{"id":2491,"date":"2021-02-23T11:48:38","date_gmt":"2021-02-23T09:48:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=2491"},"modified":"2024-10-16T11:55:48","modified_gmt":"2024-10-16T09:55:48","slug":"marreveshja-e-europes-me-kinen-si-mos-te-punohet-me-administraten-e-biden-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/analize\/marreveshja-e-europes-me-kinen-si-mos-te-punohet-me-administraten-e-biden-it\/","title":{"rendered":"Marr\u00ebveshja e Europ\u00ebs me Kin\u00ebn: Si mos t\u00eb punohet me administrat\u00ebn e Biden-it"},"content":{"rendered":"

Vet\u00eb prospekti i aleanc\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrforcuar BE-SHBA e detyroi Pekinin t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb l\u00ebshime ndaj Brukselit n\u00eb dhjetor \u2013 nj\u00eb m\u00ebsim mbi fuqin\u00eb e nd\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb koalicioneve globale, t\u00eb cilin Europa d\u00ebshtoi ta b\u00ebnte.<\/em><\/p>\n

Menj\u00ebher\u00eb pas Krishtlindjes, Bashkimi Europian arriti nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje politike rreth Marr\u00ebveshjes Gjithp\u00ebrfshir\u00ebse p\u00ebr Investime (CAI) me Kin\u00ebn. Kjo ka nxitur furi kritash n\u00eb Europ\u00eb dhe nga partner\u00ebt kryesor\u00eb t\u00eb BE-s\u00eb. K\u00ebto kritika i drejtohen m\u00eb pak vet\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjes, e cila konsiderohet relativisht m\u00eb e favorshme se marr\u00ebveshja tregtare Phase One SHBA-Kin\u00eb dhe\u00a0Partneriteti Ekonomik Rajonal Gjith\u00ebp\u00ebrfshir\u00ebs (RCEP<\/a>)<\/a>, dhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb kontekstit politik t\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjes. Kjo gjithsesi se \u00ebsht\u00eb jasht\u00eb hapit me sentimentin publik gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb dyshues ndaj Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb Europ\u00eb, dhe vjen pas nj\u00eb q\u00ebndrimi jasht\u00ebzakonisht agresiv dhe shtyp\u00ebs t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs rreth \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve si Hong Kongu, Xinjiangu dhe shtr\u00ebngimi ekonomik i Australis\u00eb. \u00c7\u2019\u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme, q\u00eb nga Uashingtoni te Nju Delhi, marr\u00ebveshja duket m\u00eb pak si akt autonomie strategjike, e m\u00eb shum\u00eb si form\u00eb e improvizimit t\u00eb lir\u00eb. BE-ja p\u00ebrfitoi nga nj\u00eb sens i porsalindur i presionit kolektiv me t\u00eb cilin u p\u00ebrball Pekini, dhe vullneti i madh i Kin\u00ebs q\u00eb t\u00eb pengoj\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjet e administrat\u00ebs s\u00eb re amerikane p\u00ebr nd\u00ebrtimin e koalicioneve, q\u00eb me t\u2019iu dh\u00ebn\u00eb rasti, t\u00eb siguroj\u00eb ujdin\u00eb dypal\u00ebshe. Prap\u00ebseprap\u00eb, ndon\u00ebse ky episod shton frik\u00ebn e kahershme t\u00eb partner\u00ebve t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs rreth qasjes s\u00eb saj ndaj Kin\u00ebs, ai sh\u00ebnon n\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00ebnyra fundin e nj\u00eb epoke. N\u00eb vend se nj\u00eb sh\u00ebmb\u00eblltyr\u00eb e mosbesueshm\u00ebris\u00eb europiane, kjo duhet t\u00eb shihet si p\u00ebrpjekja e fundit p\u00ebr finalizimin e nj\u00eb modeli t\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve BE-Kin\u00eb, q\u00eb nuk t\u00ebrheq m\u00eb ndonj\u00eb p\u00ebrkrahje t\u00eb gjer\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Argumenti p\u00ebr vet\u00eb CAI-n\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb i arsyesh\u00ebm: marr\u00ebveshja po negociohej p\u00ebr shtat\u00eb vite; BE-ja caktoi vitin 2020 si afat t\u00eb fundit p\u00ebr arritjen e marr\u00ebveshjes; n\u00eb fund, Kina pranoi k\u00ebrkesat e Europ\u00ebs. CAI nuk qe asnj\u00ebher\u00eb mjet p\u00ebrmes t\u00eb cilit do t\u00eb arrihej \u00e7do objektiv dypal\u00ebsh me Kin\u00ebn, dhe gjithmon\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb konsideruar e kufizuar p\u00ebr nga natyra. Marr\u00ebveshja p\u00ebrb\u00ebn p\u00ebrparim t\u00eb vog\u00ebl n\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtje te interesit t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt \u2013 q\u00eb prej subvencioneve industriale, deri te zhvillimi i q\u00ebndrueshem \u2013 nd\u00ebrkaq, zotimet e Kin\u00ebs p\u00ebr qasje n\u00eb treg i b\u00ebjn\u00eb mir\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00ebve, jo vet\u00ebm Europ\u00ebs. BE-ja po fuqizon instrumente t\u00eb tjera p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndjekur subvencionet kineze dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb sanksionuar shkel\u00ebsit e t\u00eb drejtave t\u00eb njeriut. K\u00ebto jan\u00eb pyetje rreth gatishm\u00ebris\u00eb kineze p\u00ebr t\u2019u pajtuar me rregullat e marr\u00ebveshjes, por ende \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e leht\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebhet presion mbi Kin\u00ebn q\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrmbush\u00eb premtimet sesa t\u00eb obligohet q\u00eb t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb hapa p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilat nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb pajtuar q\u00eb n\u00eb fillim. Nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb ekziston debati i drejt\u00eb rreth asaj sesi t\u00eb arrihet ribalancimi i zinxhir\u00ebve t\u00eb furnizimit dhe i formave t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb var\u00ebsis\u00eb ekonomike nga Kina, Europa do t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb lidhje t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme tregtare me tregun e st\u00ebrmadh t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, dhe kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb e preferueshme t\u00eb b\u00ebhet n\u00eb masa m\u00eb pak kufizuese dhe me mbrojtje formale m\u00eb t\u00eb fuqishme.<\/p>\n

Ndon\u00ebse shum\u00eb prej k\u00ebtyre pikave mund t\u00eb hidhen posht\u00eb, thelbi i argumentit \u00ebsht\u00eb bind\u00ebs: marr\u00ebveshja \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrparim modest, dhe n\u00eb vet\u00eb modestin\u00eb e saj nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb loj\u00eb shum\u00eb e rrezikshme me Kin\u00ebn, apo penges\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb punuar s\u00eb bashku n\u00eb nj\u00eb varg \u00e7\u00ebshtjesh t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta q\u00eb kan\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb me Kin\u00ebn. Por n\u00eb kontekstin m\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb strategjik, gjendja duket krejt tjet\u00ebr.<\/p>\n

Edhe nj\u00eb CAI e n\u00ebnshkruar n\u00eb shtator 2020 \u2013 afati i fundit i p\u00ebrcaktuar n\u00eb samitin e Lajpcigut \u2013 mund t\u00eb ishte perceptuar si vendim i kuptuesh\u00ebm nga ana e BE-s\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar p\u00ebrfitime t\u00eb krahasueshme me marr\u00ebveshjen e SHBA-s\u00eb, n\u00eb mes t\u00eb paqart\u00ebsis\u00eb rreth zgjedhjeve presidenciale t\u00eb n\u00ebntorit. Por pik\u00ebrisht fakti se Kina nuk nd\u00ebrmori hapat p\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur marr\u00ebveshje n\u00eb k\u00ebto data t\u00eb m\u00ebhershme \u00ebsht\u00eb problematik p\u00ebr Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe t\u00eb tjer\u00ebt: n\u00eb dhjetor nuk kishte m\u00eb paqart\u00ebsi. Joe Biden po vinte n\u00eb pushtet me nj\u00eb ofert\u00eb t\u00eb hapur p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar qasje t\u00eb re ndaj Kin\u00ebs, n\u00eb konsultime t\u00eb ngushta me partner\u00ebt dhe aleat\u00ebt, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn ai deklaroi se do t\u00eb jet\u00eb prioriteti kryesor q\u00eb n\u00eb jav\u00ebt e para t\u00eb qeverisjes s\u00eb tij. Prandaj, Pekini deshi t\u2019i shkat\u00ebrronte k\u00ebto p\u00ebrpjekje.<\/p>\n

Ende nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb i qart\u00eb tregimi i plot\u00eb i makinacioneve t\u00eb atij muaji. \u00cbsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb se gjat\u00eb periudh\u00ebs n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebn ekipit t\u00eb Biden-it iu desh t\u00eb kufizonte kontaktet me t\u00eb huajt, Kina \u2013 me p\u00ebrfshirjen personale t\u00eb Xi-s\u00eb \u2013 b\u00ebri l\u00ebshimet e duhura q\u00eb i mund\u00ebsoi arritjen e marr\u00ebveshjes me BE-n\u00eb, pas p\u00ebrfshirjes personale t\u00eb Angela Merkel-it n\u00eb bisedimet p\u00ebrfundimtare dhe n\u00eb tejkalimin e proceseve t\u00eb BE-s\u00eb, p\u00ebrkund\u00ebr nj\u00eb s\u00ebr\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtimesh. Nuk kishte iluzione rreth q\u00ebllimeve t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs. Fakti se qeveria kineze donte arritjen e marr\u00ebveshjes para ardhjes s\u00eb administrat\u00ebs s\u00eb re, u p\u00ebrshkrua nga nj\u00eb studim i BE-s\u00eb si \u201cnj\u00eb mund\u00ebsi\u201d q\u00eb nuk duhej \u00e7uar d\u00ebm. Dhe n\u00eb rast se nuk ishte krejt e qart\u00eb se \u00e7far\u00eb mendonte administrata e Biden-it, k\u00ebshtilltari p\u00ebr siguri komb\u00ebtare i SHBA-s\u00eb Jake Sullivan, b\u00ebri nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyrje publike delikate, e t\u00eb pazakont\u00eb me nj\u00eb k\u00ebrkes\u00eb t\u00eb thjesht\u00eb: prisni, le t\u00eb flasim nj\u00ebher\u00eb. Kjo k\u00ebrkes\u00eb u hodh posht\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Ideja se BE-ja duhet t\u00eb k\u00ebshillohet me Uashingtonin, apo k\u00ebdo tjet\u00ebr, para se t\u00eb arrij\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje investimesh me Kin\u00ebn, ende ndjell zem\u00ebrim n\u00eb disa qarqe t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs. P\u00ebrtej protestave rreth sovranitetit europian, ekziston nj\u00eb dyshim i p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm nga pal\u00ebt tregtuese se administrata e Biden-it do t\u00eb sjell\u00eb ndryshime thelb\u00ebsore n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00ebn sesi trajtohen k\u00ebto \u00e7\u00ebshtje. E gjith\u00eb kjo p\u00ebr shkak se administrata e Trump-it kurr\u00eb nuk e pa t\u00eb udh\u00ebs q\u00eb t\u00eb ndaj\u00eb me BE-n\u00eb tekstet e negociatave t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, apo t\u00eb krahasoj\u00eb sh\u00ebnimet e bisedimeve t\u00eb saj dypal\u00ebshe, nd\u00ebrsa administrata e Obama-s nuk ishte gjithashtu e gatshme q\u00eb t\u00eb ndaj\u00eb tekstet e Partneritetit Trans-Pacifik, p\u00ebrkund\u00ebr shk\u00ebmbimeve politike rreth asaj sesi t\u00eb \u201cangazhohemi n\u00eb Azi s\u00eb bashku\u201d. Ndjesia \u00ebsht\u00eb se, po t\u00eb kishte qen\u00eb Uashingtoni n\u00eb pozit\u00eb t\u00eb ngjashme, nuk do t\u00eb kishte hamendur po t\u00eb kishte n\u00eb tavolin\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb mir\u00eb p\u00ebr firmat amerikane.<\/p>\n

Ky pesimiz\u00ebm \u00ebsht\u00eb i tepruar. N\u00eb Uashington ka pasur nj\u00eb rivler\u00ebsim t\u00eb thell\u00eb rreth vler\u00ebs s\u00eb nj\u00eb qasjeje t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb si e vetme, pasi gjat\u00eb kat\u00ebr viteve t\u00eb fundit, pushteti i nj\u00ebansh\u00ebm amerikan ndaj Kin\u00ebs u testua deri n\u00eb kufijt\u00eb e saj. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, pas nj\u00eb viti sjelljesh skandaloze diplomatike, ekonomike e ushtarake t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, vlera e vendosjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb fronti t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt bind\u00ebs ndaj Kin\u00ebs, shtrihet p\u00ebrtej \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve tregtare. D\u00ebshtimi p\u00ebr t\u2019i besuar administrat\u00ebs dashamir\u00ebse t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjeje jo edhe aq t\u00eb favorshme me Pekinin nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb shpalosje e kok\u00ebfort\u00ebsis\u00eb. P\u00ebrkundrazi, kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb sakrifikim i q\u00ebllimeve m\u00eb t\u00eb gjera t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs p\u00ebr q\u00ebllime mjaft m\u00eb t\u00eb ngushta. P\u00ebr me t\u00ebp\u00ebr, vet\u00eb CAI tregon se nd\u00ebrtimi i koalicionit me Kin\u00ebn nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht i pashpres\u00eb. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm fuqia europiane q\u00eb solli l\u00ebshimet kineze. Duke marr\u00eb parasysh q\u00eb Pekini ishte tashm\u00eb mjaft i brengosur sa p\u00ebr t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb ofertat t\u00eb cilat i b\u00ebri, mund t\u00eb nxirrej shum\u00eb m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, po qe se p\u00ebrpjekjeve p\u00ebr nd\u00ebrtimin e koalicionit do t\u2019u ishte dh\u00ebn\u00eb mund\u00ebsi m\u00eb e madhe. Prandaj, vendimi i CAI e dob\u00ebson k\u00ebt\u00eb pozicion dhe e fuqizon perceptimin n\u00eb Kin\u00eb se partner\u00ebt e koalicionit mund t\u00eb blihen, me \u00e7mim t\u00eb lir\u00eb madje.<\/p>\n

Adresimi i k\u00ebtyre \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve k\u00ebrkon pun\u00eb t\u00eb madhe, megjithat\u00eb disa faktor\u00eb mund t\u00eb jen\u00eb leht\u00ebsues. Me largimin e Merkel-it n\u00eb shtator, konstelacioni politik n\u00eb Europ\u00eb q\u00eb solli k\u00ebt\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje po venitet. Trendet n\u00eb Europ\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb t\u00eb l\u00ebvizin n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjtin drejtim: r\u00ebnia e madhe n\u00eb sondazhe e reputacionit t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, ngritja e madhe e mbik\u00ebqyrjes dhe e kritik\u00ebs nga mediat dhe parlamentet europiane, dhe analiza gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb kritike e Kin\u00ebs nga grupet europiane t\u00eb biznesit, shum\u00eb prej t\u00eb cilave nuk jan\u00eb t\u00eb bindura p\u00ebr meritat e vet\u00eb CAI. P\u00ebrderisa i t\u00ebr\u00eb ky episod tregon se modeli i vjet\u00ebr i marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnies BE-Kin\u00eb nuk do t\u00eb dor\u00ebzohet pa luft\u00eb, ajo se \u00e7far\u00eb do t\u00eb ndodh\u00eb n\u00eb vazhdim \u00ebsht\u00eb zgjedhje politike. Reagimet e ashpra ndaj CAI mund t\u00eb sjellin disa l\u00ebvizje kompensuese, si n\u00eb frontin e bashk\u00ebpunimit transatlantik, apo n\u00eb shtyrjen p\u00ebrpara nga BE-ja t\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve t\u00eb tjera q\u00eb kan\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb me Kin\u00ebn. Me t\u00eb finalizuar CAI, ka arsye t\u00eb forta p\u00ebr t\u2019i p\u00ebrqendruar p\u00ebrpjekjet n\u00eb mprehjen e elementeve garuese dhe rivalizuese t\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnies. Sigurisht se CAI qe moment i d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm. Por do t\u00eb jet\u00eb edhe m\u00eb i d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm, n\u00ebse kjo \u00e7\u00ebshtje do t\u00eb dominoj\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb vit kritik t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktimit sesi do t\u00eb duket politika europiane mbi Kin\u00ebn pas epok\u00ebs s\u00eb Merkel-it, dhe pun\u00ebs kritike t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb koalicionit p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn ka nevoj\u00eb vet\u00eb Europa.<\/p>\n

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Artikulli origjinal n\u00eb\u00a0European Council on Foreign Relations<\/a><\/p>\n

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\"Image\"<\/div>\n

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Ky artikull\u00a0mb\u00ebshtetet nga “Sbunker” p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit\u00a0dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Vet\u00eb prospekti i aleanc\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrforcuar BE-SHBA e detyroi Pekinin t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb l\u00ebshime ndaj Brukselit n\u00eb dhjetor \u2013 nj\u00eb m\u00ebsim mbi fuqin\u00eb e nd\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb koalicioneve globale, t\u00eb cilin Europa d\u00ebshtoi ta b\u00ebnte. Menj\u00ebher\u00eb pas Krishtlindjes, Bashkimi Europian arriti nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje politike rreth Marr\u00ebveshjes Gjithp\u00ebrfshir\u00ebse p\u00ebr Investime (CAI) me Kin\u00ebn. Kjo ka nxitur furi kritash […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":492,"featured_media":8343,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1297],"ppma_author":[1313],"class_list":["post-2491","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-dragoi-i-zgjuar"],"authors":[{"term_id":1313,"user_id":492,"is_guest":0,"slug":"andrew-small","display_name":"Andrew Small","avatar_url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4560dfbc369a7200e249ebe7e778228543659f1a67aa4ba6ec0a622d483af96c?s=96&d=mm&r=g","user_url":"","last_name":"Small","first_name":"Andrew","description":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2491","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/492"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2491"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2491\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2492,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2491\/revisions\/2492"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8343"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2491"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2491"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2491"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2491"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}