{"id":7892,"date":"2024-09-24T15:20:41","date_gmt":"2024-09-24T13:20:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=7892"},"modified":"2024-09-24T16:15:03","modified_gmt":"2024-09-24T14:15:03","slug":"nje-vit-pas-sulmit-ne-banjske-pyetje-pa-pergjigje-dhe-tensione-ne-rritje","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/opinion\/nje-vit-pas-sulmit-ne-banjske-pyetje-pa-pergjigje-dhe-tensione-ne-rritje\/","title":{"rendered":"A Year After the Bansjka Attack: Unanswered Questions and Growing Tensions"},"content":{"rendered":"

On September 24, 2023, in the Serb-majority village of Banjska in Zvecan, Kosovo, a paramilitary attack resulted in the death of one Kosovo Police Sergeant and the wounding of another officer. Furthermore, Three Serbian paramilitaries were killed and several others were wounded by the Kosovo Police which resulted in their arrest.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

After the incident,<\/span> both Washington and Brussels<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> were cautious, with the EU urging a full investigation before drawing conclusions. The Kosovo government presented evidence at a press conference, including <\/span>footage<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> identifying paramilitary members, notably Milan Radoicic, then vice president of the Serb List and a known figure in organized crime in the north of Kosovo.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Radoicic admitted to orchestrating the attack, yet after being questioned by Serbian authorities in October 2024, he was <\/span>released without charges<\/span><\/a>. Radoicic continues to <\/span>maintain close ties<\/span><\/a> with the Serbian government.<\/span><\/p>\n

In September 2024, almost a year after the attack, Kosovo <\/span>aktakuz\u00eb<\/span><\/a> Radoicic and 44 others for attempting to annex the north of Kosovo. Despite these charges, Radoicic remains free in Serbia, which has ignored extradition requests from Kosovo authorities.<\/span><\/p>\n

The failure to prosecute him, coupled with the lack of international pressure on Serbia to extradite Radoicic, raises serious concerns about impunity and the political will to hold perpetrators accountable.<\/span><\/p>\n

This violent incident marks the most serious escalation over a decade in the north of Kosovo which severely heightened tensions between Kosovo and Serbia, raising concerns about stability and security.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Divergent International Responses<\/b><\/p>\n

Since the Banjska attack, the European Union has chosen to wait for the results of official investigations before taking concrete action, despite the evidence already presented.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This cautious approach has frustrated Kosovo, where many feel the EU has been biased. Kosovo faced <\/span>negative measures<\/span><\/a> for escorting mayors into municipal buildings in four northern municipalities after a boycotted election saw mayors from Albanian-majority parties take office.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In contrast, Serbia has yet to face any consequences for the paramilitary attack, which was orchestrated from within its borders and backed by Serbian armaments. The <\/span>U.S. Embassy in Kosovo<\/span><\/a> confirmed that Serbia provided logistical support to the paramilitary group involved.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The EU\u2019s hesitance may stem from internal divisions over the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and broader geopolitical concerns, such as maintaining regional stability and keeping Serbia on a path toward closer ties with the West, despite its relationship with both Russia and China.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Banjska attack has stalled the high-level Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, with no clear approach from the EU on how to move forward. Furthermore, the EU\u2019s reluctance to take a firmer stance against Serbia has prompted the Kosovo government to intensify efforts to crack down on illegal activities in the north and assert its sovereignty.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kosovo\u2019s Crackdown on Illegal Structures and Activities in the North<\/b><\/p>\n

In the past year, Kosovo authorities have taken a more assertive stance on parallel structures in the north of the country. Kosovo has taken an array of actions to ensure the rule of law and order. These actions include such as converting illegal vehicle plates and driving licenses to Kosovo ones, integrating the Vallaq power grid substation, <\/span>banning the use of the Serbian dinar<\/span><\/a> for payments and <\/span>closing parallel<\/span><\/a> postal offices and municipalities, among other things.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Actions like Prishtina\u2019s integration of Vallaq came through an <\/span>EU-facilitated agreement<\/span><\/a>, similarly, the conversion of license plates was <\/span>welcomed by the EU<\/span><\/a>. However <\/span>banning the Serbian dinar<\/span><\/a> for payments and <\/span>closure of parallel<\/span><\/a> offices was fiercely criticized, although acknowledged as lawful in principle.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Serbia\u2019s response, following the Banjska attack, has been unusually restrained. While it previously opposed any moves by Kosovo in the north, tensions have eased. Kosovo Serbs have replaced illegal vehicle license plates, and Serbia has also recognized Kosovo\u2019s customs stamps.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Serbia\u2019s focus appears to be on strengthening its regional and international standing, <\/span>evident in deals<\/span><\/a> with Germany on lithium extraction, a contract for French Rafale fighter jets, and its role in supplying ammunition to Ukraine.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This diplomatic maneuver appears to have left Serbia off the hook from any responsibility for the Banjska attack. One year later, the lack of accountability for both Radoicic and his paramilitary group, as well as Serbia\u2019s role, remains evident.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This transactional nature of Serbia\u2019s relationship with the West, coupled with the absence of meaningful punitive actions against Serbia or its paramilitary actors, may embolden Belgrade for future aggression against Kosovo.<\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

M\u00eb 24 shtator 2023, n\u00eb fshatin Banjsk\u00eb t\u00eb Zve\u00e7anit n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb, t\u00eb banuar me shumic\u00eb serbe, nj\u00eb sulm paramilitar shkaktoi vdekjen e nj\u00eb rreshteri t\u00eb Policis\u00eb s\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs dhe plagosjen e nj\u00eb zyrtari policor. Nd\u00ebrsa, tre paramilitar\u00eb serb\u00eb u vran\u00eb dhe disa t\u00eb tjer\u00eb u plagos\u00ebn nga Policia e Kosov\u00ebs, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt m\u00eb pas edhe […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":442,"featured_media":6868,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[1210,624,1211,1212],"ppma_author":[1013],"class_list":["post-7892","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-banjske","tag-kryesore","tag-sulmi-ne-banjske","tag-zvecan"],"authors":[{"term_id":1013,"user_id":442,"is_guest":0,"slug":"mehdi-sejdiu","display_name":"Mehdi Sejdiu","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/Photo_Mehdi-Sejdiu.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/Photo_Mehdi-Sejdiu.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Sejdiu","first_name":"Mehdi","description":"Mehdi Sejdiu doktorand i Shkencave Politike n\u00eb Universitetin e Heidelbergut. Ai studioi Shkenca Politike dhe Marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare n\u00eb Universitetin \u015eehir t\u00eb Stambollit (BA) dhe Universitetin e Heidelberg (MA). Ka punuar si k\u00ebshilltar politik i Z\u00ebvend\u00ebskryeministrit t\u00eb Par\u00eb t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs (2021 \u2013 2023) duke koordinuar m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti \u00e7\u00ebshtjet Kosov\u00eb \u2013 BE, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb p\u00ebrfundimin e procesit t\u00eb liberalizimit t\u00eb vizave. Ai \u00ebsht\u00eb alumni i programeve si IPS nga Bundestagu Gjerman, Akademia Diplomatike e Vjen\u00ebs dhe TEFF nga Stiftung Mercator. Mehdiu ka punuar n\u00eb disa institute k\u00ebrkimore n\u00eb Gjermani dhe Kosov\u00eb, nd\u00ebr t\u00eb tjera n\u00eb Institutin p\u00ebr Shkenca Politike n\u00eb Heidelberg, Grupin p\u00ebr Hulumtim t\u00eb Politikave Ballkanike dhe Grupin p\u00ebr Studime Juridike dhe Politike."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7892","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/442"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7892"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7892\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7896,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7892\/revisions\/7896"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6868"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7892"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7892"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7892"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=7892"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}