{"id":8191,"date":"2021-04-30T10:54:39","date_gmt":"2021-04-30T08:54:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=8191"},"modified":"2024-10-10T10:56:58","modified_gmt":"2024-10-10T08:56:58","slug":"i-fuqishmi-i-dobet-i-rusise-pjesa-i","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/analize\/i-fuqishmi-i-dobet-i-rusise-pjesa-i\/","title":{"rendered":"I fuqishmi i dob\u00ebt i Rusis\u00eb (pjesa I)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Pazaret e rrezikshme q\u00eb e mbajn\u00eb Putin-in n\u00eb pushtet<\/span><\/i>.<\/span><\/p>\n

P\u00ebr 21 vjet, Vladimir Putin ka mbizot\u00ebruar politik\u00ebn ruse. Si manipulator i zoti i opinionit publik, ai p\u00ebrdor dhun\u00ebn brenda vendit dhe pushtetin e mpreht\u00eb t\u00eb operacioneve kibernetike dhe fushatat e spiunimit kund\u00ebr armiqve t\u00eb jasht\u00ebm. Gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb, analist\u00ebt dhe zyrtar\u00ebt per\u00ebndimor\u00eb e portretizojn\u00eb si nj\u00eb ish agjent t\u00eb gjith\u00ebpushtetsh\u00ebm e t\u00eb pam\u00ebshirsh\u00ebm t\u00eb KGB-s\u00eb, q\u00eb imponon vullnetin e tij mbi Rusin\u00eb prej prapa syzeve t\u00eb err\u00ebta t\u00eb diellit. Ky narrativ, t\u00eb cilin Kremlini b\u00ebn \u00e7\u2019mundet q\u00eb ta p\u00ebrforcoj\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00ebrheq\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u2019u besuar. Putin-i ka burgosur nj\u00ebriun q\u00eb m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti i afrohet konceptit t\u00eb rivalit politik \u2013 liderin e opozit\u00ebs Alexei Navalny \u2013 dhe ka shtypur val\u00ebn e protestave t\u00eb p\u00ebrkrah\u00ebsve t\u00eb Navalny-t. Agjencit\u00eb e inteligjenc\u00ebs t\u00eb Putinit hakuan pafytyr\u00ebsisht qeverin\u00eb amerikane dhe trupat e tij po g\u00ebrryejn\u00eb gradualisht ndikimin amerikan \u00e7doku, q\u00eb nga Libia, n\u00eb Siri, n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sidoqoft\u00eb, n\u00ebse Putini nuk ka rival\u00eb n\u00eb sht\u00ebpi, nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se \u00ebsht\u00eb i plotfuqish\u00ebm. Ashtu si t\u00eb gjith\u00eb autokrat\u00ebt, ai p\u00ebrballet me k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimet e dyfishta t\u00eb grusht shtetit nga elitat p\u00ebrreth tij dhe nga revoltat popullore nga posht\u00eb. P\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb kompromiseve q\u00eb i \u00ebsht\u00eb dashur t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb konsoliduar kontrollin personal mbi shtetin, veglat e Putin-it p\u00ebr ekuilibrimin e q\u00ebllimeve garuese t\u00eb shp\u00ebrblimit t\u00eb elitave q\u00eb ndryshe do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb komplotonin kund\u00ebr tij dhe k\u00ebnaqjes s\u00eb publikut, po b\u00ebhen githnj\u00eb e m\u00eb pak t\u00eb efektshme. Ai ka dob\u00ebsuar institucionet si gjykatat, burokracit\u00eb, zgjedhjet, partit\u00eb dhe legjislaturat, ashtu q\u00eb t\u00eb mos ken\u00eb mund\u00ebsi ta p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb, q\u00eb do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se nuk mund t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetet tek to p\u00ebr t\u00eb gjeneruar rritje ekonomike, zgjidhur konflikte sociale, madje as t\u00eb ndihmojn\u00eb n\u00eb dor\u00ebzimin paq\u00ebsor t\u00eb postit q\u00eb mban. Kjo e b\u00ebn t\u00eb varur Putin-in n\u00eb komoditetin kalimtar t\u00eb popullaritetit personal dhe metodat e rrezikshme t\u00eb shtypjes dhe propagand\u00ebs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ata q\u00eb kuptojn\u00eb k\u00ebto dob\u00ebsi shpesh v\u00ebrejn\u00eb se Putin-i \u201cpo luan mir\u00eb nj\u00eb dor\u00eb t\u00eb dob\u00ebt\u201d. Megjith\u00ebk\u00ebt\u00eb, Putin-i ka zgjedhur dor\u00ebn e tij dhe kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb e dob\u00ebt kryesisht p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimeve q\u00eb jan\u00eb pjes\u00eb e regjimeve si ky q\u00eb ka nd\u00ebrtuar. Me koh\u00eb, ai do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb vendos\u00eb se a do t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb me t\u00eb njejt\u00ebn loj\u00eb ekuilibrimi, duke e luajtur me shkatht\u00ebsi dor\u00ebn e dob\u00ebt edhe n\u00ebse kjo e zvog\u00eblon gradualisht pushtetin e tij, apo t\u00eb provoj\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrforcoj\u00eb dor\u00ebn duke nisur reforma ekonomike q\u00eb do t\u2019i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnonte njer\u00ebzit e tij n\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimet e sigurimit, burokraci, dhe sektorin privat.<\/span><\/p>\n

Putin-i ishte mb\u00ebshtetur nga nj\u00eb rritje e madhe ekonomike e nxitur nga nafta, q\u00eb ngriti duksh\u00ebm standardet e jetes\u00ebs n\u00eb dhjet\u00ebvje\u00e7arin e par\u00eb n\u00eb pushtet dhe nga nj\u00eb val\u00eb e sentimentit nacionalist pas aneksimit t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb n\u00eb dhjet\u00ebvje\u00e7arin e dyt\u00eb. Me venitjen e shkelqimit t\u00eb k\u00ebtyre arritjeve n\u00eb dhjet\u00ebvje\u00e7arin e tij t\u00eb tret\u00eb, Putin-i po mb\u00ebshtetet gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb tek shtypja p\u00ebr t\u00eb neutralizuar si kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebt e m\u00ebdhenj, ashtu edhe t\u00eb vegjlit. Ky trend me gjas\u00eb do t\u00eb rritet p\u00ebr sa koh\u00eb q\u00eb rriten problemet e Rusis\u00eb, duke p\u00ebrshpejtuar nj\u00eb cik\u00ebl t\u00eb dhun\u00ebs politike dhe s\u00ebmundjes ekonomike q\u00eb mund t\u00eb ngulfas\u00eb ambiciet e Putinit p\u00ebr fuqi t\u00eb madhe dhe t\u00eb testoj\u00eb shkatht\u00ebsin\u00eb e tij politike.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rreziqet e putinologjis\u00eb<\/b><\/p>\n

Narrativi i Putin-it si i gjith\u00ebpushtetsh\u00ebm mb\u00ebshtetet pjes\u00ebrisht nga analist\u00ebt q\u00eb besojn\u00eb se p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar autokracin\u00eb, duhet t\u00eb kuptojm\u00eb autokratin. P\u00ebr t\u00eb gjetur t\u00eb dh\u00ebna p\u00ebr politikat e tij, putinolog\u00ebt gjurmojn\u00eb prapavij\u00ebn e liderit rus, karrier\u00ebn e tij, madje edhe \u00e7far\u00eb i p\u00eblqen t\u00eb lexoj\u00eb. Analizat e tyre tregojn\u00eb nj\u00eb storie t\u00eb p\u00eblqyeshme t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb s\u00eb Putin-it, por nuk shpjegojn\u00eb dot edhe aq shum\u00eb. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, Putin-i ishte po ai ish- agjent i KGB-s\u00eb n\u00eb vitet e para t\u00eb k\u00ebtij shekulli, kur mb\u00ebshteste politika ekonomike liberale dhe marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie m\u00eb t\u00eb mira me Per\u00ebndimit, q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe sot, me qendrimin e vendosur antiper\u00ebndimor. M\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme, politika ruse ndjek modele t\u00eb njohura t\u00eb nj\u00eb grupi regjimesh autoritare q\u00eb shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebt politik\u00eb i quajn\u00eb <\/span>\u201cautokraci personaliste<\/span><\/i>.\u201d M\u00ebnyra m\u00eb e mir\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar Rusin\u00eb e Putin-it \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb studiuarit e k\u00ebtij lloji t\u00eb sistemit, n\u00eb vend se t\u00eb studiuarit e vet njeriut.<\/span><\/p>\n

Si\u00e7 kuptohet nga emri, autokracit\u00eb personaliste udh\u00ebhiqen nga individ\u00eb t\u00eb vet\u00ebm. Ata shpesh kan\u00eb parti politike, legjislatura dhe ushtri me ndikim, por pushteti mbi personelin e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm ose vendimet politike gjithmon\u00eb i p\u00ebrket njeriut n\u00eb krye. Shembujt bashk\u00ebkohor\u00eb t\u00eb k\u00ebtij lloji t\u00eb regjimit p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb Viktor Orban-in e Hungaris\u00eb, Rodrigo Duterte-n e Filipineve, Recep Tayyip Erdogan-in e Turqis\u00eb, dhe Nicolas Maduro-n e Venezuel\u00ebs. Ish hap\u00ebsira sovjetike \u00ebsht\u00eb d\u00ebshmuar posa\u00e7\u00ebrisht mikprit\u00ebse ndaj autokrat\u00ebve personalist\u00eb: lider\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb sundojn\u00eb me Azerbajxhanin, Bellorusin\u00eb, Kazakstanin, Kirgistanin, Taxhikistanin, Turkmenistanin dhe Uzbekistanin. Globalisht, autokracit\u00eb personaliste tash jan\u00eb tipi m\u00eb i p\u00ebrhapur i autokracis\u00eb, duke ia kaluar me num\u00ebr edhe regjimeve nj\u00ebpartiake, sikurse ato n\u00eb Singapor dhe Vietnam, edhe regjimeve ushtarake, si ai n\u00eb Mianmar.<\/span><\/p>\n

Autokracit\u00eb personaliste shfaqin nj\u00eb num\u00ebr patologjish q\u00eb jan\u00eb t\u00eb njohura p\u00ebr v\u00ebzhguesit e Rusis\u00eb. Ato kan\u00eb nivele m\u00eb t\u00eb larta t\u00eb korrupsionit se sa autokracit\u00eb nj\u00ebpartiake ose ushtarake dhe rritje m\u00eb t\u00eb vog\u00ebl ekonomike, shtypje m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe dhe politik\u00eb m\u00eb pak stabile. Sundimtar\u00ebt n\u00eb autokracit\u00eb personaliste kan\u00eb gjithashtu nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt veprimi: ata ndezin sentimentet antiper\u00ebndimore p\u00ebr t\u00eb mobilizuar p\u00ebrkrah\u00ebsit, shp\u00ebrfytyrojn\u00eb ekonomin\u00eb n\u00eb sh\u00ebrbim t\u00eb miqve t\u00eb tyre, sh\u00ebnjestrojn\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebt politik\u00eb duke shfryt\u00ebzuar sistemin ligjor dhe zgjerojn\u00eb pushtetin ekzekutiv n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb institucioneve tjera. Shpesh, ata mb\u00ebshteten tek nj\u00eb rreth i brendsh\u00ebm joformal i vendimmarr\u00ebsve q\u00eb ngushtohet me koh\u00eb dhe em\u00ebrojn\u00eb lojalist\u00ebt ose an\u00ebtar\u00ebt e faimljes n\u00eb pozicione ky\u00e7e n\u00eb qeveri. Ata krijojn\u00eb organizata t\u00eb reja t\u00eb siguris\u00eb q\u00eb u raportojn\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt atyre dhe k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb p\u00ebrkrahje popullore, n\u00eb vend se zgjedhje t\u00eb lira dhe t\u00eb drejta p\u00ebr t\u00eb legjitimuar autoritetin e tyre.<\/span><\/p>\n

K\u00ebto prirje shpjegohen leht\u00eb, kur kihet parasysh \u00e7far\u00eb mund t\u00eb humbin autokrat\u00ebt personalist\u00eb n\u00eb rast se largohen nga pozita. Udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit e diktatur\u00ebs ushtarake mund t\u00eb t\u00ebrhiqen n\u00eb barakat e tyre dhe kryetar\u00ebt e diktaturave nj\u00ebpartiake mund t\u00eb marrin poste t\u00eb par\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb parti, por diktator\u00ebt personalist\u00eb e g\u00ebzojn\u00eb pasurin\u00eb dhe ndikimin e tyre vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr sa koh\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb qendrojn\u00eb n\u00eb pushtet. Me ta braktisur pushtetin, ata jan\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebshir\u00ebn e pasardh\u00ebsve t\u00eb tyre, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt rrall\u00ebher\u00eb kursejn\u00eb rival\u00ebt e tyre t\u00eb dikursh\u00ebm. P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb 70 viteve, autokrat\u00ebt personalist\u00eb q\u00eb kan\u00eb humbur pushtetin ose kan\u00eb p\u00ebrfunduar ose n\u00eb azil, ose n\u00eb burg, ose t\u00eb vdekur.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edhe pse mund t\u00eb mos e shfaq\u00eb, sigurisht se Putin-i \u00ebsht\u00eb i vet\u00ebdijsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb rrezik. Si\u00e7 pat th\u00ebn\u00eb ish-k\u00ebshilltari dhe tash kritiku i liderit rus Gleb Pavlosvsky, n\u00eb nj\u00eb intervist\u00eb t\u00eb vitit 2012:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cN\u00eb establishmentin e Kremlinit\u2026 ka pasur bindje absolute se me t\u00eb ndryshuar qendra e pushtetit, ose n\u00ebse ka presion n\u00eb mas\u00eb, ose n\u00eb u shfaq nj\u00eb lider popullor, at\u00ebher\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb do t\u00eb asgj\u00ebsohen. \u00cbsht\u00eb ndjesi e brisht\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe. Me t\u2019iu dh\u00ebn\u00eb mund\u00ebsia dikujt \u2013 jo doemos popullit, ndoshta guvernator\u00ebve, ndoshta nj\u00eb fraksioni tjet\u00ebr \u2013do ta shkat\u00ebrrojn\u00eb fizikisht establishmentin, ose neve do t\u00eb na duhet t\u00eb luftojm\u00eb q\u00eb t\u2019i shkat\u00ebrrojm\u00eb ata\u201d.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Ngjashm\u00ebrit\u00eb mes Putin-it dhe diktator\u00ebve t\u00eb tjer\u00eb personalist\u00eb nuk p\u00ebrfundojn\u00eb me brengat e tij p\u00ebr largimin nga pushteti. Ashtu si homolog\u00ebt e tij filipinas, hungarez, turk, venezuelas dhe t\u00eb Azis\u00eb Qendrore, ai ka g\u00ebrryer gradualisht fuqin\u00eb e legjislaturave, ka n\u00ebnshtruar mediat e pavarura, ka manipuluar zgjedhjet, ka uzurpuar autoritetin e zyrtar\u00ebve t\u00eb fuqish\u00ebm rajonal\u00eb. Vitin e kaluar, Putin ka nxitur ndryshimet kushtetuese t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb q\u00eb do t\u2019i lejojn\u00eb t\u00eb kandidoj\u00eb n\u00eb vitet 2024 dhe 2030. Marr\u00eb parasysh aspektet negative t\u00eb mundshme nga l\u00ebnia e postit si autokrat personalist, kjo p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjatur sundimin e tij nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb aq befasuese. P\u00ebrball kufizimeve t\u00eb ngajshme t\u00eb mandateve, secili autokrat personalist n\u00eb ish Bashkimin Sovjetik ka b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb njejt\u00ebn zgjedhje.<\/span><\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, duke dob\u00ebsuar ato institucione politike q\u00eb kufizojn\u00eb pushtetin ekzekutiv, Putin-i ka reduktuar sigurin\u00eb rreth politikave dhe ka rritur c\u00ebnueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e elitave. P\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, investitor\u00ebt parap\u00eblqejn\u00eb t\u00eb d\u00ebrgojn\u00eb kapitalin e tyre n\u00eb vende t\u00eb sigurta jasht\u00eb Rusis\u00eb dhe shum\u00eb t\u00eb rinj rus\u00eb kan\u00eb d\u00ebrguar kapitalin e tyre njer\u00ebzor jasht\u00eb vendit. Madje edhe rus\u00ebt m\u00eb t\u00eb pasur ndjehen t\u00eb c\u00ebnuesh\u00ebm: ata kan\u00eb tep\u00ebr shum\u00eb para t\u00eb thata nga pasuria e tyre dhe t\u00eb ardhura m\u00eb t\u00eb paq\u00ebndrueshme se sa bashk\u00ebmoshatar\u00ebt e tyre n\u00eb vende t\u00eb tjera, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb i kan\u00eb rezistuar thirrjeve t\u00eb Kremlinit q\u00eb t\u00eb kthejn\u00eb kapitalin e tyre n\u00eb sht\u00ebpi.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pa institucione t\u00eb forta formale p\u00ebr t\u00eb legjitimuar qeverisjen e tij, Putin-i mb\u00ebshtetet tek popullariteti i madh personal p\u00ebr t\u00eb frenuar sfidat nga elitat dhe p\u00ebr t\u2019i mbajtur protestuesit larg rrug\u00ebve. P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb 20 vjet\u00ebve t\u00eb fundit, p\u00ebrkrahja p\u00ebr Putin-in ka qen\u00eb 74 p\u00ebr qind dhe ka pak arsye p\u00ebr t\u00eb besuar q\u00eb rus\u00ebt po i g\u00ebnjejn\u00eb anketuesit n\u00eb mas\u00eb t\u00eb madhe. Megjithat\u00eb, kjo p\u00ebrkrahje e madhe ka qen\u00eb pasoj\u00eb e zhvillimit ekonomik q\u00eb dyfishoi madh\u00ebsin\u00eb e ekonomis\u00eb ruse n\u00eb vitet 1998 dhe 2008 dhe suksesi unik n\u00eb politik\u00ebn e jashtme i aneksimit t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb m\u00eb 2014. Q\u00eb prej 2018, popullariteti i Putin-it ka r\u00ebn\u00eb. P\u00ebrkrahja p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbetet diku rreth 60 p\u00ebr qind, por rus\u00ebt tregojn\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb pak besim n\u00eb t\u00eb se sa n\u00eb t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn. N\u00eb nj\u00eb sondazh t\u00eb n\u00ebntorit 2017, kur u pyet\u00ebn se cil\u00ebt jan\u00eb pes\u00eb politikan\u00ebt q\u00eb u besojn\u00eb m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti, 59 p\u00ebr qind e t\u00eb anketuarve p\u00ebrmend\u00ebn Putin-in; n\u00eb shkurt 2021, vet\u00ebm 32 p\u00ebr qind u p\u00ebrgjigjen ashtu. Gjat\u00eb k\u00ebtij intervali, p\u00ebrkrahja p\u00ebr mandatin e pest\u00eb t\u00eb Putin-it ra nga 70 p\u00ebr qind n\u00eb 48 p\u00ebr qind, me 41 p\u00ebr qind t\u00eb rus\u00ebve t\u00eb anketuar q\u00eb thon\u00eb se do t\u00eb parap\u00eblqenin q\u00eb t\u00eb dor\u00ebhiqej.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pafuqia e plotfuqis\u00eb<\/b><\/p>\n

Putin-i kufizohet jo vet\u00ebm nga nevoja p\u00ebr p\u00ebrkrahje t\u00eb gj\u00ebr\u00eb n\u00eb opinion, por gjithashtu nga sfidat e qeverisjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb shoq\u00ebrie moderne me nj\u00eb burokraci t\u00eb ngath\u00ebt. Te <\/span>Khrushchev: Njeriu dhe Epoka e tij, <\/span><\/i>shkenc\u00ebtari politik William Taubman p\u00ebrmend se si Nikita Khrushchev, i cili udh\u00ebhoqi me Bashkimin Sovjetik prej vitit 1953 deri m\u00eb 1964 dhe kontrolloi Partin\u00eb Komuniste dhe aparatin burokratik me ndikim shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madh mbi shoq\u00ebrin\u00eb se sa q\u00eb ka Putin-i, u ankua n\u00eb liderin kuban Fidel Castro rreth kufizimeve t\u00eb pushtetit t\u00eb tij:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cMund t\u2019ju shkoj\u00eb mendja se un\u00eb mund t\u00eb ndryshoj gjith\u00e7ka n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb vend. Assesi nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb ashtu. Pa marr\u00eb parasysh \u00e7far\u00eb ndrshime propozoj dhe b\u00ebj, gjith\u00e7ka mbetet nj\u00ebsoj. Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb si legen plot me brum\u00eb, e fut dor\u00ebn brenda, deri n\u00eb fund, dhe mendon se je i zoti i situat\u00ebs. Kur nxjerr s\u00eb pari dor\u00ebn, mbetet nj\u00eb vrim\u00eb e vog\u00ebl, por pastaj, p\u00ebrpara syve t\u00eb tu, brumi zgjerohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb mas\u00eb sfungjerore e t\u00eb fryr\u00eb. Ashtu disi \u00ebsht\u00eb Rusia\u201d.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Madh\u00ebsia e jasht\u00ebzakonshme e Rusis\u00eb dhe kompleksiteti burokratik do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se Putin-i duhet t\u00eb delegoj\u00eb pashmangsh\u00ebm nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb autoritetit vendimmarr\u00ebs tek zyrtar\u00ebt e nivelit t\u00eb ul\u00ebt, ku secili prej tyre ka interesat e veta. Meqen\u00ebse institucionet shtet\u00ebrore t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb jan\u00eb t\u00eb dob\u00ebta, Putin-it i duhet t\u00eb punoj\u00eb gjithashtu me biznesmen\u00eb t\u00eb fuqish\u00ebm, t\u00eb cilat jan\u00eb t\u00eb prirur q\u00eb t\u00eb akumulojn\u00eb pasuri m\u00eb shum\u00eb se sa t\u2019i sh\u00ebrbejn\u00eb shtetit. Me kanalizimin e autoritetit t\u00eb Putin-it n\u00ebp\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb zinxhir burokrat\u00ebsh, biznesmen\u00ebsh dhe spiun\u00ebsh, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt mund t\u00eb ken\u00eb ose mund t\u00eb mos ken\u00eb preferenca t\u00eb njejta me t\u00eb, l\u00ebshimet ngjajn\u00eb pashmangsh\u00ebm dhe politikat nuk zbatohen ashtu si\u00e7 do t\u00eb parap\u00eblqente ai.<\/span><\/p>\n

Problemi nd\u00ebrlikohet edhe m\u00eb kur Kremlini k\u00ebrkon t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb mohueshm\u00ebri t\u00eb p\u00eblqyeshme. P\u00ebr shembull, q\u00eb t\u00eb furnizoj\u00eb fshehtas rebel\u00ebt n\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn lindore, Putin-i u lidh me oligarkun rus Konstantin Malofeev, i cili ka financuar nj\u00eb band\u00eb mercenar\u00ebsh privat\u00eb, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt kan\u00eb mbajtur lidhje indirekte me ushtrin\u00eb ruse. Sidoqoft\u00eb, n\u00eb korrik t\u00eb vitit 2014, k\u00ebta rebel\u00eb duket se kan\u00eb rr\u00ebzuar aeorplanin e Malaysian Airlines, duke vrar\u00eb gati 300 pasagjer\u00ebt q\u00eb ishin n\u00eb bord. N\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb kamufloj\u00eb sulmet kibernetike, Kremlini mb\u00ebshtetet tek haker\u00ebt q\u00eb punojn\u00eb p\u00ebr firma t\u00eb sektorit privat, por t\u00eb cil\u00ebt nuk i p\u00ebrgjigjen sh\u00ebrbimeve ruse t\u00eb siguris\u00eb. M\u00eb 2016, ishte pik\u00ebrisht pakujdesia e k\u00ebtyre haker\u00ebve q\u00eb i mund\u00ebsoi Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara q\u00eb t\u00eb identifikojn\u00eb Rusin\u00eb si burim t\u00eb hakimit t\u00eb Komitetit Komb\u00ebtar t\u00eb Partis\u00eb Demokratike. Analisti i Rusis\u00eb Mark Galeotti e ka quajtur \u201cadhocraci\u201d delegimin e pun\u00ebve t\u00eb pista nga Kremlini te grupet me lidhjet t\u00eb err\u00ebta me pushtetin.\u00a0 Kjo metod\u00eb e pun\u00ebve t\u00eb shtetit fsheh dor\u00ebn e Mosk\u00ebs, por gjithashtu dob\u00ebson kontrollin mbi politikat.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kremlini ka telashe poashtu me kryerjen e pun\u00ebve t\u00eb p\u00ebrditshme. M\u00eb 2012, Putin-i shpalli nj\u00eb grup t\u00eb detajuar caqesh p\u00ebr t\u00eb shtuar rritjen ekonomike, p\u00ebrmir\u00ebsuar efi\u00e7enc\u00ebn burokratike dhe p\u00ebrkrahur programet sociale. Se k\u00ebto dekrete u formuluan keq ishte indikacion i dob\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb burokracis\u00eb (mes shum\u00eb t\u00eb metave, ato supozuan n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb optimiste se do t\u00eb kishte rritje vjetore prej shtat\u00eb p\u00ebr qind). Edhe m\u00eb treguese ishte mungesa e zbatimit t\u00eb tyre. N\u00eb pes\u00eb vjetorin e k\u00ebtyre dekreteve, kryetari i at\u00ebhersh\u00ebm i partis\u00eb s\u00eb af\u00ebrme me Kremlinin Rusia e Drejt\u00eb Sergei Mironov, raportoi se burokracia kishte zbatuar vet\u00ebm 35 nga 179 dekretet e monitoruara nga komisioni i tij parlamentar. Autokrat\u00ebt kan\u00eb pasur shum\u00eb telashe q\u00eb t\u00eb nxjerrin informata nga vart\u00ebsit e tyre dhe t\u00eb sigurohen q\u00eb politikat e tyre zbatohen, dhe Putin-i nuk paraqet ndonj\u00eb p\u00ebrjashtim nga kjo.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Ky artikull mb\u00ebshtetet nga “Sbunker” p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Pazaret e rrezikshme q\u00eb e mbajn\u00eb Putin-in n\u00eb pushtet. P\u00ebr 21 vjet, Vladimir Putin ka mbizot\u00ebruar politik\u00ebn ruse. Si manipulator i zoti i opinionit publik, ai p\u00ebrdor dhun\u00ebn brenda vendit dhe pushtetin e mpreht\u00eb t\u00eb operacioneve kibernetike dhe fushatat e spiunimit kund\u00ebr armiqve t\u00eb jasht\u00ebm. Gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb, analist\u00ebt dhe zyrtar\u00ebt per\u00ebndimor\u00eb e portretizojn\u00eb […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":104,"featured_media":8141,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1260],"ppma_author":[123],"class_list":["post-8191","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-kremlinshah"],"authors":[{"term_id":123,"user_id":104,"is_guest":0,"slug":"timothy-frye","display_name":"Timothy Frye","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/download-4-4.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/download-4-4.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Frye","first_name":"Timothy","description":"Timothy M. Frye \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shkenc\u00ebtar politik amerikan. Ai \u00ebsht\u00eb profesor i Marshall D. Shulman i Politik\u00ebs s\u00eb Jashtme Post-Sovjetike dhe Kryetar i Departamentit t\u00eb Shkencave Politike n\u00eb Universitetin Columbia, dhe autor i disa librave p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8191","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/104"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8191"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8191\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8192,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8191\/revisions\/8192"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8141"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8191"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8191"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8191"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=8191"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}