandojn\u00eb rrug\u00eb veprimi q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtim me vullnetin e shumic\u00ebs s\u00eb deputet\u00ebve.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Dob\u00ebsimi i Kuvendit<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Efekti juridik dhe politik i k\u00ebtij aktgjykimi \u00ebsht\u00eb zvog\u00eblimi i pushtetit t\u00eb Kuvendit, institucionit m\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb t\u00eb zgjedhur nga populli, dhe forcimi i pushtetit t\u00eb Presidentit (q\u00eb zgjidhet nga Kuvendi) dhe t\u00eb forcave potencialisht jasht\u00ebkuvendare si krer\u00ebve t\u00eb partive politike. Ishte pik\u00ebrisht ky bashk\u00ebveprim i presidentit me partit\u00eb politike q\u00eb solli votimin e qeveris\u00eb me ngut pas mocionit t\u00eb mosbesimit e q\u00eb p\u00ebrfundimisht solli vendimin e dyt\u00eb t\u00eb Kushtetueses p\u00ebr ta shpallur k\u00ebt\u00eb votim antikushtetutes. Pasojat politike gjithashtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha dhe ky precedent \u00ebsht\u00eb shqet\u00ebsues p\u00ebr demokracin\u00eb e mang\u00ebt n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb. Kjo n\u00ebnkupton q\u00eb partit\u00eb e vogla p\u00ebrcaktuese (kingmaker) thjesht mund t\u00eb nd\u00ebrrojn\u00eb an\u00ebt pa pasoja dhe t\u00eb formojn\u00eb nj\u00eb qeveri me ofertuesin m\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb. Kjo mund t\u00eb ket\u00eb pasoja t\u00eb r\u00ebnda p\u00ebr demokracin\u00eb, por edhe p\u00ebr korrupsionin, pasi kjo sigurisht q\u00eb do t\u00eb rris\u00eb shpenzimet e kota, sepse partit\u00eb do t\u00eb p\u00ebrpiqen t\u00eb tejkalojn\u00eb nj\u00ebra-tjetr\u00ebn me ofertat e ministrive e portofolave t\u00eb rinj dhe formave t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb pushtetit politik si\u00e7 jan\u00eb em\u00ebrimet n\u00eb bordet e nd\u00ebrmarrjeve publike dhe universitetet publike p\u00ebr partin\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuese (kingmaker). Sistemi ekzistues i \u201cndarjes s\u00eb pla\u00e7k\u00ebs\u201d nga partit\u00eb politike, do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrhapet edhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb dhe shpresa e reform\u00ebs antikorrupsion zvog\u00eblohet.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Elefanti n\u00eb dhom\u00eb: konsociacionalizmi i sforcuar<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Ndoshta pasoja m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00eb e k\u00ebtij dekreti \u00ebsht\u00eb se do ta fuqizonte edhe m\u00eb tej sistemin problematik t\u00eb konsociacionalizmit, duke rritur ndikimin e Serbis\u00eb n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb. N\u00ebse partit\u00eb e vogla p\u00ebrcaktuese do t\u00eb ken\u00eb mund\u00ebsi t\u2019i nd\u00ebrrojn\u00eb qeverit\u00eb leht\u00eb duke nd\u00ebrruar tabor p\u00ebrmes mocioneve, kjo e fuqizon pozit\u00ebn e partive si Lista Srpska ose ajo gorane q\u00eb jan\u00eb lojale ndaj Beogradit zyrtar. P\u00ebrmes ul\u00ebseve t\u00eb garantuara partit\u00eb e pakicave etnike n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb, i kan\u00eb t\u00eb garantuara s\u00eb paku mbi 16% t\u00eb ul\u00ebseve n\u00eb Kuvend, edhe pse pakicat p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb rreth 8% t\u00eb popullsis\u00eb, pra kan\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsim t\u00eb dyfishuar. P\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb k\u00ebtij sistemi, tri nga pes\u00eb qeverit\u00eb e formuara pas pavar\u00ebsis\u00eb (duke p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb q\u00eb u rr\u00ebzua nga gjykata ku n\u00eb diskutim ishte pik\u00ebrisht vota e nj\u00eb deputetit q\u00eb mbante nj\u00eb vend t\u00eb garantuar) kan\u00eb qen\u00eb qeveri q\u00eb nuk kan\u00eb g\u00ebzuar shumic\u00ebn e vot\u00ebs popullore edhe pse kan\u00eb pas\u00eb shumic\u00ebn parlamentare. \u00cbsht\u00eb shum\u00eb e mundshme t\u00eb kemi nj\u00eb situat\u00eb me dy blloqe politike ku \u00ebsht\u00eb pik\u00ebrisht Lista Srpska ajo q\u00eb p\u00ebrcakton se cili bllok e formon qeverin\u00eb dhe t\u00eb ket\u00eb mund\u00ebsin\u00eb q\u00eb ta rr\u00ebzoj\u00eb qeverin\u00eb p\u00ebrmes mocionit n\u00ebse opozita i ofron di\u00e7ka m\u00eb shum\u00eb. Kjo gj\u00eb do ta rriste ndikimin e Serbis\u00eb n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb edhe m\u00eb tep\u00ebr dhe do ta mund ta ndryshonte vet\u00eb natyr\u00ebn e shtetin e ta mbante peng at\u00eb vazhdimisht. Kjo pra d\u00ebshmon se konsociacionalizmi i sforcuar si\u00e7 ekziston n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb, nuk duhet t\u00eb bashk\u00ebjetoj\u00eb me mocionet konstruktive t\u00eb mosbesimit, ku pas nj\u00eb mocioni nuk shkohet n\u00eb zgjedhje por thjesht formohet nj\u00eb qeveri e re sipas preferencave t\u00eb disa individ\u00ebve, potencialisht jasht\u00ebparlamentar\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Gjykimi i par\u00eb i Kushtetueses, duke p\u00ebrligjur tregtimet politike t\u00eb partive me presidentin, \u00e7oi te gjykimi i dyt\u00eb, i cili shp\u00ebrfaqi mang\u00ebsit\u00eb institucionale. Mbetet t\u00eb shpresojm\u00eb se gjykimi i dyt\u00eb do t\u00eb rezultoj\u00eb n\u00eb forcimin e bashk\u00ebpunimit nd\u00ebrinstitucional n\u00eb vend dhe efektivitetin e institucioneve n\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi. Kurse sa i p\u00ebrket gjykimit t\u00eb par\u00eb, pasojat e mundshme negative t\u00eb tij jan\u00eb t\u00eb shumta. Disa nga ato pasoja mund t\u2019i shohim edhe pas zgjedhjeve q\u00eb po vijn\u00eb n\u00eb 2021, n\u00ebse asnj\u00ebri bllok politik nuk e fiton nj\u00eb shumic\u00eb komode n\u00eb kuvend.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"news-right\">\n<div class=\"post\">\n<p class=\"author\">\n<\/div>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Aktgjykimi i Gjykat\u00ebs Kushtetuese (i 28 majit 2020) mbi dekretin e Presidentit q\u00eb e mandaton t\u00eb propozuarin e LDK-s\u00eb p\u00ebr krijimin e nj\u00eb qeverie t\u00eb re pas mocionit t\u00eb mosbesimit dhe vendimi (i 21 dhjetorit 2020) mbi kushtetutshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e zgjedhjes s\u00eb qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb koalicionit LDK-AAK-Srpska-NISMA\/AKR jan\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsis\u00eb p\u00ebr form\u00ebsimin e sistemit politik dhe forcimin [&hellip;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":9669,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1527,1270],"ppma_author":[29],"class_list":["post-4828","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-gjykata-kushtetuese","tag-sistemi-politik"],"authors":[{"term_id":29,"user_id":19,"is_guest":0,"slug":"seb-bytyci","display_name":"Seb Byty\u00e7i","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/1668771566235.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/1668771566235.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Byty\u00e7i","first_name":"Seb","description":"Dr. Seb Bytyci ka p\u00ebrvoj\u00eb udh\u00ebheq\u00ebse n\u00eb hulumtim shkencor dhe m\u00ebsimdh\u00ebnie p\u00ebr m\u00eb shum\u00eb se dy dekada, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb angazhime me University of London\/LSE, University of York, University of Winchester, William College, IPOL Institute, si dhe Police Federation of England and Wales. Ai ka qen\u00eb gjithashtu i p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb n\u00eb avokim praktik dhe ka bashk\u00ebpunuar me organizata nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare si OKB, UNDP dhe OSBE.\r\n\r\nSeb ka doktoratur\u00eb (PhD) nga University of York; nj\u00eb Master n\u00eb Administrat\u00eb Publike (MPA) n\u00eb Analiz\u00eb Politikash dhe \u00c7\u00ebshtje Krahasuese &amp; Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare nga Indiana University (Bloomington), si dhe nj\u00eb MES n\u00eb Integrim Evropian dhe Rajonaliz\u00ebm nga University of Graz\/EIPA\/EURAC.\r\n\r\nHulumtimi i tij i doktoratur\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb fokusuar n\u00eb institucionet n\u00eb vende n\u00eb tranzicion, nd\u00ebrsa fushat e tij t\u00eb interesit p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb nd\u00ebrtimin e institucioneve efektive dhe lidershipin, \u00e7\u00ebshtjet e BE-s\u00eb dhe marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, zgjidhjen e konflikteve, shtetin zhvillimor dhe proceset e transformimit shoq\u00ebror."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4828","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4828"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4828\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9670,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4828\/revisions\/9670"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9669"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4828"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4828"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4828"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=4828"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}