{"id":8167,"date":"2020-12-24T09:14:53","date_gmt":"2020-12-24T07:14:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=8167"},"modified":"2024-10-10T09:19:11","modified_gmt":"2024-10-10T07:19:11","slug":"largimi-i-turqise-nga-krahet-e-rusise-nje-interes-transatlantik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/analize\/largimi-i-turqise-nga-krahet-e-rusise-nje-interes-transatlantik\/","title":{"rendered":"Largimi i Turqis\u00eb nga krah\u00ebt e Rusis\u00eb: Nj\u00eb interes transatlantik"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Nga pik\u00ebv\u00ebshtrimi europian dhe transatlantik, ky fakt \u00ebsht\u00eb sa shqet\u00ebsues aq edhe kund\u00ebrintuitiv: mes Rusis\u00eb dhe Turqis\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb zhvilluar nj\u00eb de facto partneritet, rreth Europ\u00ebs. Sado paradoksal, trendi tashm\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb i qart\u00eb dhe p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson hal\u00eb n\u00eb sy p\u00ebr interesat europiane dhe transatlantike.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Paradoksi qendron te fakti se Turqia dhe Rusia jan\u00eb rival\u00eb historik\u00eb. Q\u00eb prej luft\u00ebrave osmano-ruse e deri te an\u00ebtar\u00ebsia e Turqis\u00eb n\u00eb NATO si mburoj\u00eb p\u00ebr ekspansionizmin sovjetik, marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet turko-ruse nuk kan\u00eb qen\u00eb kurr\u00eb t\u00eb mira. Periudha pas Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb nuk b\u00ebn p\u00ebrjashtim, dhe gati sa \u00e7oi n\u00eb ballafaqim t\u00eb hapur ushtarak vet\u00ebm para pes\u00eb vitesh, kur aeoroplani ushtarak turk F-16 rr\u00ebzoi nj\u00eb avion rus af\u00ebr kufirit turko-sirian.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi, nuk ka rajon n\u00eb Europ\u00eb e p\u00ebrreth saj ku Turqia dhe Rusia shihen sy m\u00eb sy. Si n\u00eb Azin\u00eb Qendrore ku Moska ka ngulfatur \u00ebndrrat pan-turke t\u00eb Ankaras\u00eb; n\u00eb Ballkan ku t\u00eb dy pal\u00ebt kan\u00eb mbajtur an\u00eb t\u00eb ndryshme si gjat\u00eb luft\u00ebs ashtu edhe gjat\u00eb paqes; si n\u00eb Afrik\u00ebn Veriore dhe n\u00eb Lindjen e Mesme ku jan\u00eb grindur n\u00eb p\u00ebplasjet rreth islamit politik; apo n\u00eb Kaukaz ku p\u00ebrkrahja e Turqis\u00eb p\u00ebr Azerbajxhanin ka pasqyruar af\u00ebrsin\u00eb fetare dhe lidhjet e siguris\u00eb s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb me Armenin\u00eb, Ankaraja dhe Moska rrall\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb mos th\u00ebn\u00eb asnj\u00ebher\u00eb, kan\u00eb qen\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb njejt\u00ebn linj\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Prap\u00ebseprap\u00eb, modeli \u00ebsht\u00eb i qart\u00eb: n\u00eb \u00e7do konflikt t\u00eb hapur, Turqia dhe Rusia kan\u00eb arritur t\u00eb gjejn\u00ebn mir\u00ebkuptim sa t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb aq edhe real. N\u00eb Siri, p\u00ebrplasja mund t\u00eb kishte shp\u00ebrthyer n\u00eb konfrontim t\u00eb hapur, por pas nj\u00eb d\u00ebshtimi gati t\u00eb plot\u00eb m\u00eb 2015, Moska dhe Ankaraja u rikthyen n\u00eb sken\u00eb me nisjen e procesit t\u00eb Astan\u00ebs n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin t\u00eb kan\u00eb qen\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshira thell\u00ebsisht. Tensionet jan\u00eb ngritur prap\u00eb koh\u00eb pas kohe. Pas sulmit t\u00eb Bashar al-Assadit n\u00eb Idlib m\u00eb 2019, Turqia e ka d\u00ebnuar Rusin\u00eb, por me koh\u00eb mir\u00ebkuptimi turko-rus u rivendos. Gjithashtu n\u00eb Sirin\u00eb verilindore, ku Turqia ka nd\u00ebrhyr\u00eb ushtarakisht kund\u00ebr kurd\u00ebve sirian\u00eb m\u00eb 2016 dhe p\u00ebrs\u00ebri m\u00eb 2019, Moska mund ta kishte parandaluar ofensiven e Turqis\u00eb duke pasur mund\u00ebsin\u00eb e ndalimit t\u00eb qasjes n\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00ebn ajrore siriane (A2\/AD), por zgjodhi mos ta b\u00ebnte nj\u00eb gj\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb Libi, Turqia dhe Rusia kan\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetur pal\u00ebt e kund\u00ebrta t\u00eb luft\u00ebs civile. Vlen t\u00eb p\u00ebrmendet se Rusia, me mercenar\u00ebt e tyre Wagner, ofroi mb\u00ebshtetje t\u00eb fuqishme ofensives ushtarake t\u00eb Khalifa Haftar-it ndaj Qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb Ujdis\u00eb Komb\u00ebtare (GNA) n\u00eb Tripoli. Duke marr\u00eb pjes\u00eb p\u00ebrkrah Emirateve t\u00eb Bashkuara Arabe, Egjiptit dhe Franc\u00ebs, futja e grupit t\u00eb Wagner-it n\u00eb mo\u00e7alin libian gati sa p\u00ebrmbysi pushtetin, ku p\u00ebrparimi i Haftar-it drejt Tripolit u b\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb m\u00eb i af\u00ebrt m\u00eb 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Kur GNA-ja gati sa d\u00ebshtoi, Ankaraja nd\u00ebrhyri duke i ofruar mb\u00ebshtetje ushtarake nje qeverie p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn komuniteti nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar nuk kurseu fjal\u00eb p\u00ebrkahjeje, por p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn b\u00ebr\u00eb fare pak n\u00eb praktik\u00eb. Nd\u00ebrhyrja ushtarake e Turqis\u00eb p\u00ebrmbysi fatet ushtarake dhe krijoi ng\u00ebr\u00e7in e dhimbshem p\u00ebr t\u00eb dyja pal\u00ebt q\u00eb solli arm\u00ebpushimin e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb n\u00eb ver\u00ebn e vitit 2020. Turqia mbetet mjaft e p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb ushtarakisht n\u00eb Libi, dhe prania ushtarake e Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb lindje, nga t\u00eb qenit veg\u00ebl \u201ce mir\u00eb por jo e domosdoshme\u201d p\u00ebr t\u2019u shfryt\u00ebzuar, tash \u00ebsht\u00eb fortifikuar. Pa marr\u00eb parasysh procesin e vazhduesh\u00ebm t\u00eb dialogut poltik, Libia rrezikon t\u00eb ndahet ushtarakisht p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb vij\u00ebs Sirte-Jufra, ku si prania ushtarake turke ashtu edhe ajo ruse po konsolidohen brenda vendit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Rifillimi i luft\u00ebs mes Armenis\u00eb dhe Azerbajxhanit pas nj\u00ebzet\u00eb e gjasht\u00eb viteve t\u00eb arm\u00ebpushimit t\u00eb paq\u00ebndruesh\u00ebm p\u00ebrreth Nagorno-Karabakut dhe territoreve p\u00ebrreth, u b\u00eb pik\u00ebndezja e tret\u00eb potenciale turko-ruse, por q\u00eb nuk shp\u00ebrtheu. Kur Azerbajxhani nisi luft\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb rimarr\u00eb territoret q\u00eb i kishte humbur n\u00eb luft\u00ebn 1992-94, shum\u00eb prej v\u00ebmendjes mediale nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare u kthye kah Ankaraja.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb fakt, Turqia qe e vetmja fuqi e jashtme q\u00eb nuk b\u00ebri thirrje p\u00ebr arm\u00ebpushim, por nxiti Bakun drejt fushat\u00ebs ushtarake. U fol mjaft p\u00ebr dron\u00ebt turq dhe xhihadist\u00ebt sirian\u00eb, roli i t\u00eb cil\u00ebve qe i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm, por gjasm\u00eb i ekzagjeruar. Nga ana saj, Rusia u aktivizua n\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsimin e arm\u00ebpushimit. Nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb nd\u00ebrhynte p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsuar arm\u00ebpushimin humanitar, ajo lejoi q\u00eb lufta t\u00eb b\u00ebnte k\u00ebrdin\u00eb p\u00ebr gjasht\u00eb jav\u00eb, me \u00e7\u2019rast Azerbajxhani rimorri shumic\u00ebn prej shtat\u00eb rajoneve p\u00ebrreth Nagorno Karabakut. Vet\u00ebm kur forcat azere u nis\u00ebn drejt Karabakut, Moska vendosi t\u2019i bjer\u00eb bilbilit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0Marr\u00ebveshja e paq\u00ebs e nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsuar nga Moska ishte fitore e madhe p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb, gjithashtu edhe p\u00ebr Azerbajxhanin. P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb vij\u00ebs s\u00eb kontaktit n\u00eb Nagorno Karabak dhe korridorit t\u00eb Lachin-it, nj\u00eb kontingjent prej gati 2000 trupash rus\u00eb po dergohen p\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb q\u00eb prej p\u00ebrfundimit t\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb. Kjo i jep Rusis\u00eb jo vet\u00ebm pushtet t\u00eb paprecedent\u00eb mbi fatin kushtetues t\u00eb Nagorno Karabakut, por gjithashtu mbi politik\u00ebn vendore n\u00eb Azerbajxhan dhe mbi t\u00eb gjitha Armeni. Sidoqoft\u00eb, n\u00eb nj\u00eb mas\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb vog\u00ebl Turqia p\u00ebrfitoi gjithashtu. Ankara fitoi p\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb mund\u00ebsin\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb d\u00ebrgoj\u00eb v\u00ebzhgues n\u00eb rajon, dhe, \u00e7\u2019\u00ebsht\u00eb me e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishmja, me rihapjen e lidhjes direkte mes Azerbajxhanit dhe eksklav\u00ebs Niakhichevan, Turqia p\u00ebrfitoi qasje t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb n\u00eb Azerbajxhan dhe Detin Kaspik.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb secilin prej k\u00ebtyre konflikteve, Turqia, aleate e NATO-s, dhe t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn teorikisht, vend kandidat i BE-s\u00eb, ka ndjekur pa diskutim interesat e saj komb\u00ebtare dhe shpesh nacionaliste. K\u00ebt\u00eb e ka b\u00ebr\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyra q\u00eb me plot siguri nuk p\u00ebrkojn\u00eb me ato t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian ose t\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara. Megjithat\u00eb, do t\u00eb ishte gabim t\u00eb thuhet se interesat e Turqis\u00eb kan\u00eb qen\u00eb diametralisht t\u00eb kund\u00ebrta me ato t\u00eb Per\u00ebndimit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb Siri, sulmet e Turqis\u00eb ndaj kurd\u00ebve sirian\u00eb shkaktuan reagime n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim \u2013 me fjal\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb se me vepra \u2013 p\u00ebrderisa dyanshm\u00ebria p\u00ebrsa I takon p\u00ebrkrahjes s\u00eb trup\u00ebzimeve t\u00eb ndryshme t\u00eb opozit\u00ebs islamike ndaj regjimit sirian mbolli mosbesim, posa\u00e7\u00ebrisht gjat\u00eb koh\u00ebs kur k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit m\u00eb t\u00eb madh q\u00eb shfaqte ISIS n\u00eb Lindjen e Mesme, Europ\u00eb dhe n\u00eb bot\u00eb. Megjithat\u00eb, Turqia, ndryshe nga Rusia dhe Irani, dhe p\u00ebrkrah Per\u00ebndimit, ka qen\u00eb armike e p\u00ebrbetuar e regjimit sirian, q\u00ebkur protestat degjeruan n\u00eb luft\u00eb civile n\u00eb fund t\u00eb vitit 2011. N\u00eb faz\u00ebn e rind\u00ebrtimit dhe kthimit t\u00eb refugjat\u00ebve t\u00eb konfliktit sirian, BE-ja dhe Turqia do t\u00eb p\u00ebrleshen p\u00ebr sfida t\u00eb ngjashme p\u00ebrsa i p\u00ebrket politikave.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb Libi poashtu, Turqia ka ndjekur interesat e saj dhe tash po konsolidon pranin\u00eb e saj ushtarake, politike dhe ekonomike n\u00eb vend. Turqia nuk e ka mendjen t\u00eb largohet nga Libia. Prap\u00ebseprap\u00eb, edhe aty, interesat per\u00ebndimore dhe turke nuk jan\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht t\u00eb pap\u00ebrputhshme. Ankaraja nd\u00ebrhyri n\u00eb luft\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb parandaluar r\u00ebnien e GNA-s\u00eb s\u00eb Sarraj-it t\u00eb cil\u00ebn Europa dhe SHBA-ja e mb\u00ebshtet\u00ebn n\u00eb teori. Edhe Turqia edhe BE-ja kan\u00eb interes n\u00eb stabilizimin e Libis\u00eb dhe parandalimin e ndarjes de facto t\u00eb saj n\u00eb dy blloqe.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb fund, n\u00eb Nagorno Karabak, Turqia ka k\u00ebnduar nj\u00eb k\u00ebng\u00eb tjet\u00ebr nga thirrja e Per\u00ebndimit p\u00ebr arm\u00ebpushim t\u00eb m\u00ebnjehersh\u00ebm. Sidoqoft\u00eb, asnj\u00eb v\u00ebnd europian as SHBA-ja nuk ka kund\u00ebrshtuar ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb integritetin territorial t\u00eb Azerbajxhanit. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, p\u00ebrfshirja e Turqis\u00eb mes v\u00ebzhguesve n\u00eb Nagorno Karabak duhet t\u00eb shihet me sy t\u00eb mir\u00eb nga europian\u00ebt n\u00eb kontekstin ku Grupi i Minskut i OSBE-s\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb anashkaluar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb dhimbshme dhe ku Rusia do t\u00eb monopolizonte situat\u00ebn.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Pavar\u00ebsisht faktit se ndarjet mes Turqis\u00eb dhe Rusis\u00eb jan\u00eb pafund\u00ebsisht m\u00eb t\u00eb prekshme dhe akute se sa ato mes Turqis\u00eb dhe Per\u00ebndimit, marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet mes Turqis\u00eb dhe Rusis\u00eb po konsolidohen n\u00eb nj\u00eb partneritet de facto, nd\u00ebrsa ato mes Turqis\u00eb dhe Per\u00ebndimit po shkojn\u00eb drejt sanksioneve. Pse?<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Pjesa e leht\u00eb e p\u00ebrgjigjes ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me politikat e brendshme n\u00eb Rusi dhe Turqi. Rusia e Vladimir Putinit ka koh\u00eb q\u00eb ka braktisur narrativ\u00ebn e demokracis\u00eb, duke u vet\u00ebshpallur si nj\u00eb prej lidereve t\u00eb bot\u00ebs post-liberale. Presidenti rus ka p\u00ebrdorur politik\u00ebn e jashtme p\u00ebr t\u00eb marr\u00eb p\u00ebrpar\u00ebsi strategjike ndaj Per\u00ebndimit, dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb nxitur nacionalizmin n\u00eb vend, duke shp\u00ebrqendruar v\u00ebmendjen publike nga d\u00ebshtimet e brendshme. Presidenti turk Recep Tayyip Erdogan ka marr\u00eb shembull nga Putini, dhe gjat\u00eb vitit t\u00eb kaluar ka rifituar mb\u00ebshtetje t\u00eb brendshme politike pas vitit t\u00eb tmerrshem zgjedhor t\u00eb Partis\u00eb Drejt\u00ebsi dhe Zhvillim m\u00eb 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Me nd\u00ebrhyrjen ushtarake n\u00eb Libi, eskalimin e tensioneve n\u00eb Mesdheun Lindor dhe rifutjen n\u00eb Kaukaz, Erdogani ka b\u00ebr\u00eb at\u00eb q\u00eb shum\u00eb turq, p\u00ebr t\u00eb mos th\u00ebn\u00eb shumica prej tyre, do ta perceptojn\u00eb si ripohim t\u00eb interesave komb\u00ebtare me korrigjimin e gabimeve t\u00eb s\u00eb kaluar\u00ebs. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb, Erdogani ka shp\u00ebrqendruar opinionin publik nga d\u00ebshtimet e brendshme n\u00eb ekonomi. Me fjal\u00eb t\u00eb tjera, lider\u00ebt rus\u00eb dhe turq ndjekin taktika t\u00eb ngjashme: ata \u201ce kuptojn\u00eb nj\u00ebri tjetrin\u201d dhe ky mir\u00ebkuptim mbrun nj\u00eb nivel t\u00eb respektit t\u00eb nd\u00ebrsjell\u00eb dhe at\u00ebher\u00eb kur ka interesa t\u00eb kund\u00ebrta.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sigurisht se ka t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb shpjegim, q\u00eb d\u00ebgjohet vazhdimisht n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim. Megjithk\u00ebt\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb e p\u00ebrshtatshme p\u00ebr Per\u00ebndimin, duke l\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb hije nj\u00eb realitet tjet\u00ebr komplementar, por shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb parehatsh\u00ebm.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr shpjegim \u00ebsht\u00eb se Rusia dhe Turqia kan\u00eb gjetur mir\u00ebkuptim pragmatik meq\u00eb kan\u00eb qen\u00eb ashtu t\u00eb detyruar. T\u00eb dyja jan\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshira n\u00eb secilin prej k\u00ebtyre konflikteve, ku europian\u00ebt dhe amerikan\u00ebt nuk shihen gj\u00ebkundi. Turqia dhe Rusia jan\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb prirura q\u00eb t\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyjn\u00eb ushtarakisht n\u00eb konflikte se sa ka qen\u00eb ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb europian\u00ebt dhe se sa po b\u00ebhen amerikan\u00ebt.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">M\u00eb gj\u00ebr\u00eb, qoft\u00eb n\u00eb Siri, Libi a Kaukaz, SHBA-ja dhe BE-ja kan\u00eb hequr dor\u00eb prej p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsive dhe i jan\u00eb shmangur rreziqeve. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb vakum, ka nd\u00ebrhyr\u00eb Rusia, Turqia dhe t\u00eb tjer\u00eb aktor\u00eb rajonal\u00eb, duke u m\u00ebsuar t\u00eb punojn\u00eb me nj\u00ebri tjetrin. Nga ana e saj, SHBA-ja ka arsye t\u00eb distancohet duke th\u00ebn\u00eb se kjo nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb pjesa e bot\u00ebs ku ajo duhet t\u2019i marr\u00eb p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsit\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha. Duhet t\u00eb presim se n\u00eb forma dhe m\u00ebnyra t\u00eb ndryshme, kjo do t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb t\u00eb jet\u00eb qasja e administrat\u00ebs s\u00eb Biden-it.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Nd\u00ebrsa europian\u00ebve nuk iu ka kush faj. Edhe mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb shum\u00eb von\u00eb p\u00ebr Sirin\u00eb dhe mbase edhe p\u00ebr Kaukazin. Megjithat\u00eb, kur \u00ebsht\u00eb puna te Libia, europian\u00ebt duhet t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb. Gjermania ka investuar mjaft n\u00eb procesin e Berlinit, dhe sigurisht se diplomacia luan rol t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm n\u00eb procesin e nd\u00ebrtimit t\u00eb paqes. Por, p\u00ebr sa koh\u00eb q\u00eb europian\u00ebt nuk nd\u00ebrmarrin risqe p\u00ebr t\u00eb konsoliduar paqen n\u00eb terren n\u00eb Libi \u2013 dhe jo thjesht vet\u00ebm n\u00eb det \u2013 ata do t\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb t\u00eb jen\u00eb kalimtar\u00eb rasti t\u00eb kontrollit de facto t\u00eb jasht\u00ebm t\u00eb vendit nga Turqia dhe Rusia. Me shpalosjen e dialogut politik n\u00eb Libi, europian\u00ebt duhet t\u00eb angazhohen shum\u00eb m\u00eb aktivisht n\u00eb nd\u00ebrtimin e paqes, duke shfaqur m\u00eb shum\u00eb gatishm\u00ebri p\u00ebr t\u00eb q\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb pranish\u00ebm n\u00eb terren.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Nd\u00ebrsa marrin m\u00eb shum\u00eb risqe dhe p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsi, europian\u00ebt duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrpilojn\u00eb nj\u00eb strategji q\u00eb b\u00ebn dallimin e duhur mes Turqis\u00eb dhe Rusis\u00eb, duke shmangur thellimin e m\u00ebtejm\u00eb t\u00eb partneritetit t\u00eb panatyrsh\u00ebm mes t\u00eb dyjave, prej t\u00eb cilit partneritet europian\u00ebt dhe amerikan\u00ebt kan\u00eb vet\u00ebm humbje. N\u00eb ve\u00e7anti, nuk duhet t\u00eb mbyllim syt\u00eb para t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebtave q\u00eb shohim mes Rusis\u00eb s\u00eb Putin-it dhe Turqis\u00eb s\u00eb Erdoganit n\u00eb planin e brendsh\u00ebm, dhe t\u00eb b\u00ebhemi m\u00eb t\u00eb aft\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb dalluar mes sjelljeve t\u00eb tyre n\u00eb politik\u00ebn e jashtme.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">N\u00eb politik\u00ebn e jashtme, pozicionet dhe ambicet ruse dhe turke dallojn\u00eb n\u00eb disa pika t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme. P\u00ebrtej aneksimit t\u00eb Krimes\u00eb dhe p\u00ebrmbysjes s\u00eb arkitektur\u00ebs s\u00eb siguris\u00eb europiane, Rusia e Putinit promovon lidershipin e nj\u00eb bote sovraniste. N\u00eb asnj\u00eb m\u00ebyre nuk e sheh veten si pjes\u00eb t\u00eb Per\u00ebndimit, dhe shpesh jasht\u00ebzakonisht e ashp\u00ebr ndaj joefektivitetit, qyqarll\u00ebkut, arroganc\u00ebs dhe bankrotimit moral t\u00eb demokracive liberale per\u00ebndimore. Rusia ka vepruar drejp\u00ebrdrejt n\u00eb d\u00ebm t\u00eb demokracive per\u00ebndimore duke nd\u00ebrhyr\u00eb n\u00eb proceset zgjedhore, duke shp\u00ebrndar\u00eb keqinformata dhe duku u p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb n\u00eb sulme kibernetike. Patjet\u00ebr q\u00eb duhet t\u00eb \u201cangazhohemi\u201d me Rusin\u00eb, por me syt\u00eb hapur ndaj kontekstit ku ndodh angazhimi yn\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Turqia, me gjith\u00eb t\u00eb metat e saj, jo vet\u00ebm se \u00ebsht\u00eb dhe mbetet aleat i NATO-s, por vazhdon t\u00eb shpreh\u00eb interesin e saj p\u00ebr marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie m\u00eb t\u00eb af\u00ebrta me Bashkimin Europian, duke filluar me bashkimin e modernizuar doganor. Sinqeriteti i Ankaras\u00eb duhet t\u00eb v\u00ebrtetohet, por p\u00ebr ta arritur k\u00ebt\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb BE-ja q\u00eb duhet t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb hapin e par\u00eb. Poashtu, BE-ja dhe SHBA-ja duhet q\u00eb aktivisht t\u00eb k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb mund\u00ebsi p\u00ebr t\u00eb punuar me Turqin\u00eb n\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtje t\u00eb politik\u00ebs s\u00eb jashtme aty ku nuk ka dallime t\u00eb m\u00ebdha interesash. Me Sirin\u00eb dhe Nagorno Karabakun larg ndikimit Per\u00ebndimor, Libia do t\u00eb ishte vend i duhur p\u00ebr t\u00eb filluar. Edhe k\u00ebtu, hap\u00ebsira p\u00ebr t\u00eb manovruar po zvog\u00eblohet shpejt. Me nisjen e dialogut politik n\u00eb Libi, koha \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi t\u00eb madhe.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">E gjith\u00eb kjo nuk n\u00ebnkupton se BE-ja dhe SHBA-ja duhet t\u00eb rrin\u00eb cuc dhe t\u00eb mos e p\u00ebrdorin shkopin ndaj Turqis\u00eb kur \u00ebsht\u00eb nevoja. Qoft\u00eb lidhur me debaklin S400 me NATO-n apo veprimet e Turqis\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdheun Lindor, k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi i masave restrictive mbetet n\u00eb tavolin\u00eb. Aq m\u00eb pak n\u00ebnkupton se BE-ja dhe SHBA-ja duhet t\u00eb rrin\u00eb t\u00eb heshtur p\u00ebrball korozionit demokratik n\u00eb Turqi. Me nj\u00eb administrat\u00eb n\u00eb Uashington q\u00eb do t\u00eb shfaq\u00eb interes t\u00eb rip\u00ebrt\u00ebrir\u00eb n\u00eb demokraci, t\u00eb drejta t\u00eb njeriut, sundim t\u00eb ligjit, fokusi transatlantic ndaj dinamik\u00ebs s\u00eb brendshme n\u00eb Turqi do t\u00eb jet\u00eb i domosdosh\u00ebm.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sido q\u00eb t\u00eb jet\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar se kur dhe si t\u00eb reagohet ndaj l\u00ebvizjeve t\u00eb Turqis\u00eb n\u00eb politik\u00ebn e jashtme, Europa dhe SHBA-ja duhet t\u00eb marrin parasysh kontekstin m\u00eb t\u00eb gj\u00ebr\u00eb strategjik n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin operojm\u00eb. Q\u00ebllimi i veprimeve tona duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb largimi i Ankaras\u00eb nga Moska, e jo shtyrja e Turqis\u00eb n\u00eb krah\u00ebt e Rusis\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">***<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Artikulli origjinal n\u00eb <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.iai.it\/en\/pubblicazioni\/peeling-turkey-away-russias-embrace-transatlantic-interest\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Instituto Affari Internazionali<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">***<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Ky artikull mb\u00ebshtetet nga &#8220;Sbunker&#8221; p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autores dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nga pik\u00ebv\u00ebshtrimi europian dhe transatlantik, ky fakt \u00ebsht\u00eb sa shqet\u00ebsues aq edhe kund\u00ebrintuitiv: mes Rusis\u00eb dhe Turqis\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb zhvilluar nj\u00eb de facto partneritet, rreth Europ\u00ebs. Sado paradoksal, trendi tashm\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb i qart\u00eb dhe p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson hal\u00eb n\u00eb sy p\u00ebr interesat europiane dhe transatlantike. Paradoksi qendron te fakti se Turqia dhe Rusia jan\u00eb rival\u00eb historik\u00eb. Q\u00eb prej [&hellip;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":477,"featured_media":8141,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1260],"ppma_author":[1262],"class_list":["post-8167","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-kremlinshah"],"authors":[{"term_id":1262,"user_id":477,"is_guest":0,"slug":"nathalie-tocci","display_name":"Nathalie Tocci","avatar_url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/e30e149d1db9bd035c283a269b9b3a649395cfada16a8a0b2601562877f999c6?s=96&d=mm&r=g","user_url":"","last_name":"Tocci","first_name":"Nathalie","description":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8167","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/477"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8167"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8167\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8168,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8167\/revisions\/8168"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8141"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8167"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8167"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8167"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=8167"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}