{"id":3827,"date":"2019-04-11T11:25:28","date_gmt":"2019-04-11T09:25:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=3827"},"modified":"2025-01-15T11:27:25","modified_gmt":"2025-01-15T09:27:25","slug":"rendesia-e-rambujese-per-kosoven","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/analize\/rendesia-e-rambujese-per-kosoven\/","title":{"rendered":"R\u00ebnd\u00ebsia e Rambujes\u00eb p\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Konferenca e Rambujes\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00ebra nga ngjarjet m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb historin\u00eb e Kosov\u00ebs. Edhe pse negociatat teknikisht kishin d\u00ebshtuar, politikisht situata \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e komplikuar. D\u00ebshtimi teknik i tyre kishte mund\u00ebsuar suksesin politik t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj konference p\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn. K\u00ebsisoj, nj\u00ebri nga interpretimet m\u00eb t\u00eb paq\u00ebndrueshme t\u00eb Marr\u00ebveshjes s\u00eb Rambujes\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb ai q\u00eb thot\u00eb se negociatat e Rambujes\u00eb kan\u00eb qen\u00eb d\u00ebshtim p\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn. Rambuje ka d\u00ebshtuar vet\u00ebm n\u00eb aspektin formal. N\u00eb rrafshin real, ajo ka triumfuar.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrkrah\u00ebsit e k\u00ebsaj teorie pohojn\u00eb se Millosheviqi ka b\u00ebr\u00eb gabim q\u00eb nuk e ka n\u00ebnshkruar marr\u00ebveshjen, sepse me t\u00eb do t\u00eb fitonte shum\u00eb. Ata mendojn\u00eb se po ta pranonte Millosheviqi dokumentin e Rambujes\u00eb, Kosova edhe sot e k\u00ebsaj dite do t\u00eb ishte jo m\u00eb shum\u00eb sesa me autonomi n\u00eb kuad\u00ebr t\u00eb Serbis\u00eb. Por e v\u00ebrteta \u00ebsht\u00eb tjet\u00ebr.<\/p>\n

Millosheviqi e refuzoi marr\u00ebveshjen sepse ka pasur arsye m\u00eb t\u00eb forta sesa p\u00ebr ta n\u00ebnshkruar. Kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebt e Rambujes\u00eb n\u00eb mesin e shqiptar\u00ebve me ose pa q\u00ebllim e injorojn\u00eb faktin q\u00eb Marr\u00ebveshja e p\u00ebrpiluar nga NATO-ja ishte dizajnuar n\u00eb at\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb ajo t\u00eb mos pranohej nga Millosheviqi. Arsyet q\u00eb na shtyn\u00eb t\u00eb mendojm\u00eb se Rambuje ishte formuluar n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb jan\u00eb disa.<\/p>\n

Akordet e Marr\u00ebveshjes p\u00ebrmbanin obligime t\u00eb cilat do ta detyronin gjith\u00eb ish-Jugosllavin\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb pranonte okupimin nga ana e NATO-s. Interpretimi zyrtar e p\u00ebrs\u00ebriste iden\u00eb se b\u00ebrthama e Marr\u00ebveshjes ishte autonomia e Kosov\u00ebs n\u00eb kuad\u00ebr t\u00eb Jugosllavis\u00eb, q\u00eb do t\u00eb mund\u00ebsohej nga nj\u00eb \u201cforc\u00eb paqeruajt\u00ebse\u201d n\u00eb Kosov\u00eb. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe arsyeja kryesore se pse Rambuje kund\u00ebrshtohet edhe sot nga disa si dokument shum\u00eb i d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn.<\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, Apendiksi (Shtojca) B i Kapitullit VII i Marr\u00ebveshjes i jepte NATO-s liri t\u00eb l\u00ebvizjes \u201cn\u00eb gjith\u00eb territorin e Jugosllavis\u00eb,\u201d dometh\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb Serbi, Mal t\u00eb Zi dhe Kosov\u00eb. Artikulli 8 i k\u00ebsaj shtojce thot\u00eb: \u201cPersoneli i NATO-s, me gjith\u00eb automjetet, anijet, avion\u00ebt dhe t\u00eb gjitha pajisjet tjera, do t\u00eb ken\u00eb fuqin\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb l\u00ebviz\u00eb lirsh\u00ebm dhe pa pengesa, si dhe do t\u00eb ket\u00eb qasje pa asnj\u00eb penges\u00eb n\u00eb gjith\u00eb ish-Republik\u00ebn Federale t\u00eb Jugosllavis\u00eb (RFJ), p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00ebn ajrore dhe ujore.\u201d<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, por jo vet\u00ebm kaq, NATO-ja kishte t\u00eb drejt\u00eb edhe t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtonte kampe ushtarake, t\u00eb kryente manovra ushtarake dhe t\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzonte t\u00eb gjitha hap\u00ebsirat dhe mjetet e nevojshme n\u00eb ish-RFJ-s\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer operacionet e parapara nga NATO-ja. Artikulli 6 u garantonte forcave okupuese imunitet t\u00eb plot\u00eb: \u201cPersoneli i NATO-s, n\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha rrethanat dhe n\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha koh\u00ebt, do t\u00eb jet\u00eb imun prej institucioneve jugosllave gjyq\u00ebsore, t\u00eb cilat nuk kan\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb denoncojn\u00eb asnj\u00eb shkelje t\u00eb personelit t\u00eb NATO-s, qofshin shkelje civile, administrative, kriminale apo disiplinore\u201d.<\/p>\n

Artikulli 9 e lironte NATO-n nga \u00e7do taks\u00eb apo gjob\u00eb dhe nga \u00e7do inspektim q\u00eb autoritetet jugosllave mund t\u2019ia b\u00ebnin p\u00ebr ndonj\u00eb dokument. Artikulli 10 i siguron NATO-s p\u00ebrdorimin pa pages\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha rrug\u00ebve, aeroporteve dhe porteve jugosllave. Artikulli 11 thot\u00eb se NATO-ja mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrdor\u00eb \u00e7do aeroport, rrug\u00eb, hekurudh\u00eb apo port pa asnj\u00eb pages\u00eb. Artikulli 14 ia mund\u00ebsonte NATO-s q\u00eb t\u00eb importonte dhe eksportonte t\u2019i gjitha gj\u00ebrat q\u00eb ata i konsideronin si t\u00eb nevojshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb vazhduar operacioni.<\/p>\n

N\u00ebse qeveria Jugosllave do ta n\u00ebnshkruante Marr\u00ebveshjen, ata do t\u00eb hiqnin dor\u00eb nga sovraniteti i vet shtet\u00ebror. Si\u00e7 tregojn\u00eb referenca t\u00eb ndryshme, gazeta gjermane \u201cBerliner Zeitung\u201d n\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb shkruante: \u201ckjo marr\u00ebveshje ting\u00ebllon sikur nj\u00eb traktat dor\u00ebzimi pasi q\u00eb humbet lufta\u2026 fakti q\u00eb Millosheviqi nuk e n\u00ebnshkroi \u00ebsht\u00eb e kuptueshme.\u201d<\/p>\n

Millosheviqi e dinte se po t\u00eb pranonte Marr\u00ebveshjen do t\u00eb prodhohej nj\u00eb realitet krejt i ri dhe se nuk do t\u00eb kishte m\u00eb asgj\u00eb n\u00eb dor\u00ebn e tij pasi NATO-ja t\u00eb futej n\u00eb gjith\u00eb territorin e Jugosllavis\u00eb. Marr\u00ebveshja m\u00eb shum\u00eb se propozim i pranuesh\u00ebm ishte ultimatum i ashp\u00ebr dhe kjo kishte ngritur dyshimet se NATO-ja po k\u00ebrkonte nj\u00eb pretekst p\u00ebr t\u00eb sulmuar ushtarakisht Jugosllavin\u00eb.<\/p>\n

\u201cNj\u00eb akord i till\u00eb nuk mund t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruhet nga drejtuesit e nj\u00eb shteti Sovran,\u201d shkruante gazeta gjermane Taz. \u201cN\u00ebse bisedimet kan\u00eb pasur synim q\u00eb t\u00eb arrijn\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje dhe jo thjesht q\u00eb t\u00eb binden skepktik\u00ebt se NATO-ja po k\u00ebrkon luft\u00eb, at\u00ebher\u00eb teksti i Akordeve \u00ebsht\u00eb i pakuptuesh\u00ebm.\u201d<\/p>\n

Propozimi fillestar i Grupit t\u00eb Kontaktit (ShBA, Britania, Gjermania, Franca, Italia dhe Rusia), q\u00eb organizoi Konferenc\u00ebn e Rambujes\u00eb, nuk i p\u00ebrmbante k\u00ebto paragrafe. Fillimisht negociatat ishin planifikuar t\u00eb merreshin me autonomin\u00eb e Kosov\u00ebs dhe vet\u00ebm pasi t\u00eb b\u00ebhej kjo mund t\u00eb flitej p\u00ebr \u00e7\u00ebshtjen e masave ushtarake q\u00eb duhej t\u00eb kryheshin p\u00ebr implementimin e saj. Ky ishte edhe kushti i qeveris\u00eb jugosllave q\u00eb t\u00eb merrte pjes\u00eb n\u00eb konferenc\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Gjat\u00eb koh\u00ebs sa mbaheshin negociatat, nga 6 deri 23 shkurt, 5 shtetet per\u00ebndimore t\u00eb Grupit t\u00eb Kontaktit mbronin hapur q\u00ebndrimin e pal\u00ebs kosovare q\u00eb insistonte n\u00eb stacionimin e trupave t\u00eb NATO-s brenda Kosov\u00ebs. N\u00eb dit\u00ebn e fundit t\u00eb Konferenc\u00ebs ishte prezentuar drafti final i Marr\u00ebveshjes q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbante Shtojc\u00ebn B.<\/p>\n

Nga ai moment e tutje dokumentet q\u00eb i referoheshin autonomis\u00eb s\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs \u2013 p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn pala jugosllave ishte pajtuar \u2013 dhe propozimet p\u00ebr stacionimin e trupave t\u00eb NATO-s brenda Kosov\u00ebs, konsideroheshin si dy kushte t\u00eb panegociuesh\u00ebm dhe t\u00eb pandash\u00ebm nga nj\u00ebri-tjetri.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb muajin shkurt, ende pa vendosur pal\u00ebt, NATO-ja ve\u00e7 kishte filluar t\u00eb tregonte muskujt ushtarak\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb \u00e7onte mesazh se p\u00ebrdorimi i forc\u00ebs ishte alternativ\u00eb reale. K\u00ebto p\u00ebrgatitje b\u00ebheshin n\u00eb Ballkan dhe n\u00eb fund t\u00eb shkurtit NATO-ja ishte n\u00eb gjendje q\u00eb t\u00eb fillonte me sulme. M\u00eb 20 shkurt ShBA-ja, si faktori kryesor ushtarak e politik, b\u00ebri gati 51 aeroplan\u00eb t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb 12 luftarak\u00eb F-117A, 25 avion\u00eb KC-135 dhe 10 aeroplan\u00eb radarbllokues dhe i d\u00ebrgoi n\u00eb Evrop\u00eb, ku ve\u00e7se i kishte t\u00eb stacionuar 260 aeroplan\u00eb t\u00eb tjer\u00eb luftarak\u00eb. 5 anije t\u00eb luft\u00ebs dhe 2 n\u00ebndet\u00ebse i kishte l\u00ebshuar n\u00eb Mesdhe dhe Adriatik p\u00ebr t\u00eb lansuar raketa n\u00eb drejtim t\u00eb Jugosllavis\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Sinjali ishte i qart\u00eb dhe Jugosllavia ishte n\u00eb hall. Ajo menj\u00ebher\u00eb d\u00ebrgoi nj\u00eb ankes\u00eb n\u00eb K\u00ebshillin e Sigurimit, duke th\u00ebn\u00eb se veprimet e fundit t\u00eb NATO-s ishin k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim i past\u00ebrt p\u00ebr bombardime dhe p\u00ebr agresion mbi sovranitetin e saj shtet\u00ebror dhe k\u00ebrkoi nj\u00eb seanc\u00eb emergjente t\u00eb K\u00ebshillit. Delegacionit jugosllav i ishte b\u00ebr\u00eb me dije q\u00eb nuk mund t\u00eb pranonin vet\u00ebm nj\u00ebrin nga kushtet. NATO-ja i kishte dh\u00ebn\u00eb Jugosllavis\u00eb ultimatum q\u00eb ose t\u00eb pranonin ose t\u00eb refuzonin marr\u00ebveshjen n\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00ebsi. Jugosllavia refuzoi.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebr shkak se drafti i par\u00eb nuk parashihte asnj\u00eb mund\u00ebsi p\u00ebr referendum, edhe pala kosovare refuzoi q\u00eb ta n\u00ebnshkruaj\u00eb at\u00eb. Konferenca ishte shtyr\u00eb deri kur kosovar\u00ebt n\u00ebnshkruan draftin e dyt\u00eb t\u00eb Marr\u00ebveshjes s\u00eb propozuar me 18 mars n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin merrej parasysh \u201cvullneti i popullit\u201d t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs n\u00eb nj\u00eb referendum p\u00ebr zgjidhjen e statusit final t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs tri vite pas hyrjes s\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjes n\u00eb fuqi.<\/p>\n

NATO-ja tash kishte fituar pretekstin q\u00eb deshi p\u00ebr t\u00eb nisur sulmin e saj mbi Jugosllavi. M\u00eb 24 mars bombat e para ishin l\u00ebshuar.<\/p>\n

Gazeta gjermane \u201cTaz\u201d kishte analizuar Minstrin\u00eb e Jashtme Gjermane dhe kishte gjetur se dy nga tre zyrtar\u00ebt m\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb shtet\u00ebror\u00eb \u2013 Ministri i Shtetit, Gunther Verheugen dhe Ludger Volmer \u2013 ishin t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht t\u00eb befasuar. Ata kishin pohuar se Artikujt n\u00eb Shtojc\u00ebn B ishin \u201ckrejt\u00ebsisht t\u00eb rinj\u201d p\u00ebr ta. Zyrtari i tret\u00eb \u2013 Sekretari Permanent \u00cbolfgang Ischinger \u2013 kishte th\u00ebn\u00eb se pasazhet bazoheshin n\u00eb nj\u00eb version m\u00eb t\u00eb hersh\u00ebm t\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjes, por kjo nuk mund t\u00eb v\u00ebrtetohej.<\/p>\n

Artikulli i \u201cTaz\u201d pyet: \u201cA e ka mbajtur qeveria gjermane q\u00ebllimisht larg syve t\u00eb publikut k\u00ebt\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje?\u201d. Shum\u00eb deputet\u00eb n\u00eb Gjermani ishin mllefosur me loj\u00ebn e qeveris\u00eb. Teksti i Marr\u00ebveshjes ishte prezentuar n\u00eb parlamentin gjerman vet\u00ebm dy jav\u00eb pasi q\u00eb kishin filluar bombardimet, duke i b\u00ebr\u00eb diskutimet t\u00eb panevojshme.<\/p>\n

Angelika Beer i kishte shkruar kolegut t\u00eb saj t\u00eb Partis\u00eb s\u00eb Gjelb\u00ebr, Joschka Fischer, se po ta dinte p\u00ebrmbajtjen e Marr\u00ebveshjes nga fillimi, ajo do t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtonte bombardimet e NATO-s. Deputeti i Partis\u00eb Social Demokrate Hermann Scheer kishte th\u00ebn\u00eb: \u201cn\u00ebse do t\u00eb na ishte prezentuar marr\u00ebveshja at\u00ebher\u00eb kur \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrpiluar, argumenti se t\u00eb gjitha mjetet diplomatike dhe politike jan\u00eb shterur dhe se bombardimet ishin t\u00eb pashmangshme, nuk do t\u00eb ishte i q\u00ebndruesh\u00ebm.\u201d Scheer poashtu akuzon qeverin\u00eb gjermane se kishte r\u00ebn\u00eb komplet n\u00eb ndikimin e ShBA-s\u00eb n\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtjet e NATO-s.<\/p>\n

K\u00ebtu nuk e kishte aq gabim Scheer. ShBA-t\u00eb ishin lidere t\u00eb padiskutueshme t\u00eb aleanc\u00ebs s\u00eb NATO-s. Kishin qen\u00eb amerikan\u00ebt ata q\u00eb qysh n\u00eb korrik t\u00eb vitit 1998 kishin filluar planet p\u00ebr bombardimin e ish-Jugosllavis\u00eb. K\u00ebto p\u00ebrgatitje u quajt\u00ebn Operacioni i Luanit t\u00eb Shkatht\u00eb dhe udh\u00ebhiqej t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht nga ShBA-t\u00eb. Nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr plan i ve\u00e7ant\u00eb i quajtur Koncepti i Planit t\u00eb Operacioneve (CONOPLAN 10601) u zhvillua nga NATO dhe u miratua nga Komiteti K\u00ebshillues Komb\u00ebtar amerikan. Ky plan edhe ishte b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb pas shtylla e bombardimeve t\u00eb NATO-s. Amerikan t\u00eb padiskutuesh\u00ebm t\u00eb fushat\u00ebs 78 ditore.<\/p>\n

\u00cbsht\u00eb pik\u00ebrisht Shtojca B ajo q\u00eb e b\u00ebri t\u00eb papranueshme marr\u00ebveshjen e Rambujes\u00eb p\u00ebr pal\u00ebn jugosllave. Po t\u00eb ishte i k\u00ebnaqur me autonomi, lidershipi kosovar do ta pranonte propozimin e Holbrookut n\u00eb tetor t\u00eb 1998 kur u propozua autonomi, por pa pranin\u00eb e trupave t\u00eb NATO-s. Po t\u00eb ishte autonomia k\u00ebrkesa kryesore e Grupit t\u00eb Kontaktit, ata do ta pranonin propozimin e Millosheviqit m\u00eb 23 mars.<\/p>\n

Pala serbe shpresonte se shqiptar\u00ebt do ta refuzonin dokumentin. N\u00eb momentin q\u00eb pala shqiptare pranoi dokumentin, syt\u00eb e NATO-s u drejtuan kah ish-Jugosllavia. Qasja pasive e serb\u00ebve n\u00eb negociata dhe pranimi i dokumentit nga shqiptar\u00ebt e b\u00ebn\u00eb bombardimin opsion serioz. N\u00ebn trysnin\u00eb e k\u00ebsaj klime, pala jugosllave propozoi autonomi p\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn, por pa trupat t\u00eb NATO-s, vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb dit\u00eb para fillimit t\u00eb bombardimeve.<\/p>\n

Por NATO-ja refuzoi. Marr\u00ebveshje mund t\u00eb kishte vet\u00ebm n\u00ebse Millosheviqi do t\u00eb pranonte futjen e trupave t\u00eb NATO-s n\u00eb gjith\u00eb territorin e ish-Jugosllavis\u00eb. Nj\u00eb gj\u00eb e till\u00eb ishte e papranueshme p\u00ebr Millosheviqin. Prandaj ai zgjodhi bombardimet. Mendoi se mund t\u2019u b\u00ebnte ball\u00eb, por u gabua. Sidoqoft\u00eb, edhe po ta pranonte marr\u00ebveshjen, Millosheviqi do t\u00eb ishte i mbaruar. Me trupat e NATO-s n\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00eb ish-Jugosllavin\u00eb dhe me referendumin pas tri viteve, gjasat p\u00ebr pavar\u00ebsim t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs ishin t\u00eb m\u00ebdha.<\/p>\n

Si p\u00ebrfundim, denoncuesit e k\u00ebsaj marr\u00ebveshje thon\u00eb q\u00eb bombardimet e NATO-s mbi ish-Jugosllavi kan\u00eb ardhur si pasoj\u00eb e d\u00ebshtimit t\u00eb Rambujes\u00eb e jo si pasoj\u00eb e suksesit t\u00eb saj. Ky interpretim \u00ebsht\u00eb i cek\u00ebt, sepse e injoron faktin q\u00eb Marr\u00ebveshja e Rambujes\u00eb ka qen\u00eb e dizajnuar q\u00eb t\u00eb d\u00ebshtoj\u00eb. Pal\u00ebs jugosllave q\u00ebllimisht i ishte vendosur n\u00eb tavolin\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje q\u00eb nuk mund t\u00eb pranohej. Pragu ishte tep\u00ebr i lart\u00eb p\u00ebr Millosheviqin.<\/p>\n

K\u00ebt\u00eb interpretim e mbron edhe diplomati amerikan, Henry Kissinger, q\u00eb thot\u00eb se marr\u00ebveshja e detyronte ish-Jugosllavin\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb pranonte n\u00ebnshtrim ndaj NATO-s. Ai shton se k\u00ebt\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje nuk do ta pranonte as serbi m\u00eb engj\u00ebllor, e l\u00ebre m\u00eb Millosheviqi. Shkurt, p\u00ebr Kissinger, marr\u00ebveshja ishte nj\u00eb shantazh i past\u00ebr dhe nj\u00eb pretekst p\u00ebr ta bombarduar ish-Jugosllavin\u00eb. Historiani Christopher Clark e kishte barazuar propozimin e Grupit t\u00eb Kontaktit me ultimatumin e Austro-Hungaris\u00eb p\u00ebr Serbin\u00eb m\u00eb 1914. \u00a0Juridikisht, teksti ishte ambivalent, por interpretimi i tij do t\u00eb b\u00ebhej n\u00eb p\u00ebrshtatje me realitetin e ri n\u00eb terren. Paqart\u00ebsia juridike e tekstit do t\u00eb d\u00ebbohej nga qart\u00ebsia politike dhe ushtarake e terrenit.<\/p>\n

Konferenca e Rambujes\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishmja n\u00eb historin\u00eb e shqiptar\u00ebve t\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs. \u00cbsht\u00eb konferenca e par\u00eb nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare q\u00eb afirmoi aspiratat e Kosov\u00ebs p\u00ebr \u00e7lirim nga Serbia apo nga ndonj\u00eb entitet tjet\u00ebr. M\u00eb 1878 n\u00eb Konferenc\u00ebn e Berlinit u injoruan k\u00ebrkesat e shqiptar\u00ebve p\u00ebr bashkim n\u00eb nj\u00eb vilajet. M\u00eb 1913 n\u00eb Konferenc\u00ebn e Londr\u00ebs u mbrojt pavar\u00ebsia e Shqip\u00ebris\u00eb, por Kosova u la n\u00ebn Serbi. U desht t\u00eb vinte viti 1999 q\u00eb t\u00eb organizohej nj\u00eb konferenc\u00eb nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare e vendeve m\u00eb t\u00eb fuqishme q\u00eb Kosov\u00ebs t’i mund\u00ebsohej \u00e7lirimi nga Serbia. Edhe pse q\u00ebllimi nuk ishte q\u00eb t\u00eb respektohej ndonj\u00eb e drejt\u00eb historike p\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn, efektet ishin t\u00eb tilla. Kosova do t\u00eb \u00e7lirohej nga Serbia. Si e till\u00eb, Konferenca e Rambujes\u00eb z\u00eb nj\u00eb vend unik dhe t\u00eb pamohuesh\u00ebm n\u00eb historin\u00eb e Kosov\u00ebs.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Konferenca e Rambujes\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00ebra nga ngjarjet m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb historin\u00eb e Kosov\u00ebs. Edhe pse negociatat teknikisht kishin d\u00ebshtuar, politikisht situata \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e komplikuar. D\u00ebshtimi teknik i tyre kishte mund\u00ebsuar suksesin politik t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj konference p\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn. K\u00ebsisoj, nj\u00ebri nga interpretimet m\u00eb t\u00eb paq\u00ebndrueshme t\u00eb Marr\u00ebveshjes s\u00eb Rambujes\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb ai q\u00eb thot\u00eb se […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":415,"featured_media":11979,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[11,2307],"ppma_author":[778],"class_list":["post-3827","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-kosova","tag-rambuje"],"authors":[{"term_id":778,"user_id":415,"is_guest":0,"slug":"shkodran-ramadani","display_name":"Shkodran Ramadani","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/shkodran-e1729253403162.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/shkodran-e1729253403162.jpeg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"Ramadani","first_name":"Shkodran","description":"Shkodran Ramadani \u00ebsht\u00eb hulumtues n\u00eb Institutin \u201cCompass\u201d n\u00eb Prishtin\u00eb. Ai ka p\u00ebrfunduar studimet Bachelor n\u00eb Shkenca Politike n\u00eb Universitetin e Evrop\u00ebs Juglindore n\u00eb Tetov\u00eb t\u00eb Maqedonis\u00eb dhe studimet Master n\u00eb Sociologji n\u00eb Universitetin e Prishtin\u00ebs. Shkodrani \u00ebsht\u00eb aktiv n\u00eb fush\u00ebn e hulumtimeve t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, drejt\u00ebsis\u00eb tranzicionale, marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, populizmit, sekularizmit, demokracis\u00eb konsociacionale dhe autonomis\u00eb."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3827","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/415"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3827"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3827\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11980,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3827\/revisions\/11980"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11979"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3827"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3827"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3827"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=3827"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}