{"id":8333,"date":"2021-06-30T11:46:20","date_gmt":"2021-06-30T09:46:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=8333"},"modified":"2024-10-15T11:47:21","modified_gmt":"2024-10-15T09:47:21","slug":"rusia-eshte-ne-mesdhe-dhe-se-ka-mendjen-te-largohet-ii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/analize\/rusia-eshte-ne-mesdhe-dhe-se-ka-mendjen-te-largohet-ii\/","title":{"rendered":"Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe dhe s\u2019e ka mendjen t\u00eb largohet (II)"},"content":{"rendered":"

P\u00ebrfundimi i Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb sh\u00ebnoi fillimin e nj\u00eb rreshtimi t\u00eb ri madhor strategjik n\u00eb Europ\u00eb dhe Mesdhe. Rusia u t\u00ebrhoq prej perandorive t\u00eb saj t\u00eb jashtme dhe t\u00eb brendshme p\u00ebr t\u2019u p\u00ebrqendruar te problemet e brendshme, t\u00eb cilat e mbajt\u00ebn t\u00eb preokupuar p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb viteve 1990. Me shterjen e resurseve t\u00eb saj dhe shk\u00ebrmoqjen e establishmentit t\u00eb mbrojtjes, Rusia u zhduk nga Mesdheu si aktore detare, ushtarake dhe gjeopolitike. Mbetjet e Flot\u00ebs Sovjetike n\u00eb Detin e Zi u ndan\u00eb me Ukrain\u00ebn dhe Rusia gati sa nuk pushoi s\u00eb ekzistuari fare si forc\u00eb detare.<\/span><\/p>\n

Prania e vazhdueshme e flot\u00ebs ruse n\u00eb Sevastopol, gj\u00eb e cila bazohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb traktat t\u00eb negociuar me Ukrain\u00ebn m\u00eb 1997, u ballafaqua me nj\u00eb t\u00eb ardhme t\u00eb pasigurt duke marr\u00eb parasysh aspiratat e k\u00ebsaj t\u00eb fundit p\u00ebr t\u2019iu bashkuar NATO-s. Me zotimin e NATO-s t\u00eb vitit 2008 p\u00ebr t\u00eb pranuar Ukrain\u00ebn dhe Gjeorgjin\u00eb si an\u00ebtare n\u00eb nj\u00eb t\u00eb ardhme t\u00eb pacaktuar, ambiciet ruse n\u00eb Mesdhe jo vet\u00ebm q\u00eb u duk se u veniten n\u00eb t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn, por prania e saj n\u00eb Detin e Zi erdhi n\u00eb pik\u00ebpyetje gjithashtu.<\/span><\/p>\n

Zotimi la mund\u00ebsin\u00eb q\u00eb Rusia t\u00eb humb qasjen n\u00eb Sevastopol, duke e l\u00ebn\u00eb me vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb port t\u00eb madh n\u00eb Novorossiysk dhe duke e l\u00ebn\u00eb Mosk\u00ebn me prospektin q\u00eb Deti i Zi t\u00eb b\u00ebhet liqen i NATO-s me pasoja t\u00eb r\u00ebnda p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb e saj. Bullgaria dhe Rumania ishin an\u00ebtar\u00ebsuar n\u00eb NATO m\u00eb 2004. M\u00eb 2011, Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe Rumania u pajtuan t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtojn\u00eb nj\u00eb baz\u00eb raketore n\u00eb Rumani, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn zyrtar\u00ebt rus\u00eb pretendojn\u00eb se mund t\u00eb paraqes\u00eb rrezik p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb ruse.<\/span><\/p>\n

K\u00ebto ishin aspekte t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb vendimet e Kremlinit p\u00ebr t\u00eb nisur luft\u00eb kund\u00ebr Gjeorgjis\u00eb m\u00eb 2008 dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb pushtuar Ukrain\u00ebn gjasht\u00eb vjet m\u00eb von\u00eb. Prospektet e tyre p\u00ebr an\u00ebtar\u00ebsi n\u00eb NATO dhe partneritetet e ngushta me aleanc\u00ebn premtonin transformim madhor n\u00eb rajonin e Detit t\u00eb ZI, k\u00ebrc\u00ebnime t\u00eb reja ndaj aft\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb treguar fuqin\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe t\u00eb mbroj\u00eb pozicionin e saj n\u00eb Detin e Zi, si dhe nj\u00eb kthes\u00eb n\u00eb ekulibrin e p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm NATO-Rusi n\u00eb cepin jugor t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs. Sipas fjal\u00ebve t\u00eb vet\u00eb presidentit Vladimir Putin, Krimea dhe Sevastopolimund t\u00eb b\u00ebhen nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr platform\u00eb p\u00ebr komponentet raketore amerikane dhe baz\u00eb e l\u00ebshimit p\u00ebr sulme raketore kund\u00ebr Rusis\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

N\u00eb kontekstin e Detit t\u00eb Zi dhe Mesdheut, konfliktet me Gjeorgjin\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebn mor\u00ebn r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe se sa deklaratat ambicioze por t\u00eb turbullta t\u00eb Kremlinit lidhur me nj\u00eb sfer\u00eb t\u00eb \u201cinteresave t\u00eb privilegjuara.\u201d T\u00eb nisura p\u00ebr t\u2019i mbajtur k\u00ebto vende larg NATO-s, k\u00ebto luft\u00ebra kan\u00eb arritur m\u00eb shum\u00eb se sa kishin pasur p\u00ebr q\u00ebllim. N\u00eb syt\u00eb e v\u00ebzhguesve t\u00eb huaj, konfliktet kan\u00eb krijuar dy shtete armiq\u00ebsore n\u00eb kufirin jugper\u00ebndimor t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, prej syve t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs ato parandaluan dep\u00ebrtimin e nj\u00eb aleance armiq\u00ebsore n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rajon kritik, duke tkurrur pranin\u00eb e saj n\u00eb Detin e Zi dhe duke paraqitur sfida t\u00eb reja p\u00ebr qasjen e saj n\u00eb Mesdhe, si dhe nj\u00eb p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsim t\u00eb konsideruesh\u00ebm t\u00eb korrelacionit t\u00eb forcave n\u00eb krahun jugor t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs dhe p\u00ebr rrjedhoj\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00eb teatrit europian. T\u00eb dy luft\u00ebrat kan\u00eb rikthyer gjithashtu posedimin e Krimes\u00eb nga Rusia \u2013 nj\u00eb pik\u00eb kritike p\u00ebr mbrojtjen e Rusis\u00eb jugore dhe platform\u00eb e shfaqjes s\u00eb fuqis\u00eb dhe ndikimit n\u00eb Detin e Zi dhe Mesdhe.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sido q\u00eb t\u00eb jet\u00eb, konfliktet n\u00eb Gjeorgji dhe Ukrain\u00eb, si dhe reforma e jasht\u00ebzakonshme ushtarake dhe modernizimi i forcave t\u00eb armatosura, p\u00ebrfshi aft\u00ebsit\u00eb detare, t\u00eb nisura pas luft\u00ebs s\u00eb vitit 2008 n\u00eb Gjeorgji, nuk mund t\u00eb kompensojn\u00eb p\u00ebr sfidat q\u00eb kan\u00eb paraqitur me shekuj p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb gjeografia dhe gjeopolitika europiane. Luft\u00ebanijet e saj nde duhet t\u00eb kalojn\u00eb p\u00ebrmes ngushticave t\u00eb kontrolluara nga Turqia ose t\u00eb lundrojn\u00eb p\u00ebrreth Europ\u00ebs e pas brigjeve t\u00eb aleat\u00ebve e partner\u00ebve t\u00eb NATO-s, si\u00e7 kishin b\u00ebr\u00eb n\u00eb koh\u00ebt e Katarin\u00ebs s\u00eb Madhe, q\u00eb prej Gjirit t\u00eb Finland\u00ebs e deri te ngushtica e Gjibraltarit. Aeroplan\u00ebt ushtarak\u00eb rus\u00eb duhet t\u00eb fluturojn\u00eb n\u00ebp\u00ebr hap\u00ebsir\u00ebn jomiq\u00ebsore ajrore n\u00ebse duan t\u00eb arrijn\u00eb Mesdheun. T\u00eb dyja jan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb problematike si pasoj\u00eb e t\u00eb dy konflikteve.<\/span><\/p>\n

Strumbullari sirian<\/b><\/p>\n

Shum\u00eb shpjegime rreth vendimit p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyr\u00eb ushtarakisht n\u00eb Siri m\u00eb 2015 \u2013 e para nd\u00ebrhyrje e till\u00eb n\u00eb epok\u00ebn postsovjetike \u2013 u p\u00ebrqendruan n\u00eb d\u00ebshir\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb rikthyer Rusin\u00eb n\u00eb pozit\u00ebn e m\u00ebparshme si forc\u00eb madhore n\u00eb gjeopolitik\u00ebn e Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme. Nuk ka dyshim se ky q\u00ebllim luajti rol madhor n\u00eb vendimin q\u00eb transformoi Rusin\u00eb prej nj\u00eb fuqie t\u00eb per\u00ebnduar n\u00eb aktor madhor n\u00eb rajon. Shpjegime t\u00eb tjera jan\u00eb p\u00ebrqendruar n\u00eb shqet\u00ebsimin e Kremlinit p\u00ebr k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimin terrorist q\u00eb u p\u00ebrhap prej Siris\u00eb n\u00eb Kaukazin Verior e m\u00eb tej. Megjith\u00ebk\u00ebt\u00eb, nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr shtys\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme, edhe n\u00ebse jo e till\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00ebrhiqte v\u00ebmendje t\u00eb menj\u00ebhershme, ka qen\u00eb balanci i pushtetit n\u00eb krahun jugor t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs dhe dinamik\u00eb NATO-Rusi n\u00eb teatrin m\u00eb t\u00eb gj\u00ebr\u00eb europian.<\/span><\/p>\n

Suksesi ushtarak i Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Siri u d\u00ebshmua shum\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm p\u00ebr pozicionin e saj n\u00eb Mesdhe. Siria ka qen\u00eb klienti m\u00eb i vjet\u00ebr dhe i fundit i Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Lindjen e Mesme dhe Mesdhe dhe vend ku flota e saj ka pasur ende prani. Jo me tep\u00ebr se vend p\u00ebr t\u00eb shkelur, ajo ka qen\u00eb i vetmi pozicion ushtarak n\u00eb rajon. Me nd\u00ebrhyrjen ushtarake, Rusia e rikonsolidoi veten si prani e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme ushtarake n\u00eb Mesdheun lindor me nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje afatgjate me Sirin\u00eb q\u00eb siguron pranin\u00eb e saj n\u00eb baz\u00ebn detare t\u00eb Tartusit dhe baz\u00ebn ajrore t\u00eb Hmeimimit, t\u00eb dyjat prej t\u00eb cilave po p\u00ebrjetojn\u00eb zgjerim madhor n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb akomodojn\u00eb prani m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe detare dhe ajrore.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hi\u00e7 m\u00eb pak i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm ka qen\u00eb pozicionimi i ushtris\u00eb ruse n\u00eb nj\u00eb teat\u00ebr q\u00eb Turqia e konsideron kritik p\u00ebr sugurin\u00eb dhe stabilitetin e saj t\u00eb brendsh\u00ebm. Me sigurimin afatgjat\u00eb t\u00eb pranis\u00eb s\u00eb saj ushtarake n\u00eb Siri, Moska ka siguruar nj\u00eb burim madhor p\u00ebr t\u00eb fituar terren n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Ankaran\u00eb \u2013 jo ndryshe prej pozicionit t\u00eb Ankaras\u00eb n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Rusin\u00eb gjat\u00eb luft\u00ebs n\u00eb \u00c7e\u00e7eni n\u00eb vitet 1990 dhe 2000. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb fitore e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb n\u00eb raport me NATO-n, ku Turqia \u00ebsht\u00eb potencialisht aktor kryesor n\u00eb kontekstin e krahut jugor t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs dhe Mesdheut.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb angazhuar n\u00eb nj\u00eb akt ekuilibrimi me Turqin\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje transparente p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar nj\u00eb pyk\u00eb mes asaj dhe pjes\u00ebs tjet\u00ebr t\u00eb NATO-s. P\u00ebrderisa nd\u00ebrhyrja n\u00eb Siri e ka pozicionuar Mosk\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb ushtruar presion mbi Ankaran\u00eb, si ushtarakisht ashtu edhe duke ruajtur k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimin e shp\u00ebrnguljes s\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb refugjat\u00ebve p\u00ebr n\u00eb Turqi, ajo p\u00ebrkrahu presidentin Recep Tayyip Erdogan pas tentimit p\u00ebr grusht shteti m\u00eb 2016, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe vendet europiane ngurruan.<\/span><\/p>\n

Suksesi n\u00eb Siri ka sjell\u00eb edhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebrfitime p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjet e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjeruar ndikimin n\u00eb Mesdhe. Duke qen\u00eb se marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet amerikano-egjiptiane u ftoh\u00ebn pas grusht shtetit t\u00eb vitit 2013 kund\u00ebr presidentit Mohamed Morsi, lideri i ri egjiptian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi gjeti nj\u00eb partner t\u00eb ri tek Putini, p\u00ebrkrahja e t\u00eb cilit p\u00ebr presidentin Bashar al-Assad n\u00eb nj\u00eb moment rreziku dha shenj\u00eb p\u00ebr autokrat\u00ebt e rajonit se, ndryshe nga Uashingtoni, Moska do t\u00eb p\u00ebrkrah\u00eb miqt\u00eb e saj. P\u00ebrmir\u00ebsimi i marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve me Egjiptin p\u00ebr her\u00ebn e par\u00eb q\u00eb prej p\u00ebrjashtimit t\u00eb k\u00ebshilltar\u00ebve sovjetik\u00eb m\u00eb 1972, shtroi rrug\u00ebn p\u00ebr rifillimin e tregtis\u00eb s\u00eb arm\u00ebve e madje edhe diskutimeve p\u00ebr qasjen ruse n\u00eb bazat ushtarake t\u00eb vendit. Egjipti dhe Rusia kan\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruar disa marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb m\u00ebdha arm\u00ebs p\u00ebr blerje t\u00eb aeroplan\u00ebve luftarak\u00eb rus\u00eb, helikopter\u00ebve dhe sistemeve t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb arm\u00ebve me vler\u00eb prej miliarda dollar\u00ebsh (shuma e sakt\u00eb nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb publike).<\/span><\/p>\n

Sidoqoft\u00eb, kjo tregti e arm\u00ebve n\u00eb zhvillim e sip\u00ebr me gjas\u00eb nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e mjaftueshme p\u00ebr ta kaluar n\u00eb pesh\u00eb efektin e subvencioneve amerikane p\u00ebr mbrojtje p\u00ebr Egjiptin n\u00eb vler\u00eb prej 1.3 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00eb n\u00eb vit. Me sa duket Rusia ende nuk ka fituar qasje t\u00eb plot\u00eb n\u00eb bazat ushtarake t\u00eb Egjiptit, ndon\u00ebse \u00ebsht\u00eb th\u00ebn\u00eb se personeli dhe pajisjet e saj ushtarake jan\u00eb dislokuar n\u00eb bazat n\u00eb per\u00ebndim t\u00eb vendit p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrkrahur Ushtrin\u00eb Komb\u00ebtare t\u00eb Libis\u00eb (LNA), t\u00eb cil\u00ebn e mb\u00ebshtesin t\u00eb dyja. Nj\u00ebsitet ruse dhe egjiptiane kan\u00eb zhvilluar manovra t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta, luftanijet ruse kan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb ndalesa n\u00eb portet e Egjiptit dhe t\u00eb dy flotat kan\u00eb zhvilluar st\u00ebrvitje t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebta n\u00eb Detin e Zi.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ekspansioni i pranis\u00eb s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Siri, sado dometh\u00ebn\u00ebs, i ka ofruar Rusis\u00eb jo m\u00eb shum\u00eb se nj\u00eb aft\u00ebsi relativisht modeste p\u00ebr t\u00eb treguar fuqin\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe. Gjetiu n\u00eb rajon, p\u00ebrpjekjet e vazhdueshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb rind\u00ebrtuar lidhje me ish klient\u00eb dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar lidhje me partner\u00eb t\u00eb rinj jan\u00eb d\u00ebshmuar si mesatarisht t\u00eb suksesshme.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ashtu si n\u00eb epok\u00ebn sovjetike, tregtia e arm\u00ebve ka qen\u00eb mund\u00ebsi e dobishme p\u00ebr t\u00eb hapyer dyert, por jo edhe aq e mjaftueshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar at\u00eb lloj qasjeje q\u00eb kan\u00eb k\u00ebrkuar diplomat\u00ebt dhe lider\u00ebt ushtarak\u00eb, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb konsolidojn\u00eb Rusin\u00eb si aktore madhore n\u00eb gjeopolitik\u00ebn e rajonit me pesh\u00ebn diplomatike dhe aft\u00ebsit\u00eb ushtarake p\u00ebr t\u2019i b\u00ebr\u00eb ball\u00eb pesh\u00ebs s\u00eb nd\u00ebrthurur t\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, aleat\u00ebve t\u00eb saj t\u00eb NATO-s dhe Bashkimit Europian. Kompleti i mjeteve ekonomike t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb\u00ebsht\u00eb kopje e dob\u00ebt e resurseve q\u00eb ishte n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb ofroj\u00eb Bashkimit Sovjetik gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb dhe nuk krahasohet me resurset q\u00eb mund t\u00eb grumbullojn\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe Bashkimi Europian.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pas Siris\u00eb, Libia u shfaq si mund\u00ebsia tjet\u00ebr madhore p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjeruar rrjetin e ndikimit rus n\u00eb Mesdhe. Me p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzimin e luft\u00ebs civile n\u00eb vend, Rusia u shfaq si p\u00ebrkrah\u00ebse kryesore e LNA-s\u00eb, t\u00eb udh\u00ebhequr nga gjenerali Khalifa Haftar. Perkrahja p\u00ebr t\u00ebu tregua me d\u00ebrgesa arm\u00ebsh, mercenar\u00ebsh dhe avion\u00ebsh rus\u00eb nga Siria, si dhe ndihm\u00eb financiare n\u00eb form\u00ebn e valut\u00ebs s\u00eb falsifikuar. N\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn koh\u00eb, Kremlini ka ngurruar t\u00eb zotohet dhe ka mbajtur lidhjet me qeverin\u00eb n\u00eb Tripoli t\u00eb njohur nga KB-ja. Q\u00ebndrimi i saj n\u00eb luft\u00ebn civile n\u00eb Libi sugjeron se \u00ebsht\u00eb e p\u00ebrgatitur p\u00ebr nj\u00eb loj\u00eb t\u00eb gjat\u00eb, pa marr\u00eb parasysh se si do t\u00eb zgjidhet konflikti dhe planifikon t\u00eb mbetet e p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb n\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtjet e vendit.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rreziku ndaj interesave ruse n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb situat\u00eb\u00ebsht\u00eb minimal, nd\u00ebrsa p\u00ebrfimitet diplomatike, ekonomike, tregtia e arm\u00ebve dhe marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnia potenciale n\u00eb mbrojtje dhe siguri me nj\u00eb vend me pozicion strategjik n\u00eb mes t\u00eb vij\u00ebs bregdetare jugore t\u00eb Mesdheut paraqesin nj\u00eb \u00e7mim t\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonsh\u00ebm me pasoja afatgjata p\u00ebr pozicionin e Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb rajon. Prap\u00ebseprap\u00eb, nj\u00eb pik\u00ebmb\u00ebshtetje e sigurt n\u00eb Libi, sado mund\u00ebsi t\u00ebrheq\u00ebse, \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb prospekt i larg\u00ebt duke marr\u00eb parasysh gjendjen e pasigurt atje.<\/span><\/p>\n

Gjetk\u00eb n\u00eb Afrik\u00ebn Veriore, orvatjet e Rusis\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjeruar marrr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet e saj kan\u00eb pak gjasa t\u00eb korrin sukses. Po t\u00eb matej me numrin e memorandumeve t\u00eb mir\u00ebkuptimit (MOU) dhe marr\u00ebveshjet q\u00eb ka n\u00ebnshkruar, orvatjet e saj p\u00ebr partneritete n\u00eb rajon duken mbres\u00ebl\u00ebn\u00ebse. Megjith\u00ebat\u00eb, n\u00ebse gjykohet nga numri i MOU-ve t\u00eb zbatuara, volumin e tregtis\u00eb, dhe rrjedhjet e investimeve direkte t\u00eb huaja (FDI), at\u00ebher\u00ebrezultatet jan\u00eb zhg\u00ebnjyese.<\/span><\/p>\n

Marr\u00ebveshja e shum\u00ebp\u00ebrmendur p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuar nj\u00eb termocentral b\u00ebrthamor n\u00eb Egjipt \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruar pas shum\u00eb vonesave m\u00eb 2015, e p\u00ebrs\u00ebri m\u00eb 2017, por me sa duket nd\u00ebrtimi nuk ka filluar ende. Th\u00ebn\u00eb tro\u00e7, marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet tregtare dhe ekonomike t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Afrik\u00ebn Veriore dhe p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Mesdheut nuk l\u00ebn\u00eb shum\u00eb mbresa. Ajo nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb ndonj\u00eb burim dometh\u00ebn\u00ebs i p\u00ebrkrahjes p\u00ebr vendet n\u00eb rajon q\u00eb k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb t\u00eb zhvillojn\u00eb ekonomit\u00eb e tyre dhe t\u00eb nxisin rritje ekonomike.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rusia ka shfryt\u00ebzuar gjithashtu asetet dhe ekspertiz\u00ebn edhe t\u00eb naft\u00ebs edhe t\u00eb gazit n\u00eb eksplorim dhe zhvillim p\u00ebr t\u2019u orvatur q\u00eb t\u00eb ndikoj\u00eb qeverit\u00eb n\u00ebp\u00ebr Mesdhe. K\u00ebto orvatje kan\u00eb pasur m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti sukses n\u00eb Turqi, e cila d\u00ebshiron t\u00eb pozicionohet si nyj\u00eb e distribuimit t\u00eb energjis\u00eb p\u00ebr Europ\u00ebn, por nuk ka pasur n\u00eb vendet tjera, posa\u00e7\u00ebrisht n\u00eb ato ku prodhuesit vendor\u00eb garojn\u00eb me firmat ruse. Firmat ruse t\u00eb energjis\u00eb kan\u00eb investuar n\u00eb projekte n\u00eb disa vende n\u00ebp\u00ebr Mesdhe (Egjipt, Algjeri) dhe po k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb mund\u00ebsi t\u00eb tjera (Libi), por p\u00ebr k\u00ebto vende Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb gjithashtu rivale n\u00eb tregun europian t\u00eb energjis\u00eb q\u00eb\u00ebsth\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb garues. Karta m\u00eb e fort\u00eb e Rusis\u00eb ka qen\u00eb tregtia e arm\u00ebve, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Algjerin\u00eb, ku ekziston nj\u00eb arsenal substancial i sistemeve t\u00eb trash\u00ebgimis\u00eb nga epoka sovjetike. Megjithat\u00eb, tregtia e Algjeris\u00eb me Rusin\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebn vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb fraksion t\u00eb asaj me BE-n\u00eb\u20133.6 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00eb dhe 28 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00eb respektivisht m\u00eb 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/span><\/p>\n

Hulumtimi origjinal nga Eugene Rumer dhe Richard Sokolsky i botuar nga <\/span>Carnegie Endowment<\/span><\/a>, m\u00eb 27 maj 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

***<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Ky artikull mb\u00ebshtetet nga “Sbunker” p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

P\u00ebrfundimi i Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb sh\u00ebnoi fillimin e nj\u00eb rreshtimi t\u00eb ri madhor strategjik n\u00eb Europ\u00eb dhe Mesdhe. Rusia u t\u00ebrhoq prej perandorive t\u00eb saj t\u00eb jashtme dhe t\u00eb brendshme p\u00ebr t\u2019u p\u00ebrqendruar te problemet e brendshme, t\u00eb cilat e mbajt\u00ebn t\u00eb preokupuar p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb viteve 1990. Me shterjen e resurseve t\u00eb saj dhe shk\u00ebrmoqjen e […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":8141,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1260],"ppma_author":[266],"class_list":["post-8333","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-kremlinshah"],"authors":[{"term_id":266,"user_id":0,"is_guest":1,"slug":"eugene-rumer-richard-sokolsky","display_name":"Eugene Rumer & Richard Sokolsky","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Eugene-Rumer-Richard-Sokolsky.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Eugene-Rumer-Richard-Sokolsky.jpeg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"","first_name":"","description":"Eugene Rumer \u00ebsht\u00eb ish oficer i inteligjenc\u00ebs komb\u00ebtare p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb dhe Euroazin\u00eb n\u00eb K\u00ebshillin Komb\u00ebtar t\u00eb Inteligjenc\u00ebs s\u00eb SHBA, \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb an\u00ebtar i lart\u00eb dhe drejtor i Programit t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb dhe Euroazis\u00eb s\u00eb Carnegie.\r\n\r\nRichard Sokolsky \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb bashk\u00ebpun\u00ebtor i lart\u00eb jorezident n\u00eb Programin e Carnegie p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb dhe Euroazin\u00eb. Puna e tij p\u00ebrqendrohet n\u00eb politik\u00ebn e SHBA ndaj Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb prag t\u00eb kriz\u00ebs n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8333","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8333"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8333\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8334,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8333\/revisions\/8334"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8141"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8333"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8333"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8333"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=8333"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}