{"id":8187,"date":"2021-04-27T10:51:19","date_gmt":"2021-04-27T08:51:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=8187"},"modified":"2024-10-10T10:52:47","modified_gmt":"2024-10-10T08:52:47","slug":"lufte-e-jorealitetit-pse-rusia-po-kercenon-me-pershkallezim-te-konfliktit-ne-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/analize\/lufte-e-jorealitetit-pse-rusia-po-kercenon-me-pershkallezim-te-konfliktit-ne-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Luft\u00eb e jorealitetit: Pse Rusia po k\u00ebrc\u00ebnon me p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzim t\u00eb konfliktit n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb"},"content":{"rendered":"

P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb jav\u00ebve t\u00eb fundit l\u00ebvizjet dhe vendosja e ushtris\u00eb ruse pran\u00eb kufirit me Ukrain\u00ebn kan\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr v\u00ebmendjen e Per\u00ebndimit. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb marsit, l\u00ebvizjet e tilla po b\u00ebheshin n\u00eb lindje, veri dhe jug t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs \u2013 p\u00ebrfshi vendosjen e disa trupave <\/span>bjelloruse<\/span><\/a> \u2013 por jav\u00ebn e kaluar, qendra e gravitetit t\u00eb mobilizimit ushtarak t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb u zhvendos drejt gadishullit t\u00eb okupuar t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb dhe rajonit t\u00eb Krasnodarit, q\u00eb kufizohet me Donbasin.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb situata \u00ebsht\u00eb akoma <\/span>duke u zhvilluar<\/span><\/a>, ka vler\u00ebsime t\u00eb ndryshme p\u00ebr madh\u00ebsin\u00eb e trupave ruse. Rusia ka d\u00ebrguar n\u00eb terren shum\u00eb prej brigadave dhe regjimenteve t\u00eb Distriktit Ushtarak Jugor, ku secila ka d\u00ebrguar t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn nga nj\u00eb batalion (gjithsej 30). Nd\u00ebrsa, m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 16 jan\u00eb d\u00ebrguar n\u00eb rajonet e tjera p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Rusis\u00eb. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb pak a shum\u00eb e ngjashme me fuqin\u00eb e trupave t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs (p\u00ebr krahasim, forcat p\u00ebr reagim t\u00eb shpejt\u00eb t\u00eb NATO-s p\u00ebrb\u00ebhen nga 30 batalione). Meq\u00eb zhvendosjet nga ajri jan\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb gjurmohen nga civil\u00ebt, ka shum\u00eb pak informata publike p\u00ebr l\u00ebvizjet ajrore ruse. Sidoqoft\u00eb, <\/span>jan\u00eb regjistruar rritje<\/span><\/a> t\u00eb aktiveteteve ajrore ruse n\u00eb rajonin e Baltikut gjat\u00eb k\u00ebsaj periudhe, dhe Ministria e Mbrojtjes e Rusis\u00eb ka deklaruar se t\u00eb gjitha nj\u00ebsit\u00eb e forcave ajrore dhe detare t\u00eb Distriktit Ushtarak Jugor do t\u00eb st\u00ebrviten p\u00ebr detyrat e p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta opeacionale. Ka shum\u00eb pak dyshim se Rusia po p\u00ebrgatit nj\u00eb forc\u00eb ushtarake, t\u00eb aft\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb pushtuar Ukrain\u00ebn. Deri ku \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb shkoj\u00eb Rusia?<\/span><\/p>\n

N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb mes, v\u00ebrehet mungesa e nj\u00eb elementi t\u00eb aparatit ushtarak rus: Rosgvardia (Garda Komb\u00ebtare). M\u00eb <\/span>2014<\/span><\/a>, kur Rusia k\u00ebrc\u00ebnonte me pushtimin e plot\u00eb t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs, formacionet pararend\u00ebse t\u00eb Gard\u00ebs Komb\u00ebtare (at\u00ebher\u00eb n\u00ebn Ministrin\u00eb e Brendshme) u d\u00ebrguan n\u00eb numra t\u00eb shumt\u00eb p\u00ebrkrah nj\u00ebsiteve ushtarake. Ideja se Kremlinit do t\u2019i duhet Garda Komb\u00ebtare p\u00ebr t\u00eb instaluar regjimin okupator n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb shtypur rezistenc\u00ebn lokale dhe jo t\u00eb \u00e7rregullt t\u00eb okupuesve rus\u00eb.<\/span> Prandaj, \u00e7far\u00ebdo t\u00eb jen\u00eb planet e Rusis\u00eb, p\u00ebr momentin duket sikur nuk do t\u00eb ket\u00eb pushtim t\u00eb plot\u00eb t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs \u2013 si p\u00ebr shembull pushtimi i gjith\u00eb territorit n\u00eb lindje t\u00eb Denprit, t\u00eb cilin mediat propaganduese ruse e quajn\u00eb \u2018Novorossiya\u2019 (Rusia e Re).<\/span><\/p>\n

Prap\u00ebseprap\u00eb, ka gjasa q\u00eb Rusia t\u00eb angazhohet n\u00eb forma t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzimit t\u00eb kufizuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndryshuar termat e luft\u00ebs n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. Jan\u00eb disa arsye p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb. S\u00eb pari, p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzimi mund t\u2019i ofroj\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs prektekst p\u00ebr t\u00eb d\u00ebrguar formalisht \u2018paq\u00ebruajt\u00ebsit\u2019, ose p\u00ebr t\u00eb ngritur nivelin e lidhjeve diplomatike me republikat separatiste t\u00eb krijuara n\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn lindore, duke ndryshuar k\u00ebshtu termat e mosmarr\u00ebveshjes ligjore rreth luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Donbasit. Edhe n\u00eb rast t\u00eb nj\u00eb provokimi rus n\u00eb Donbas, zhvendosjet masive t\u00eb trupave ruse n\u00eb krah\u00eb do t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrronin rezervist\u00ebt ukrainas q\u00eb ruajn\u00eb brend\u00ebsin\u00eb e vendit, duke privuar Kievin nga reagimi me dor\u00eb t\u00eb hekurt.<\/span><\/p>\n

S\u00eb dyti, p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzimi i kufizuar rreth Krimes\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb sht\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb dor\u00eb nj\u00eb pozicion t\u00eb vog\u00ebl n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb \u2013 operacion q\u00eb arsyetua formalisht nga mungesa e furnzimit me uj\u00eb n\u00eb gadishull, por q\u00eb n\u00eb praktik\u00eb u dizajnua p\u00ebr t\u00eb theksuar cenueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb ushtarake t\u00eb Kievit \u2013 \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb i mundsh\u00ebm. D\u00ebrgesa e fundit e mjeteve t\u00eb zbarkimit prej Detit Kaspik n\u00eb Detin e Zi krijon dyshime t\u00eb m\u00ebtejshme n\u00eb at\u00eb front. Rritja e fundit e <\/span>propagand\u00ebs<\/span><\/a> s\u00eb pafre ruse kund\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebs mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb thirrje mobilizuese p\u00ebr nj\u00eb operacion t\u00eb till\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sido q\u00eb t\u00eb jet\u00eb, Moska i sheh p\u00ebrpjekjet p\u00ebr t\u00eb ekspozuar cenueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb ushtarake t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs si tejet t\u00eb vlefshime n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjet <\/span>p\u00ebr t\u2019i b\u00ebr\u00eb presion<\/span><\/a> Kievit q\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb l\u00ebshime. Kremlini k\u00ebrkon q\u00eb Kievi t\u2019i p\u00ebrmbahet Marr\u00ebveshjes s\u00eb Minskut sipas <\/span>kushteve t\u00eb saj<\/span><\/a> \u2013 duke integruar republikat e reja n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb ashtu si\u00e7 jan\u00eb, duke i ofruar Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb nj\u00eb veto t\u00eb p\u00ebrhershme mbi politik\u00ebn vendore t\u00eb Kievit. Q\u00eb prej fillimit t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, Moska nuk ka qen\u00eb e gatshme t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb kompromis n\u00eb lidhje me k\u00ebt\u00eb. As Ukraina as Per\u00ebndimi nuk kan\u00eb l\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb kuptohet se do t\u00eb pajtoheshin me kushtet e Mosk\u00ebs. P\u00ebrkundrazi, presidenti amerikan Joe Biden shfryt\u00ebzoi telefonat\u00ebn e par\u00eb me homologun rus Vladimir Putin, p\u00ebr t\u00eb deklaruar qart\u00eb se <\/span>sovraniteti i Ukrain\u00ebs<\/span><\/a> nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb shitje. Putin duket se po e teston se a do t\u00eb qendroj\u00eb kjo edhe pasi t\u00eb ket\u00eb ngritur \u00e7mimin.<\/span><\/p>\n

Megjith\u00ebk\u00ebt\u00eb, ka nj\u00eb motivim edhe m\u00eb shqet\u00ebsues p\u00ebr l\u00ebvizjet ushtarake ruse se sa thjesht loj\u00eb gjakftoht\u00eb me zjarrin. Akuzat e Kremlinit se Kievi po k\u00ebrkon <\/span>zgjidhje ushtarake<\/span><\/a> p\u00ebr konfliktin e Donbasit dhe se NATO-ja dhe Shtetet e Bashkuara po komplotojn\u00eb me Ukrain\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb rimarr\u00eb Krimen\u00eb, nuk jan\u00eb vet\u00ebm vegla t\u00eb propagand\u00ebs. Pjes\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb establishmentit politik t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs \u2013 ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht sh\u00ebrbimet e inteligjenc\u00ebs \u2013 besojn\u00eb sinqerisht n\u00eb k\u00ebto akuza. Prandaj, ata po e p\u00ebrdorin ushtrin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb parandaluar p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzimin, t\u00eb cil\u00ebn n\u00eb realitet nuk po e planifikon askush n\u00eb Kiev.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ironikisht m\u00eb 2019, presidenti Volodymyr Zelensky vendosi kufizime shtes\u00eb mbi ushtrin\u00eb ukrainase p\u00ebr t\u00eb mos b\u00ebr\u00eb as p\u00ebrparime minimale n\u00eb Donbas (ndon\u00ebse fitoi disa p\u00ebrleshje t\u00eb vogla mes viteve 2016 dhe 2018, duke l\u00ebvizur aty k\u00ebtu vijen e frontit 50 metra p\u00ebrpara). Ai ishte shum\u00eb m\u00eb i gatsh\u00ebm se paraardh\u00ebsi i tij Petro Poroshenko n\u00eb lidhje me negociatat p\u00ebr \u00e7militarizim dhe ndarje t\u00eb trupave \u2013 me shpres\u00ebn se do ta siguronte Mosk\u00ebn q\u00eb Kievi nuk d\u00ebshiron t\u00eb sfidoj\u00eb statuskuon\u00eb ushtarake. P\u00ebr t\u00eb njejt\u00ebn arsye, Zelensky em\u00ebroi n\u00eb ekipin e tij <\/span>Andriy Yermak<\/span><\/a>, nj\u00eb prej figurave m\u00eb pro-ruse, si t\u00eb d\u00ebrguar t\u00eb posa\u00e7\u00ebm p\u00ebr negociatat me Rusin\u00eb. Madje, Zelensky e vuri Yermak-un n\u00eb krye t\u00eb administrat\u00ebs presidenciale, p\u00ebr t\u00eb larguar pengesat e komunikimit t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb mes Kremlinit dhe zyr\u00ebs s\u00eb tij. M\u00eb 2019, Zelensky u pajtua t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshinte n\u00eb nj\u00eb <\/span>shk\u00ebmbim t\u00eb burgosurish<\/span><\/a> Volodymyr Tsemakh<\/span><\/a>-un, d\u00ebshmitar ky\u00e7 i incidentit MH17, duke synuar ta shp\u00ebtonte Rusin\u00eb nga turp\u00ebrimi i hetimit holandez t\u00eb rastit. K\u00ebto hapa kan\u00eb qen\u00eb shum\u00eb kund\u00ebrth\u00ebn\u00ebse n\u00eb Kiev, por Zelensky i konsideroi si t\u00eb domosdoshme.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ukraina nuk mori asgj\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebmbim. Vet\u00ebm s\u00eb fundmi, Zelensky dha shenja t\u00eb pak\u00ebnaq\u00ebsis\u00eb me mosgatishm\u00ebrin\u00eb e Mosk\u00ebs q\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb p\u00ebrparime p\u00ebr k\u00ebto \u00e7\u00ebshtje, duke v\u00ebn\u00eb sanksione ndaj aleatit m\u00eb t\u00eb besuesh\u00ebm t\u00eb Putinit n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb <\/span>Viktor Medvedchuk<\/span><\/a>. Ndon\u00ebse, ka shum\u00eb pak gjasa q\u00eb nj\u00eb figur\u00eb pro-ruse si Medvedchuk ose Yuriy Boyko t\u00eb fitojn\u00eb zgjedhjet komb\u00ebtare n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, Kremlini ende beson se jan\u00eb forc\u00eb e besueshme politike \u2013 nj\u00eb nga keqperceptimet themelore t\u00eb politik\u00ebs ukrainase. Prandaj, Putin-i u ndje i privuar nga \u201copsioni politik\u201d p\u00ebr Kievin q\u00eb nuk ishte aty fillimisht.<\/span><\/p>\n

Si p\u00ebrgjigje ndaj k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve t\u00eb fundit ushtarake nga Moska, Zelensky ka rritur p\u00ebrpjekjet p\u00ebr t\u2019u <\/span>an\u00ebtar\u00ebsuar n\u00eb NATO<\/span><\/a> dhe ka eliminuar mund\u00ebsin\u00eb e kthimit n\u00eb <\/span>negociata n\u00eb Minsk<\/span><\/a>, p\u00ebr shkak se Bjellorusia nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb neutrale n\u00eb konflikt (l\u00ebvizja e k\u00ebsaj t\u00eb fundit \u00ebsht\u00eb pritur gj\u00ebr\u00ebsisht q\u00eb n\u00eb gusht, kur Moska filloi t\u00eb kontrollonte m\u00eb ashp\u00ebr regjimin e lodhur n\u00eb Minsk pas protestave kund\u00ebr zgjedhjeve t\u00eb manipuluara presidenciale n\u00eb Bjellorusi).<\/span><\/p>\n

Zelensky ka qen\u00eb politikani m\u00eb pajtues p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin mund t\u00eb ket\u00eb shpresuar realisht Moska. Tash, Moska ka shtyr\u00eb Zelensky-n q\u00eb t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb pozicion t\u00eb ngjash\u00ebm me Poroshenkon.<\/span><\/p>\n

Qeverit\u00eb evropiane ende duhet t\u00eb m\u00ebsojn\u00eb m\u00ebsimet e k\u00ebtij ballafaqimi. Realiteti alternativ n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin jeton Kremlini \u2013 nd\u00ebrtuar mbi fantazi sikurse NATO-ja dhe Ukraina po bashkojn\u00eb forcat p\u00ebr t\u00eb pushtuar Krimen\u00eb \u2013 po b\u00ebhet gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb i rreziksh\u00ebm. Nuk ka pasur ndonj\u00eb operacion ushtarak nga ana Ukrain\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb arsyetuar operacionet e tashme t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb kufijt\u00eb e Ukrain\u00ebs. P\u00ebrderisa frikat e Kremlinit bazohen n\u00eb iluzione, ai beson se k\u00ebto iluzione i japin t\u00eb drejt\u00eb t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb aksione ushtarake reale. Hiq ShBA-t\u00eb dhe Mbret\u00ebrin\u00eb e Bashkuar, shtetet per\u00ebndimore kan\u00eb qen\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonisht t\u00eb ngadalta dhe t\u00eb kujdesshme n\u00eb kritikat ndaj sjelljes s\u00eb fundit t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb. P\u00ebr hir t\u00eb siguris\u00eb s\u00eb saj, Evropa duhet t\u2019ia b\u00ebj\u00eb t\u00eb qart\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs se nuk do t\u00eb pranoj\u00eb deluzionet ruse p\u00ebr q\u00ebllimet e shteteve t\u00eb tjera si arsyetim p\u00ebr luft\u00eb. Lider\u00ebt evropian\u00eb duhet q\u00eb publikisht t\u2019i quaj\u00eb t\u00eb rreme akuzat ruse kund\u00ebr Kievit dhe Per\u00ebndimit, si dhe t\u00eb p\u00ebrdor\u00eb t\u00eb <\/span>gjitha veglat p\u00ebr masat e nd\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb mir\u00ebbesimit t\u00eb OSBE-s\u00eb<\/span><\/a> p\u00ebr t\u00eb diskredituar publikisht si t\u00eb rreme argumentet e Kremlinit. P\u00ebrmbajtja, indiferenca, dhe distanca diplomatike vet\u00ebm sa do t\u00eb trim\u00ebrojn\u00eb Kremlinin q\u00eb t\u00eb \u00e7oj\u00eb jorealitetin n\u00eb nivel tjet\u00ebr dhe t\u00eb veproj\u00eb n\u00eb p\u00ebrputhje me t\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sa m\u00eb t\u00eb cenuesh\u00ebm fqinjt\u00eb e Rusis\u00eb, aq m\u00eb i efektsh\u00ebm tregimi i forc\u00ebs ushtarake. P\u00ebrforcimi i aft\u00ebsive t\u00eb tyre p\u00ebr t\u2019u vet\u00ebmbrojtur dhe ngritja e \u00e7mimit p\u00ebr aveturizmin ushtarak rus \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje afatgjate q\u00eb evropian\u00ebt nuk mund ta lan\u00e7ojn\u00eb pa qen\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrgatitur \u2013 n\u00eb nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebn e kuptojn\u00eb papritmas se duhet t\u00eb kishin vepruar shum\u00eb m\u00eb her\u00ebt. Ka <\/span>shum\u00eb<\/span><\/a> propozime<\/span><\/a> rreth asaj se si duhet q\u00eb Bashkimi Europian t\u00eb p\u00ebrforcoj\u00eb qendrueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e partner\u00ebve t\u00eb tij lindor. \u00cbsht\u00eb koha q\u00eb t\u00eb veproj\u00eb sipas tyre.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/span><\/p>\n

Artikulli origjinal n\u00eb <\/span>European Council on Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a>, m\u00eb 14 prill 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Ky artikull mb\u00ebshtetet nga “Sbunker” p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb jav\u00ebve t\u00eb fundit l\u00ebvizjet dhe vendosja e ushtris\u00eb ruse pran\u00eb kufirit me Ukrain\u00ebn kan\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr v\u00ebmendjen e Per\u00ebndimit. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb marsit, l\u00ebvizjet e tilla po b\u00ebheshin n\u00eb lindje, veri dhe jug t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs \u2013 p\u00ebrfshi vendosjen e disa trupave bjelloruse \u2013 por jav\u00ebn e kaluar, qendra e gravitetit t\u00eb mobilizimit ushtarak t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":229,"featured_media":8141,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1260],"ppma_author":[235],"class_list":["post-8187","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-kremlinshah"],"authors":[{"term_id":235,"user_id":229,"is_guest":0,"slug":"gustav-gressel","display_name":"Gustav Gressel","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/download-19-2.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/download-19-2.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Gressel","first_name":"Gustav","description":"Gustav Gressel \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb bashk\u00ebpun\u00ebtor i lart\u00eb i politik\u00ebs me Programin e Evrop\u00ebs m\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb n\u00eb K\u00ebshillin Evropian p\u00ebr Marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet e Jashtme n\u00eb zyr\u00ebn e Berlinit. Temat e tij t\u00eb fokusit p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb Rusin\u00eb, Evrop\u00ebn Lindore dhe politik\u00ebn e mbrojtjes."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8187","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/229"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8187"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8187\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8188,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8187\/revisions\/8188"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8141"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8187"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8187"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8187"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=8187"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}