{"id":6626,"date":"2024-02-20T14:03:13","date_gmt":"2024-02-20T13:03:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=6626"},"modified":"2024-02-21T00:00:42","modified_gmt":"2024-02-20T23:00:42","slug":"2024-ta-do-te-jete-viti-i-stagnimit-ne-dialogun-kosove-serbi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/opinion\/2024-ta-do-te-jete-viti-i-stagnimit-ne-dialogun-kosove-serbi\/","title":{"rendered":"2024 will be the year of stagnation in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue"},"content":{"rendered":"

In 2023, Kosovo and Serbia reached an important agreement to normalize relations, otherwise known as the Ohrid Agreement.<\/a>This marked a long-awaited breakthrough agreement supported by the EU and the U.S. While one might expect 2024 to be a year of implementation, this prospect seems unlikely to happen for several reasons:<\/p>\n

Miroslav Lajcak's mandate expiration<\/strong><\/p>\n

The mandate of the EU\u2019s Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, Miroslav Lajcak, expires<\/a> in August 2024 and adds uncertainty to the situation. Lajcak, who was appointed to this post in 2020 and re-appointed<\/a> in 2022, might face a different decision this time.<\/p>\n

The European Council (EUCO) holds the authority to extend Lajcak\u2019s mandate, requiring a unanimous decision by EU member states. However, the EUCO indicated at the beginning of February that this was not on the agenda and that the next meeting would be in June, Lajcak\u2019s future in this role remains uncertain.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, calls for his resignation<\/a> further complicate the situation, potentially leaving his position vacant and stalling the dialogue.<\/p>\n

Constituting the new government in Serbia<\/strong><\/p>\n

The December 2023 parliamentary elections in Serbia will have a direct impact on the dialogue. The constitution of the National Assembly and the creation of government will have an impact on the dialogue.<\/p>\n

Despite the clear victory of the incumbent party, the creation of government and political appointments will take time. For instance, the main negotiator on the Serbian side is the director<\/a> of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija and it is unclear who will assume the role. The acting government does not have the legitimacy to negotiate, let alone sign new agreements in the dialogue.<\/p>\n

European Union elections<\/strong><\/p>\n

EU elections are scheduled<\/a> to take place in June 2024 and it will have adverse effects on the normalization dialogue as well. After the European Parliament (EP) gets elected, what will ensue are months of political deliberation, coalition building, and nominations, marking a cumbersome process of elections for the Commission president, the College of Commissioners and portfolio allocation and political appointments in the EU. The process will probably last until the end of the year.<\/p>\n

In the meantime, the EU will not have the time nor the capacity to deal with the dialogue. This lack of engagement will likely compel Kosovo and Serbia to prolong their commitments and sideline the dialogue.<\/p>\n

Additionally, the Kosovo government completely distrusted<\/a> the key EU figures, Borell and Lajcak, during the dialogue in the past years. One of the reasons for distrust is that both of them come from non-recognizing countries (Spain and Slovakia). Therefore, maybe Kosovo will wait and see whether this time the Special Representative is going to be someone from a country with a more favorable stance towards Kosovo.<\/p>\n

U.S. presidential election<\/strong><\/p>\n

The U.S. presidential election will be an important determinant<\/a> of the dialogue. Given the U.S.\u2019s important role in the Kosovo-Serbia relations both Kosovo and Serbia will pay close attention to the U.S. electoral campaign and election.<\/p>\n

It looks like Belgrade and Pristina are placing bets on different presidential candidates with a strategy to improve their respective positions post-election. Serbian president Vucic supports Donald Trump in upcoming elections, hoping<\/a> that his win could be beneficial for Serbia.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, Kosovo traditionally nurtures better relations with the president from the Democratic Party, and in this case, Joe Biden is the clear choice. This strategy might indicate that both parties may postpone the implementation of agreements and delay reaching new ones, hoping for better conditions after the U.S. election.<\/p>\n

Kosovo will hold parliamentary elections<\/strong><\/p>\n

Kosovo will hold parliamentary elections in early 2025, which will dominate the political discourse. Kosovo political parties will be mostly campaigning. Therefore, any concession in the dialogue made by the ruling party will be deemed as a weakness and be used as an opportunity to attack.<\/p>\n

Simultaneously, the government led by Albin Kurti will likely maintain its course of action by introducing new measures (e.g. abolition of the use of dinars) and looking tough on Serbia and Kosovo Serbs. This approach has garnered significant popularity for Kurti. In that regard, there will most certainly be no progress in taking the necessary steps to create the Association\/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM).<\/p>\n

Finally, 2024 looks like a missed opportunity, and both sides will use every opportunity to strengthen their own positions by acting unilaterally and testing each other\u2019s limits, as well as not engaging in the dialogue to wait for new political leaders to come on board to establish new relationships with them.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

M\u00eb 2023, Kosova dhe Serbia arrit\u00ebn nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme p\u00ebr normalizimin e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve, e njohur ndryshe si Marr\u00ebveshja e Ohrit. Kjo sh\u00ebnoi nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje p\u00ebrparimi t\u00eb shum\u00ebpritur, mb\u00ebshtetur nga BE-ja dhe ShBA-ja. Derisa mund t\u00eb pritet q\u00eb viti 2024 t\u00eb jet\u00eb viti i zbatimit t\u00eb saj, kjo perspektiv\u00eb duket se nuk ka gjasa t\u00eb […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":6638,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[10,972,624,971],"ppma_author":[25],"class_list":["post-6626","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-dialogu","tag-kosove","tag-kryesore","tag-serbi"],"authors":[{"term_id":25,"user_id":15,"is_guest":0,"slug":"milos-pavkovic","display_name":"Milo\u0161 Pavkovi\u0107","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/MP_cropped-150x150-1.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/MP_cropped-150x150-1.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Pavkovi\u0107","first_name":"Milo\u0161","description":"Milo\u0161 Pavkovi\u0107 \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shkenc\u00ebtar politik me specializim n\u00eb rajonin e Evrop\u00ebs Juglindore, politik\u00ebn krahasuese, regjimet hibride dhe politik\u00ebn e BE-s\u00eb. Studimet bachelor dhe master p\u00ebr shkenca politike i kreu n\u00eb Universitetin e Beogradit. Ai kaloi nj\u00eb vit n\u00eb Universitetin e Grazit si student n\u00eb Erasmus dhe mbrojti tez\u00ebn e magjistratur\u00ebs (De)konsolidimi i shtet\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs n\u00eb kontekstin e negociatave bashk\u00ebkohore nd\u00ebrmjet Qeverive t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs* dhe Serbis\u00eb. Ai kreu masterin e dyt\u00eb n\u00eb shkencat politike n\u00eb Universitetin e Evrop\u00ebs Qendrore (CEU). Ai \u00ebsht\u00eb bashk\u00ebautor i publikimit Elementet kryesore t\u00eb nevojshme p\u00ebr p\u00ebrparimin n\u00eb normalizimin e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrmjet Kosov\u00ebs dhe Serbis\u00eb. Milo\u0161 aktualisht \u00ebsht\u00eb i pun\u00ebsuar si studiues n\u00eb Qendr\u00ebn e Politikave Evropiane (CEP), Beograd dhe sh\u00ebrben si Ambasador i Ri i Evrop\u00ebs n\u00eb Ballkanin Per\u00ebndimor."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6626","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6626"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6626\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6632,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6626\/revisions\/6632"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6638"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6626"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6626"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6626"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=6626"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}