{"id":5577,"date":"2024-01-11T13:55:52","date_gmt":"2024-01-11T12:55:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=5577"},"modified":"2024-12-12T15:56:07","modified_gmt":"2024-12-12T13:56:07","slug":"vleresimi-i-efektivitetit-te-sanksioneve-te-be-se-kunder-kosoves","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/analize\/vleresimi-i-efektivitetit-te-sanksioneve-te-be-se-kunder-kosoves\/","title":{"rendered":"Assessing the effectiveness of EU sanctions against Kosovo"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Kosovo-Serbia dialogue witnessed breakthroughs and tensions throughout 2023. Apart from reaching the second\u00a0Agreement on the path to normalization of relations\u00a0and its Annex in March<\/a>, affairs between Belgrade and Pristina were all but good.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Following the Kosovo Serb\u2019s boycott of and placement of barricades in December 2022, Kosovo entered 2023 with simmering tensions. These tensions escalated further after snap local elections were organized in the north of Kosovo, which were largely\u00a0boycott<\/a>\u00a0by local Serbs, with a voter\u00a0turnout<\/a>\u00a0of less than 4%, questioning the legitimacy of election results.<\/p>\n

This boiled up in May when the\u00a0protests<\/a>\u00a0in the north became violent, prompting the deployment of Kosovo special police units. At the same time, calls for de-escalation by the international community were ignored, leading to even more tensions.<\/p>\n

In July, the Serbian Gendarmerie\u00a0arrested<\/a>\u00a0three Kosovo Police officers at the border, which exacerbated tensions further.<\/p>\n

Finally, the Banjska incident<\/a>, ultimately pushed tensions to a critical juncture, bringing the countries to the brink of military conflict. In order to overcome the impasse, the EU proposed a\u00a0de-escalation plan<\/a>,\u00a0which included the full withdrawal of special police units from the north of Kosovo, the organization of new local elections, and the creation of the Association\/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM).<\/p>\n

However, Kosovo rejected the EU\u2019s de-escalation plan and instead\u00a0presented<\/a>\u00a0its own plan for de-escalation, which was considerably different from what the EU proposed.<\/p>\n

In its five-point Plan, Kurti proposed the following measures: Identification and persecution of criminal groups in the north; withdrawal of criminal groups from Kosovo to Serbia; joint security evaluation of Kosovo Police, EULEX and KFOR; and early local elections in the northern municipalities.<\/p>\n

In the sea of problems and tensions, in June 2023, the EU decided to adopt sanctions (restrictive measures) against the Kosovo government for the first time in history. The\u00a0measures<\/a>\u00a0adopted unanimously by the EU included the suspension of high-level visits, contacts and events and financial cooperation.<\/p>\n

EU\u2019s spokesperson, Peter Stano,\u00a0highlighted<\/a>\u00a0that these measures are temporary and reversible, depending on the Kosovo government\u2019s decision to de-escalate in the north of Kosovo.<\/p>\n

In 2024, the restrictive measures against Kosovo are still in place, while tensions are still smoldering. However, these sanctions are not being applied properly by the EU and its member states, raising questions about the efficiency and success of its arm-twisting EU policy and the credibility of the EU.<\/p>\n

Violations of High-Level Visit Restrictions<\/strong><\/p>\n

Starting from the restrictions on high-level visits, events and contacts, a closer examination reveals multiple violations by heads of state and governments of EU member states.<\/p>\n

For instance, Kosovo\u2019s President Vjosa Osmani met with the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in June and\u00a0visited<\/a>\u00a0the President of Croatia Zoran Milanovic in October 2023. Additionally, President Osmani\u00a0hosted<\/a>\u00a0the President of Bulgaria Ruman Radev in Pristina and was\u00a0invited<\/a>\u00a0to the EU-Western Balkans summit.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, Prime Minister Albin Kurti participated in\u00a0\u00a0meetings<\/a>\u00a0organized by Greece in August and in the EU-Western Balkans\u00a0summit<\/a>\u00a0hosted by Albania in October 2023. He also\u00a0met<\/a>\u00a0with Chancellor Scholz in December 2023.<\/p>\n

The only instance when the EU enforced its measures regarding high-level meetings was when it came to the Kosovo Serb politician Nenad Rasic. Rasic became the first victim of restrictive measures when the EU\u00a0canceled<\/a>\u00a0several meetings with him in Brussels in June 2023.<\/p>\n

Biased implementation of sanctions and rules is discriminatory and undemocratic, especially when they are applied selectively against minority representatives.<\/p>\n

Limited Impact of Financial Cooperation Restrictions<\/strong><\/p>\n

The EU\u2019s financial cooperation restrictions focus on\u00a0haltering<\/a>\u00a0funding for specific green projects in Kosovo, such as wastewater treatment and solar and thermal power plant projects intended to help Kosovo\u2019s decarbonization efforts.<\/p>\n

The EU\u2019s decision to freeze financial support for environmental protection is counterproductive, slows down the green transition and directly affects the citizens of Kosovo. Moreover, this is completely unrelated to the tensions in the north and dialogue.<\/p>\n

Apart from these, there is no information that the EU has blocked or halted any other financial support, neither from its Economic and Investment Plan nor from the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). Quite the contrary, the Commission has announced the\u00a0Growth Plan<\/a>\u00a0for the Western Balkans including Kosovo.<\/p>\n

Going deeper into the financial measures, it can be seen that the amount of frozen funds for Kosovo is\u00a024 million EUR<\/a>, which makes it only a fraction of what Kosovo gets from IPA. For comparison, within the IPA II program (2014-2020), Kosovo\u00a0received<\/a>\u00a0more than 600 million EUR.<\/p>\n

Counterproductive Outcomes and Loss of Credibility<\/strong><\/p>\n

The introduction of restrictive measures on Kosovo not only resulted in the government of Kosovo completely disregarding them but also proved counter-productive.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s not that the Kosovo side failed to comply with the de-escalation plan; rather, the Serbian side exacerbated tensions (Banjska incident) because it probably perceived no consequences for non-compliance. Consequently, the EU ended up losing more credibility in the negotiations and normalization process, contributing to increased instability.<\/p>\n

This happened because the EU policy of arm-twisting and sanctioning was wrong in the first place. The EU was forced to pursue this policy as it was unable to grant any benefits in terms of the credible accession and membership process for Serbia and Kosovo.<\/p>\n

Mixed Signals<\/strong><\/p>\n

By breaching the restrictive measures against Kosovo, EU member states have sent several important messages to Kosovo\u2019s political leadership: a) these measures are not serious; b) member states do not fully support them; c) there are no serious consequences for breaching the measures.<\/p>\n

Consequently, the Kosovo government was reluctant to cooperate with the EU, failing to implement the EU de-escalation plan (e.g. organization of new local elections and removal of special police units), and the Agreement on the path to normalization, particularly the establishment of the ASM.<\/p>\n

Another significant development was the entry into force of visa liberalization for Kosovo, which became effective on 1 January 2024 and further contributed to mixed messaging.<\/p>\n

It remains to be seen whether the EU restrictions for Kosovo will be implemented in 2024 and whether the Kosovo government will change course.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb vitit 2023, dialogu Kosov\u00eb-Serbi d\u00ebshmoi p\u00ebrparime dhe tensione. Ve\u00e7 arritjes s\u00eb Marr\u00ebveshjes s\u00eb dyt\u00eb n\u00eb rrug\u00ebn drejt normalizimit t\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve dhe Aneksit t\u00eb saj, n\u00eb mars, pun\u00ebt midis Beogradit dhe Prishtin\u00ebs nuk ishin aspak t\u00eb mira. Pas bojkotit t\u00eb serb\u00ebve t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs dhe vendosjes s\u00eb barrikadave n\u00eb dhjetor t\u00eb vitit 2022, Kosova hyri n\u00eb […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":6250,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[672,664,12],"ppma_author":[25],"class_list":["post-5577","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-eu","tag-kosovo","tag-serbia"],"authors":[{"term_id":25,"user_id":15,"is_guest":0,"slug":"milos-pavkovic","display_name":"Milo\u0161 Pavkovi\u0107","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/MP_cropped-150x150-1.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/MP_cropped-150x150-1.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Pavkovi\u0107","first_name":"Milo\u0161","description":"Milo\u0161 Pavkovi\u0107 \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shkenc\u00ebtar politik me specializim n\u00eb rajonin e Evrop\u00ebs Juglindore, politik\u00ebn krahasuese, regjimet hibride dhe politik\u00ebn e BE-s\u00eb. Studimet bachelor dhe master p\u00ebr shkenca politike i kreu n\u00eb Universitetin e Beogradit. Ai kaloi nj\u00eb vit n\u00eb Universitetin e Grazit si student n\u00eb Erasmus dhe mbrojti tez\u00ebn e magjistratur\u00ebs (De)konsolidimi i shtet\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs n\u00eb kontekstin e negociatave bashk\u00ebkohore nd\u00ebrmjet Qeverive t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs* dhe Serbis\u00eb. Ai kreu masterin e dyt\u00eb n\u00eb shkencat politike n\u00eb Universitetin e Evrop\u00ebs Qendrore (CEU). Ai \u00ebsht\u00eb bashk\u00ebautor i publikimit Elementet kryesore t\u00eb nevojshme p\u00ebr p\u00ebrparimin n\u00eb normalizimin e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrmjet Kosov\u00ebs dhe Serbis\u00eb. Milo\u0161 aktualisht \u00ebsht\u00eb i pun\u00ebsuar si studiues n\u00eb Qendr\u00ebn e Politikave Evropiane (CEP), Beograd dhe sh\u00ebrben si Ambasador i Ri i Evrop\u00ebs n\u00eb Ballkanin Per\u00ebndimor."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5577","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5577"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5577\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10989,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5577\/revisions\/10989"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6250"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5577"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5577"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5577"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=5577"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}