{"id":2516,"date":"2021-07-21T13:21:34","date_gmt":"2021-07-21T11:21:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=2516"},"modified":"2024-10-15T13:24:54","modified_gmt":"2024-10-15T11:24:54","slug":"ndryshimi-i-regjimit-nuk-eshte-opsion-ne-kine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/analize\/ndryshimi-i-regjimit-nuk-eshte-opsion-ne-kine\/","title":{"rendered":"Ndryshimi i regjimit nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb opsion n\u00eb Kin\u00eb"},"content":{"rendered":"

Fokusi duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb te sjelljet e Pekinit, jo te udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsia e tij<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnia mes Kin\u00ebs dhe Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara \u00ebsht\u00eb drama qendrore e politik\u00ebs globale sot. Ajo p\u00ebrkufizon koh\u00ebt e sotme: rivaliteti i fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha, gara ideologjike, p\u00ebrhapja e teknologjis\u00eb s\u00eb p\u00ebrparuar dhe dob\u00ebsimi i hegjemonis\u00eb amerikane. P\u00ebrballja me Kin\u00ebn \u00ebsht\u00eb duke u b\u00ebr\u00eb sfid\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb e madhe p\u00ebr politikb\u00ebr\u00ebsit amerikan\u00eb se sa q\u00eb ka qen\u00eb ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb konkurrenca me Bashkimin Sovjetik.<\/p>\n

Jo vet\u00ebm q\u00eb Pekini \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb i aft\u00eb se sa q\u00eb ishte Moska gjat\u00eb pik\u00ebs kulmore t\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb, por zgjerimi i zon\u00ebs s\u00eb ndikimit ekonomik t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs e b\u00ebn at\u00eb nj\u00eb rivale shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb. Nj\u00eb ekonomi globale e ndar\u00eb m\u00eb dysh i lejoi Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara q\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb Bashkimin Sovjetik, por Kina sot \u00ebsht\u00eb partnere kryesore tregtare e m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 100 vendeve, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb shum\u00eb lidhje t\u00eb ngushta me Shtetet e Bashkuara.<\/p>\n

Kombinimi habit\u00ebs i konkurrenc\u00ebs s\u00eb ashp\u00ebr dhe nd\u00ebrvar\u00ebsis\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe ka nxitur nj\u00eb debat n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara rreth m\u00ebnyr\u00ebs s\u00eb qasjes ndaj Kin\u00ebs. Debati ka marr\u00eb nj\u00eb kthes\u00eb t\u00eb rrezikshme n\u00eb vitet e fundit. Duke filluar n\u00eb 2020, sekretari i shtetit Mike Pompeo dhe z\u00ebvend\u00ebsk\u00ebshilltari i Siguris\u00eb Komb\u00ebtare Matt Pottinger ishin dy prej zyrtar\u00ebve q\u00eb filluan t\u00eb flasin p\u00ebr presion ndaj Partis\u00eb Komuniste t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb m\u00ebnyra q\u00eb shum\u00ebkush i ka interpretuar si thirrje p\u00ebr ndryshim t\u00eb regjimit. Duke d\u00ebnuar ashp\u00ebr \u201ctiranin\u00eb e re\u201d t\u00eb Pekinit Pompeo deklaroi: \u201cN\u00ebse bota e lir\u00eb nuk ndryshon, Kina komuniste me siguri se do na ndryshoj\u00eb neve.\u201d Duke b\u00ebr\u00eb dallimin mes popullit kinez dhe regjimit t\u00eb tyre, Pottinger inkurajoi popullin kinez q\u00eb t\u00eb \u201carrij\u00eb nj\u00eb qeveri t\u00eb qytetar\u00ebve n\u00eb Kin\u00eb\u201d si kund\u00ebrhelm ndaj PPK-s\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Kjo retorik\u00eb ka rr\u00ebnj\u00ebt n\u00eb nj\u00eb linj\u00eb t\u00eb mendimit q\u00eb beson se karakteristikat e nj\u00eb regjimi \u2013 dhe jo interesat komb\u00ebtare t\u00eb vendit os pozicioni i tij brenda sistemit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar \u2013p\u00ebrcaktojn\u00eb sjelljet e shtetit. Duke reflektuar mbi k\u00ebt\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb, Zack Cooper dhe Hal Brands argumentuan s\u00eb fundmi n\u00eb Foreign Affairs se p\u00ebr shkak se \u201cantagonizmi i ashp\u00ebr sino-amerikan do t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb p\u00ebr sa koh\u00eb q\u00eb nj\u00eb Kin\u00eb e fuqishme t\u00eb qeveriset prej Partis\u00eb Komuniste t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs,\u201d politikb\u00ebr\u00ebsit amerikan\u00eb do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb ndihmojn\u00eb n\u00eb sjelljen e \u201cndryshimeve afatgjate n\u00eb pushtetin kinez dhe n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb se si qeveriset Kina.\u201d<\/p>\n

Argumente t\u00eb tilla jehojn\u00eb p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb spektrit politik amerikan. Ekipi i presidentit Joe Biden e ka mbajtur ideologjin\u00eb n\u00eb qend\u00ebr t\u00eb strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb tij p\u00ebr Kin\u00ebn, duke n\u00ebnvizuar shtypjet drakonike t\u00eb Pekinit n\u00eb Hong Kong dhe Xinjiang. Administrata e Bidenit nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb se ka ndjekur ndryshimin e regjimit si q\u00ebllim eksplicit, por p\u00ebrshkrimi i presidentit i \u201cnj\u00eb beteje mes dobis\u00eb s\u00eb demokracive dhe autokracive\u201d paraqet pranimin e nj\u00eb mase t\u00eb betej\u00ebs ideologjike.<\/p>\n

Ndon\u00ebse gara ideologjike mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb e pashmangshme, sh\u00ebnjestrimi i PPK-s\u00eb nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm shum\u00eb jopraktike si strategji, por edhe e rrezikshme. \u00c7do p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndryshuar regjimin me gjas\u00eb do t\u00eb d\u00ebshtonte dhe do t\u00eb kishte kosto afatgjate mbi p\u00ebrpjekjet amerikane p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndryshuar sjelljet kineze. Pak aleat\u00eb dhe partner\u00eb amerikan\u00eb do t\u00eb p\u00ebrkrahnin d\u00ebmtimin e partis\u00eb shtet \u2013 duke topitur vegl\u00ebn mbase m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb arsenalin strategjik t\u00eb Uashingtonit. Nj\u00eb qasje e till\u00eb do t\u00eb izolonte Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe do t\u00eb thellonte edh\u00eb m\u00eb tej rivalitetin me Pekinin. N\u00eb vend t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj, Uashingtoni duhet t\u00eb fokusohet n\u00eb sjelljet kineze, jo n\u00eb PPK-n\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Kthimi\u00a0n\u00eb\u00a0t\u00eb\u00a0ardhmen<\/strong><\/p>\n

Avokuesit e strategjis\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndryshuar regjimin kinez thon\u00eb se interesi i vet\u00ebm i PPK-s\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbetur n\u00eb pushtet nxit politik\u00ebn e brendshme shtyp\u00ebse dhe vendosm\u00ebrin\u00eb nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs, p\u00ebrfshi edhe p\u00ebrpjekjet e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb d\u00ebmtuar normat dhe institucionet liberale. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb pik\u00ebpamje, karakteri joliberal i partis\u00eb e b\u00ebn aktore shtr\u00ebnguese dhe grabitqare n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonisht unike. Pastaj k\u00ebshilltari p\u00ebr siguri komb\u00ebtare Robert O\u2019Brien e artikuloi k\u00ebt\u00eb mendim n\u00eb nj\u00eb artikull t\u00eb vitit 2020 n\u00eb Foreign Affairs ku thot\u00eb se \u201cagjenda ideologjike e PPK-s\u00eb zgjerohet larg e p\u00ebrtej kufijve t\u00eb vendit dhe paraqet k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim p\u00ebr iden\u00eb e vet\u00eb demokracis\u00eb.\u201d<\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, kjo analiz\u00eb nuk merr parasysh faktor\u00ebt shtes\u00eb q\u00eb motivojn\u00eb sjelljet kineze. P\u00ebr shembull, edhe para se t\u00eb vinte PPK-ja n\u00eb pushtet m\u00eb 1949, Kina shpesh sillej si nj\u00eb pushtet agresiv perandorak, duke shtr\u00ebnguar fqinjt\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb pranojn\u00eb hegjemonin\u00eb rajonale dhe duke k\u00ebrkuar (ndon\u00ebse shpesh duke d\u00ebshtuar) q\u00eb t\u00eb institucionalizoj\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem t\u00eb pajtimit me preferencat kineze. Ekuilibri i pushtetit mes Kin\u00ebs dhe qeverive fqinje, politika elitiste p\u00ebrbrenda Kin\u00ebs dhe reagimet e fqinjve t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs ndaj k\u00ebrkesave t\u00eb Pekinit jan\u00eb disa prej faktor\u00ebve q\u00eb nd\u00ebrveprojn\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb nd\u00ebrlikuara p\u00ebr t\u00eb prodhuar sjellje kategorike.<\/p>\n

Ndon\u00ebse t\u00eb p\u00ebrdit\u00ebsuara p\u00ebr rrethana bashk\u00ebkohore, k\u00ebto dinamika mbesin relevante edhe sot. Prandaj, \u00e7do strategji q\u00eb p\u00ebrqendrohet par\u00ebsisht n\u00eb sh\u00ebnjestrimin e vet\u00eb PPK-s\u00eb do t\u00eb d\u00ebshtonte t\u00eb ndryshonte sjelljet kineze. Edhe n\u00ebse Shtetet e Bashkuara do t\u00eb provonin t\u00eb transformonin karakterin e partis\u00eb shtet t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs \u2013 p\u00ebr shembull, duke sh\u00ebnjestruar lider\u00ebt e CCP-s\u00eb p\u00ebrmes sanksioneve dhe mb\u00ebshtetjes s\u00eb sfidave t\u00eb brendshme ndaj qeveris\u00eb \u2013 suksesi nuk do t\u00eb ishte aspak i garantuar. Nj\u00eb qasje e till\u00eb nuk kupton si duhet burimet e vendosm\u00ebris\u00eb kineze dhe do ta ngujonte Pekini dhe Uashingtonin n\u00eb nj\u00eb konflikt t\u00eb rreziksh\u00ebm e t\u00eb p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzuar.<\/p>\n

\u00c7do p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb d\u00ebmtuar PPK-n\u00eb nga jasht\u00eb do t\u00eb kishte pak gjasa q\u00eb t\u00eb siguronte p\u00ebrkrahje nga populli kinez dhe p\u00ebrkundrazi do t\u00eb p\u00ebrforconte besnik\u00ebrin\u00eb ndaj partis\u00eb, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht n\u00eb mesin e nj\u00eb klase t\u00eb mesme t\u00eb madhe, ambicioze dhe n\u00eb rritje. Shum\u00ebkush n\u00eb Kin\u00eb nj\u00eb fushat\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb do ta shihte si p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb penguar ngritjen e vonuar t\u00eb vendit dhe do ta p\u00ebrkujtonte nd\u00ebrhyrjen per\u00ebndimore q\u00eb e la Kin\u00ebn t\u00eb dob\u00ebt e t\u00eb p\u00ebr\u00e7ar\u00eb p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb shekullit t\u00eb 19 dhe fillimshekullit t\u00eb 20.<\/p>\n

Spektri i imperializmit t\u00eb rigjall\u00ebruar amerikan n\u00eb koh\u00ebn kur dyshimi kinez p\u00ebr Shtetet e Bashkuara \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb i larti ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb, do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb rriste popullaritetin e presidentit kinez Xi Jinping dhe do ta shtynte q\u00eb t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmerrte veprime edhe m\u00eb ambicioze jasht\u00eb vendit, n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb interesave amerikane dhe paqes dhe siguris\u00eb s\u00eb p\u00ebrgjithshme p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Azis\u00eb.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrpjekja p\u00ebr t\u00eb rr\u00ebzuar PPK-n do t\u00eb d\u00ebmtonte gjithashtu bashhk\u00ebpunimin SHBA- Kin\u00eb rreth \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve q\u00eb k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb nj\u00ebfar\u00eb partneriteti\u00a0 – p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigjen ndaj programeve nukleare t\u00eb Iranit dhe Kores\u00eb s\u00eb Veriut, si dhe ndryshimin klimatik. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, nj\u00eb strategji agresive do t\u00eb reduktonte mund\u00ebsit\u00eb e Uashingtonit q\u00eb t\u00eb menaxhoj\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtjet m\u00eb t\u00eb diskutueshme n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Pekinit, p\u00ebrfshi statusin e Tajvanit.<\/p>\n

Arsyeja m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme p\u00ebr ta shmangur fiksimin me regjimin e padashur t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb se ky fiksim k\u00ebrc\u00ebnon p\u00ebrpar\u00ebsin\u00eb kryesore t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb: rrjetin e gj\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb partner\u00ebve dhe aleat\u00ebve t\u00eb Uashingtonit. Nd\u00ebrtimi dhe mbajtja e koalicioneve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare q\u00eb kufizojn\u00eb veprimet kineze do t\u00eb jet\u00eb jetike n\u00eb \u00e7do p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndryshuar sjelljet e Pekinit. P\u00ebr shembull, veprimet e koordinuara mes aleat\u00ebve, partner\u00ebve dhe miqve t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb jan\u00eb ky\u00e7e n\u00eb luftimin e praktikave ekonomike eksploatuese t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs dhe n\u00eb frenimin e agresionit t\u00eb mundsh\u00ebm ushtarak p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Azis\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Nd\u00ebrkaq, realiteti i v\u00ebshtir\u00eb me t\u00eb cilin p\u00ebrballet Uashingtoni \u00ebsht\u00eb se shumica e aleat\u00ebve dhe partner\u00ebve t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb nuk jan\u00eb t\u00eb interesuar p\u00ebr ndryshimin e regjimit n\u00eb Pekin. Shumica supozojn\u00eb se kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb e pamundshme, nd\u00ebrsa t\u00eb tjer\u00ebt e shohin si kund\u00ebrproduktive. P\u00ebrkundrazi, shumica duan t\u00eb p\u00ebrfitojn\u00eb nga marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet ekonomike me Kin\u00ebn, p\u00ebrderisa ekonomia e saj rritet dhe diversifikohet. Ata duan t\u00eb kufizojn\u00eb sjelljet kategorike t\u00eb Pekinit jasht\u00eb vendit, por nuk kan\u00eb shum\u00eb d\u00ebshir\u00eb t\u00eb d\u00ebmtojn\u00eb qeverin\u00eb kineze brenda vendit.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb strategji amerikane q\u00eb bazohet n\u00eb ndryshim t\u00eb regjimit do t\u00eb ballafaqohej me probleme serioze n\u00eb bindjen e partner\u00ebve dhe do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb d\u00ebmtonte p\u00ebrpjekjet m\u00eb t\u00eb gj\u00ebra t\u00eb Uashingtonit p\u00ebr t\u00eb orkestruar nj\u00eb ekuilib\u00ebr t\u00eb efektsh\u00ebm t\u00eb pushtetit dhe n\u00eb Azi edhe n\u00ebp\u00ebr bot\u00eb. N\u00ebse Shtetet e Bashkuara shp\u00ebrqendrohen nga ky q\u00ebllim qendror, do t\u00eb jet\u00eb m\u00eb pak n\u00eb gjendje q\u00eb t\u00eb zgjidh\u00eb problemet nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar\u00eb dhe t\u00eb vendos\u00eb kosto mbi Kin\u00ebn.<\/p>\n

Terapia bihejviorale<\/strong><\/p>\n

Shtetet e Bashkuara nuk duhet t\u00eb injorojn\u00eb veprimet e papranueshme t\u00eb PPK-s\u00eb brenda dhe jasht\u00eb vendit. As zyrtar\u00ebt amerikan\u00eb nuk duhet t\u00eb shtiren se jan\u00eb indiferent\u00eb ndaj karakterit t\u00eb d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm t\u00eb qeveirs\u00eb kineze. \u00cbsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb se ka filluar konkurrenca mes dy shteteve lidhur me idet\u00eb e qeverisjes, si asaj t\u00eb brendshme ashtu edhe nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare. Por, Uashingtoni duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrqendrohet n\u00eb p\u00ebrballjen me sjelljet k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuese t\u00eb regjimit, n\u00eb vend se t\u00eb nis kryq\u00ebzat\u00eb ndaj vet\u00eb PPK-s\u00eb. Kjo n\u00ebnkupton prioritizimin e krijimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb ambienti nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar q\u00eb kolektivisht ekuilibron, lidh, frenon dhe i jep form\u00eb zgjedhjeve t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb strategji e till\u00eb k\u00ebrkon p\u00ebrkrahjen e shtetet q\u00eb jan\u00eb s\u00eb paku jo t\u00eb c\u00ebnueshme ndaj presionit t\u00eb Pekinit dhe q\u00eb me raste jan\u00eb t\u00eb gatshme t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtojn\u00eb shtr\u00ebngimin dhe agresionin kinez. Kjo n\u00ebnkupton krijmin e koalicioneve rreth \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme si transferet e teknologjis\u00eb, thellimin e integrimit tregtar mes kryeqyteteve mike, si dhe garantimin q\u00eb aleatet si Australia dhe Japonia t\u00eb jen\u00eb edhe t\u00eb gatshme edhe n\u00eb gjendje q\u00eb t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtojn\u00eb veprimet e mundshme ushtarake t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb Indo-Paq\u00ebsor.<\/p>\n

Kjo mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshij\u00eb gjithashtu artikulimin e normave eksplicite t\u00eb sjelljeve t\u00eb pranueshme nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, duke i legjitimuar ato p\u00ebrmes institucioneve shum\u00ebpal\u00ebshe dhe kur t\u00eb jet\u00eb e nevojshme, t\u2019i zbatoj\u00eb ato p\u00ebrmes fuqis\u00eb ushtarake t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb. Kufizimi i sjelljeve t\u00eb Pekinit n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb, ndryshe prej sh\u00ebnjestrimit t\u00eb regjimit, ofron shpres\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb mir\u00eb p\u00ebr p\u00ebrforcimin e rendit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar t\u00eb bazuar n\u00eb rregulla q\u00eb mbron interesat jetike t\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb qasje praktike q\u00eb syon ndryshimin e sjelljeve kineze do t\u00eb fokusohej pashmangsh\u00ebm n\u00eb parandalimin e Pekinit q\u00eb t\u00eb d\u00ebmtoj\u00eb interesat diplomatike, ekonomike, teknologjike dhe ushtarake t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb. P\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur k\u00ebt\u00eb, Uashingtoni duhet t\u00eb ket\u00eb p\u00ebr cak nj\u00eb varg t\u00eb gj\u00ebr\u00eb aktivitetesh, p\u00ebrfshi p\u00ebrpjekjet kineze p\u00ebr t\u00eb abuzuar me sistemin tregtar nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar, p\u00ebr t\u00eb vjedhur teknologjit\u00eb e p\u00ebrparuara nga Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj, p\u00ebr t\u00eb intimiduar partner\u00ebt e SHBA-s\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb projektuar ndikimin kinez jasht\u00eb vendit dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb promovuar hibridin e autoritarizmit tregtar si alternativ\u00eb p\u00ebr rendin liberal.<\/p>\n

Megjith\u00ebk\u00ebt\u00eb, t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtuarit e k\u00ebtyre aktiviteteve nuk n\u00ebnkupton se marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet duhet t\u00eb jen\u00eb ekskluzivisht ballafaquese apo se e gjith\u00eb konkurrenca dypal\u00ebshe do t\u00eb prodhoj\u00eb domosdo nj\u00eb gjendje ku dikush fiton e dikush humb. Sido q\u00eb t\u00eb jet\u00eb, kjo strategji supozon nj\u00eb form\u00eb t\u00eb bashk\u00ebjetes\u00ebs konkurruese mes Pekinit dhe Uashingtonit, ku t\u00eb dy pal\u00ebt hahen vazhdimisht p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpar\u00ebsi dhe ndikim n\u00ebp\u00ebr bot\u00eb. Nj\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie e till\u00eb mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb nj\u00ebkoh\u00ebsisht dinamike dhe p\u00ebr\u00e7ar\u00ebse, por rezultati do t\u00eb ishte m\u00eb i preferuar se sa konflikti i hapur, i cili do t\u00eb ishte pasoj\u00eb e pashmangshme e nj\u00eb politik\u00eb amerikane q\u00eb k\u00ebrkon t\u00eb destabilizoj\u00eb q\u00ebllimsh\u00ebm regjimin qeveris\u00ebs t\u00eb nj\u00eb bashk\u00ebkonkurrenti.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, ajo q\u00eb ka r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb se a munden Shtetet e Bashkuara t\u00eb ndryshojn\u00eb motivimet e Kin\u00ebs, por se a mundet Uashingtoni t\u00eb ndryshoj\u00eb veprat dhe sjelljet e Kin\u00ebs. Nj\u00eb qasje e till\u00eb mund t\u00eb sh\u00ebnoj\u00eb vet\u00ebm p\u00ebrparime taktike: as karakteri brutal, as impulset revizioniste t\u00eb PPK-s nuk kan\u00eb gjas\u00eb t\u00eb ndryshojn\u00eb. Por, C sa koh\u00eb q\u00eb Uashingtoni ndikon n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00ebn se si Pekini mendon dhe si i ndjek interesat e veta, Shtetet e Bashkuara mund t\u00eb mbrojn\u00eb rendin liberal nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar \u2013 dhe kjo do t\u00eb ishte fitore e konsiderueshme.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

Artikulli origjinal n\u00eb\u00a0Foreign Affairs<\/a>, m\u00eb 8 korrik 2021.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

\"Image\"<\/div>\n

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Ky artikull\u00a0mb\u00ebshtetet nga “Sbunker” p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit\u00a0dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Fokusi duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb te sjelljet e Pekinit, jo te udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsia e tij. Marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnia mes Kin\u00ebs dhe Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara \u00ebsht\u00eb drama qendrore e politik\u00ebs globale sot. Ajo p\u00ebrkufizon koh\u00ebt e sotme: rivaliteti i fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha, gara ideologjike, p\u00ebrhapja e teknologjis\u00eb s\u00eb p\u00ebrparuar dhe dob\u00ebsimi i hegjemonis\u00eb amerikane. P\u00ebrballja me Kin\u00ebn \u00ebsht\u00eb duke u […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":486,"featured_media":8343,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1297],"ppma_author":[1300,1301],"class_list":["post-2516","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-dragoi-i-zgjuar"],"authors":[{"term_id":1300,"user_id":486,"is_guest":0,"slug":"ashley-tellis","display_name":"Ashley Tellis","avatar_url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/3bcdd5d126c10c30a95209114e5672aadbe8267ac796c6863a3174e5b108c06d?s=96&d=mm&r=g","user_url":"","last_name":"Tellis","first_name":"Ashley","description":""},{"term_id":1301,"user_id":487,"is_guest":0,"slug":"evan-medeiros","display_name":"Evan Medeiros","avatar_url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/9138c83a6c192157d92eea445bd55499484afba057f6c07e5d18c3a342abdb8c?s=96&d=mm&r=g","user_url":"","last_name":"Medeiros","first_name":"Evan","description":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2516","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/486"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2516"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2516\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2517,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2516\/revisions\/2517"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8343"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2516"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2516"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2516"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2516"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}