{"id":862,"date":"2023-04-05T10:13:49","date_gmt":"2023-04-05T10:13:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=862"},"modified":"2024-12-09T12:15:04","modified_gmt":"2024-12-09T10:15:04","slug":"samiti-i-ohrit-dhe-rezultatet-e-dobeta-kosove-serbi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/opinion\/samiti-i-ohrit-dhe-rezultatet-e-dobeta-kosove-serbi\/","title":{"rendered":"Kosovo-Serbia underwhelming results from the Ohrid Summit"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>On March 18, 2023, representatives of Serbia, Kosovo, the EU, and the U.S. gathered in Ohrid, North Macedonia, to discuss the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-eu-proposal-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en\">EU<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-implementation-annex-agreement-path-normalisation-relations-between_en\">\u00a0Implementation Annex\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0for the normalization of relations.<\/p>\n<p>While Kosovo and Serbia accepted both documents, the negotiations were marked by compromises that led to a watered-down agreement, lack of a clear timeline for implementation, and absence of signatures from the parties involved.<\/p>\n<p>Most importantly, the documents fail to achieve the long-anticipated normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Instead, it looks like the mediators tried to satisfy the aspirations of both sides at the cost of more tangible progress.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, doubts remain about the potential success and implementation of the agreement.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Annex and key takeaways<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The main focus of the negotiations was the Implementation Annex, as both sides\u00a0\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after-high-level_en\">accepted<\/a>\u00a0the EU Proposal in February. After the meeting, which lasted for 12 hours, all parties agreed on a 12-point Annex.<\/p>\n<p>The Annex introduces a key novelty, the creation of the Joint Monitoring Committee, which the EU will chair, to report on the implementation progress of both sides. The Committee represents an important tool for enforcing the implementation of all previous and future agreements and is something\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/kdi-kosova.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/30-Analysis-ENG-08.pdf\">experts<\/a>\u00a0have already called for.<\/p>\n<p>However, Kosovo\u2019s agreement to\u00a0<em>\u201cimmediately launch negotiations on self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo\u201d\u00a0<\/em>has yet to officially begin, despite the use of the word \u201cimmediately\u201d in the agreement.<\/p>\n<p>Additionally, the lack of specific implementation deadlines in the Annex could result in further delays, as previous agreements have experienced.<\/p>\n<p>The only two specific dates provided in the Annex are related to the EU, requiring the EU to establish the Joint Monitoring Committee in 30 days and to organize a donor conference within 150 days to secure financial and investment aid packages for both sides.<\/p>\n<p>It remains to be seen if the EU will respect its deadlines and whether this kind of incentive will be enough to accelerate the normalization process.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What happened after March 18?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Even though Pristina was hoping for mutual recognition, the agreement only contains a provision in Article 4 of the EU proposal that parties will not object to one another regarding membership in international organizations.<\/p>\n<p>However, Serbian President Vucic\u00a0\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.danas.rs\/vesti\/politika\/vucic-o-kosovu-nece-biti-nikakve-kapitulacije-i-predaje-srbije-necemo-se-saglasiti-oko-ulaska-kosova-u-un\/\">deklaroi<\/a>\u00a0that Serbia will not recognize Kosovo or its UN membership. This raises concerns about the credibility of the agreement and its implementation, given that Vucic made his position clear immediately after the negotiations concluded.<\/p>\n<p>Considering the underwhelming results of the agreement, it seems that the EU and the U.S. have given up on mutual recognition for now. Despite significant pressure, full normalization of relations appears unlikely to be achieved immediately.<\/p>\n<p>Instead of enforcing a quick solution and risking their credibility, the focus will be on gradually normalizing economic relations, followed by a slow process of political normalization.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, the strategy has shifted towards enabling Kosovo\u2019s membership in international organizations and focusing on full normalization for a later stage.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Will the Association\/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities finally be implemented?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Despite PM Kurti\u2019s\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/n1info.rs\/english\/news\/kurti-self-management-not-self-administration-for-kosovo-serbs\/\">statement<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0that there will not be autonomy for Serbs, it has become apparent that all previous agreements, including establishing the Association\/Community of Serb-Municiaplities (ASM), must be implemented.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, there are\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/sbunker.net\/op-ed\/91712\/nga-zajednica-ne-vetemenaxhim\/\">concerns<\/a>\u00a0that the terminology in the Annex providing\u00a0<em>\u00a0self-management for the Serbian community\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0could imply an even greater degree of autonomy than what was agreed upon in the 2015 agreement.<\/p>\n<p>Serbia has consistently emphasized the importance of implementing the ASM, which will likely remain a significant challenge for Prime Minister Kurti.<\/p>\n<p>Kurti has demonstrated a willingness to change his position on this matter. His rhetoric has evolved over the past three years.<\/p>\n<p>Initially, he was staunchly against the ASM.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rtklive.com\/en\/news-single.php?ID=22589\">However, he later proposed six conduction<\/a>\u00a0that needed to be met for its implementation. Currently, his opinion has shifted in favor of\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/n1info.rs\/english\/news\/kurti-self-management-not-self-administration-for-kosovo-serbs\/\">\u00a0self-management<\/a>without granting autonomy.<\/p>\n<p>This shift was not well-received in Kosovo, leading to a\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kosovo-online.com\/en\/news\/politics\/survey-support-kurti-dropped-595-percent-may-2021-449-10-3-2023\">\u00a0decline\u00a0<\/a>in Kurti\u2019s approval rating. To show their frustration with the government, some opposition activists\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.telegraf.rs\/english\/3649672-cake-and-milkshake-in-the-face-because-of-community-of-serb-municipalities-kurtis-deputy-attacked\">\u00a0threw a cake and milkshake\u00a0<em>milkshake<\/em><\/a>\u00a0at Deputy PM Besnik Beslimi, who had previously\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/indeksonline.net\/a-do-te-jap-doreheqje-besnik-bislimi-ky-ishte-zotimi-i-tij-per-asociacionin\/\">stated<\/a>\u00a0that he would resign if the government accepted the ASM.<\/p>\n<p>Overall, the Franco-German proposal, which was grandiosely announced last year, has been a source of disappointment rather than a meaningful outcome to normalizing relations. The proposal attempted to avoid red lines from both Kosovo and Serbia to satisfy both sides.<\/p>\n<p>It did not explicitly mention the ASM for Kosovo (instead, it ambiguously\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/sbunker.net\/op-ed\/91712\/nga-zajednica-ne-vetemenaxhim\/\">\u00a0camouflaged<\/a>\u00a0as self-management), while for Serbia, it does not mention state recognition. This Agreement and its Annex, remain ambiguous much like previous agreements.<\/p>\n<p>It remains to be seen whether this agreement will represent a turning point in the normalization process or delay it further.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>M\u00eb 18 mars 2023, p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsues t\u00eb Serbis\u00eb, Kosov\u00ebs, BE-s\u00eb e ShBA-s\u00eb, u mblodh\u00ebn n\u00eb Oh\u00ebr t\u00eb Maqedonis\u00eb e Veriut p\u00ebr t\u00eb diskutuar\u00a0Propozimin e BE-s\u00eb\u00a0dhe\u00a0Aneksin e Zbatimit\u00a0p\u00ebr normalizimin e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve. Derisa Kosova dhe Serbia i pranuan t\u00eb dy dokumentet, negociatat u karakterizuan nga kompromise q\u00eb \u00e7uan n\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb zbeht\u00eb, munges\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00eb afati t\u00eb [&hellip;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":10596,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[672,687,664,12,656],"ppma_author":[25],"class_list":["post-862","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-eu","tag-foreign-policy","tag-kosovo","tag-serbia","tag-usa"],"authors":[{"term_id":25,"user_id":15,"is_guest":0,"slug":"milos-pavkovic","display_name":"Milo\u0161 Pavkovi\u0107","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/MP_cropped-150x150-1.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/MP_cropped-150x150-1.jpg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Pavkovi\u0107","first_name":"Milo\u0161","description":"Milo\u0161 Pavkovi\u0107 \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shkenc\u00ebtar politik me specializim n\u00eb rajonin e Evrop\u00ebs Juglindore, politik\u00ebn krahasuese, regjimet hibride dhe politik\u00ebn e BE-s\u00eb. Studimet bachelor dhe master p\u00ebr shkenca politike i kreu n\u00eb Universitetin e Beogradit. Ai kaloi nj\u00eb vit n\u00eb Universitetin e Grazit si student n\u00eb Erasmus dhe mbrojti tez\u00ebn e magjistratur\u00ebs (De)konsolidimi i shtet\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs n\u00eb kontekstin e negociatave bashk\u00ebkohore nd\u00ebrmjet Qeverive t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs* dhe Serbis\u00eb. Ai kreu masterin e dyt\u00eb n\u00eb shkencat politike n\u00eb Universitetin e Evrop\u00ebs Qendrore (CEU). Ai \u00ebsht\u00eb bashk\u00ebautor i publikimit Elementet kryesore t\u00eb nevojshme p\u00ebr p\u00ebrparimin n\u00eb normalizimin e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrmjet Kosov\u00ebs dhe Serbis\u00eb. Milo\u0161 aktualisht \u00ebsht\u00eb i pun\u00ebsuar si studiues n\u00eb Qendr\u00ebn e Politikave Evropiane (CEP), Beograd dhe sh\u00ebrben si Ambasador i Ri i Evrop\u00ebs n\u00eb Ballkanin Per\u00ebndimor."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/862","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=862"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/862\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10796,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/862\/revisions\/10796"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10596"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=862"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=862"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=862"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=862"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}