{"id":775,"date":"2023-09-19T14:09:30","date_gmt":"2023-09-19T14:09:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=775"},"modified":"2024-12-09T11:12:56","modified_gmt":"2024-12-09T09:12:56","slug":"dialogu-kosove-serbi-farsa-e-fundit-e-brukselit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/opinion\/dialogu-kosove-serbi-farsa-e-fundit-e-brukselit\/","title":{"rendered":"Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue: Brussel\u2019s Latest Farce"},"content":{"rendered":"

To little surprise, the EU-brokered talks on September 14 between Kosovo and Serbia ended in failure. Additionally, it was no surprise that the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell again\u00a0\u00a0blamed Kosovo.<\/a>.<\/p>\n

That the negotiations have become so singularly focused on forcing Kosovo to accept the Association\/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) was again glaringly evident; no mention was made of Serbia breaching previous agreements, especially\u00a0Article 5<\/a>\u00a0of the February 2023 Brussels agreement. The appeasement of Serbia by the EU is now as blatant as it is unjust.<\/p>\n

There are three main arguments for the ASM. Some have suggested that as the ASM is an obligation Kosovo committed itself to in 2013 it\u00a0\u00a0must be implemented<\/a>Others have argued that it will\u00a0not\u00a0lead to a\u00a0\u00a0Republika Srpska<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0inside Kosovo. Additionally, some claim it is necessary to\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0help the integration<\/a>\u00a0of the Kosovo Serbs.<\/p>\n

These arguments can be challenged. The 2013 ASM was deemed unconstitutional and thus cannot be implemented in its original form; the assurances that the ASM will not become Republika Srpska ring hollow given Belgrade\u2019s\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0escalating belligerence<\/a>\u00a0and open support for a\u00a0Greater Serbia,<\/a>the idea that Kosovo Serbs lack rights and political representation is obviously unpersuasive when one looks at the\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0expansive constitutional provisions<\/a>\u00a0afforded to Kosovo Serbs.<\/p>\n

The ASM as originally conceived poses\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0a profound threat<\/a>\u00a0to Kosovo\u2019s capacity to govern inside its own territory. Not only does it threaten to fundamentally diminish the administrative power of the central government, it jeopardies Kosovo\u2019s territorial integrity.<\/p>\n

One need only look at what is\u00a0currently happening in Bosnia\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0to understand what the ASM will likely lead to.<\/p>\n

Yet, one could make the case that implementing the ASM \u2013 despite its flaws \u2013 is a price worth paying if Kosovo receives both recognition from Serbia \u2013 and thereafter recognition from the five EU non-recognizers \u2013 and the many related positives that would come with this, not least a path towards EU accession.<\/p>\n

This argument is essentially that the dangers posed by the ASM could be ameliorated if Kosovo was recognized as independent and fully integrated into the international community. But it is crucial to understand that\u00a0\u00a0this was not in the offer<\/em>.<\/p>\n

An Offer they Can\u2019t Accept<\/strong><\/p>\n

Kosovo was evidently presented with\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0a proposal\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0which would have compelled it to establish the ASM\u00a0before\u00a0the other issues stipulated at\u00a0\u00a0Ohrid<\/a>were implemented. This was patently unacceptable; establishing the ASM\u00a0without\u00a0securing recognition would have been foolhardy. Does anyone seriously imagine that if the ASM was created Vucic would thereafter dutifully implement the subsequent provisions within the EU\u2019s proposal?<\/p>\n

Kosovo\u2019s status is fragile as it is; creating the ASM while Serbia still claims Kosovo would be disastrous. Vucic\u2019s\u00a0\u00a0authoritarian<\/a>\u00a0regime and his hyper-nationalistic supporters strive to create for a \u201cGreater Serbia\u201d; they would naturally use the ASM in a still unrecognized Kosovo to further foment instability there. Vucic has\u00a0\u00a0stated many times\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0that he has no intention of implementing the Ohrid \u201cagreement\u201d; given this, for the EU to ask Kosovo to implement the ASM first with only some vague promises that all the other provisions will be implemented later is patently unreasonable. No self-respecting government would accept this.<\/p>\n

Additionally, so long as Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo, the non-recognisers within the EU, NATO and the United Nations Security Council will continue to oppose Kosovo\u2019s membership in these organisations.<\/p>\n

Kosovo will thus have degraded its capacity to function as a state and imperiled its territorial integrity without gaining anything in return beyond the acclaim of Borrell, Laj\u010d\u00e1k and all the others so desperate to herald \u201can agreement\u201d that will facilitate Serbia\u2019s interests. Put bluntly; establishing the ASM without recognition from Serbia \u2013 or the five EU non-recognisers - will not improve Kosovo\u2019s international status.<\/p>\n

Reasonable?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The repeated condemnation of Kosovo, and the\u00a0\u00a0undiplomatic vitriol<\/a>\u00a0leveled against Prime Minister Kurti, seeks to frame the failed negotiations as the \u201creasonable\u201d EU and Serbia and the \u201cunreasonable\u201d Kosovo. This is false.<\/p>\n

Kurti was a vocal opponent of the ASM when it was initially agreed, yet in\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0the proposal\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0he advanced on the 15th\u00a0he compromised by committing to launch and conclude discussions on \u201cthe Statute of the instrument of self-management for Kosovo Serbs\u201d. In previous meetings Kurti has offered to sign agreements while Vucic has refused.<\/p>\n

It is not Kurti\u2019s fault that he has come to power at a time when Kosovo\u2019s erstwhile allies have decided to abandon it in favor of Serbia; his red lines relating to maintaining both Kosovo\u2019s territorial integrity and the capacity of the government to exercise authority within its own borders are principles that every sovereign state hold inviolable.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, Kosovo was not presented with a choice between stagnation and progress; should the government have accepted EU\u2019s proposal this would have gravely weakened \u2013 if not mortally wounded \u2013 Kosovo.<\/p>\n

The Alternative?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Those opponents of the government in Kosovo who have again\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0expressed their outrage<\/a>\u00a0at the latest diplomatic failure have no credible alternative to offer. Should the old political elite have remained in government they would face exactly the same pressure the current government is now under; they may well have caved in \u2013 as they did regarding the ASM in 2013, the border deal with Montenegro in 2015 and the establishment of the Special Court in 2015 \u2013 but the result of striking a \u201cdeal\u201d now on the terms presented by the EU might win short-term acclaim from the EU but would not benefit Kosovo in the long term.<\/p>\n

The prospects of any breakthrough favorable to Kosovo are remote; so long as Vucic remains in power and Western politicians continue\u00a0\u00a0to appease him<\/a>\u00a0despite his authoritarianism and\u00a0\u00a0links with organized crime\u00a0\u2013<\/a>\u00a0Kosovo will likely remain in a state of tension domestically and paralysis internationally. Additionally, so long as both Borrell and Laj\u010d\u00e1k \u2013 who come from states that do not recognize Kosovo \u2013 remain involved the chances of any progress are significantly diminished.<\/p>\n

As unwelcome as this current impasse is, it cannot be attributed to the current government\u2019s resilience in the face of bullying and unjust condemnation as it strives to safeguard Kosovo\u2019s territorial integrity and sovereignty.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb \u00e7udi q\u00eb bisedimet e 14 shtatorit midis Kosov\u00ebs dhe Serbis\u00eb, t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsuara nga BE-ja, p\u00ebrfunduan me d\u00ebshtim. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, nuk ishte fare \u00e7udi q\u00eb P\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsuesi i Lart\u00eb i BE-s\u00eb p\u00ebr Politik\u00eb t\u00eb Jashtme dhe Siguri, Josep Borrell, s\u00ebrish\u00a0faj\u00ebsoi Kosov\u00ebn. Fakti q\u00eb negociatat jan\u00eb p\u00ebrqendruar ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht n\u00eb detyrimin e Kosov\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb pranuar […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":10596,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[669,672,664,12],"ppma_author":[18],"class_list":["post-775","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-dialogue","tag-eu","tag-kosovo","tag-serbia"],"authors":[{"term_id":18,"user_id":8,"is_guest":0,"slug":"aidan-hehir","display_name":"Aidan Hehir","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/aidan.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/aidan.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Hehir","first_name":"Aidan","description":"Dr. Aidan Hehir is a Reader in International Relations at the University of Westminster. His research interests include transitional justice, humanitarian intervention, and statebuilding in Kosovo. He is the author\/editor of eleven books; his most recent monograph \u2013 Hollow Norms and The Responsibility to Protect (Palgrave Macmillan) \u2013 won the 2019 British International Studies Association \u2018Working Group on Intervention and R2P\u2019 book prize. He has published over fifty academic book chapters and journal articles, is co-editor of the Routledge Intervention and Statebuilding book series and is a regular contributor to national and international television and radio."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/775","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=775"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/775\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10783,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/775\/revisions\/10783"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10596"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=775"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=775"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=775"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=775"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}