{"id":8335,"date":"2021-06-30T11:48:02","date_gmt":"2021-06-30T09:48:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/?p=8335"},"modified":"2024-10-15T11:49:04","modified_gmt":"2024-10-15T09:49:04","slug":"rusia-eshte-ne-mesdhe-dhe-se-ka-mendjen-te-largohet-iii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/analize\/rusia-eshte-ne-mesdhe-dhe-se-ka-mendjen-te-largohet-iii\/","title":{"rendered":"Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe dhe s\u2019e ka mendjen t\u00eb largohet (III)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><b>Aft\u00ebsia \u00ebsht\u00eb ajo q\u00eb vlen<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Pas konsolidimit t\u00eb pranis\u00eb detare n\u00eb Mesdhe m\u00eb 2012 dhe themelimit zyrtar t\u00eb task forc\u00ebs s\u00eb saj detare m\u00eb 2014, Ruisa ka pasur pak sukses n\u00eb zgjerimin e qasjes s\u00eb saj n\u00eb aranzhime t\u00eb besueshme e konsistenste p\u00ebr task forc\u00ebn e saj p\u00ebrtej Siris\u00eb. Kjo ngjan p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb faktor\u00ebve t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00eb si gjithnj\u00eb \u2013 gjeografis\u00eb dhe politik\u00ebs.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Task forca p\u00ebrb\u00ebhet prej 10 deri n\u00eb 15 anije luftarake dhe n\u00ebndet\u00ebse t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetura nga baza detare e Tartusit. Shumica e tyre dislokohen n\u00eb Mesdhe prej Flot\u00ebs s\u00eb Detit t\u00eb Zi, por disa dislokohen prej Flotave Veriore dhe t\u00eb Baltikut dhe shfryt\u00ebzojn\u00eb bazat e tyre t\u00eb mir\u00ebmbajtjes dhe riparimit. Nj\u00eb baz\u00eb e mir\u00ebmbajtjes n\u00eb Tartus pritet t\u00eb leht\u00ebsoj\u00eb ngarkes\u00ebn e operacioneve detare n\u00eb rajon. Rusia ka n\u00ebnshkruar marr\u00ebveshje me Qipron dhe Malt\u00ebn p\u00ebr qasje t\u00eb kufizuar n\u00eb porte. Sidoqoft\u00eb, t\u00eb dy vendet jan\u00eb an\u00ebtare t\u00eb BE-s\u00eb, kan\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunim t\u00eb fuqish\u00ebm n\u00eb fush\u00ebn e mbrojtjes me Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe NATO-n dhe e kan\u00eb mbik\u00ebqyrur Rusin\u00eb nga af\u00ebr.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Task forca ruse v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb krahasohet me Flot\u00ebn e Gjasht\u00eb t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb, Forc\u00ebn e Mesdheut t\u00eb NATO-s (STANAVFORMED), e as me forcat ajrore e detare t\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebve jugor\u00eb t\u00eb aleanc\u00ebs. Ndon\u00ebse jan\u00eb vet\u00ebm kat\u00ebr shkat\u00ebrrues (t\u00eb ankoruar n\u00eb Rona, Spanj\u00eb) dhe nj\u00eb anije komanduese e caktuar p\u00ebrher\u00eb p\u00ebr Flot\u00ebn e Gjasht\u00eb, rendi i betej\u00ebs ndryshon p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb vitit, at\u00ebher\u00eb kur nd\u00ebrmerr kontrollin operacional t\u00eb grupeve t\u00eb aeroplanmbajt\u00ebsve, grupeve amfibe t\u00eb gatishm\u00ebris\u00eb dhe luftarake t\u00eb pavarura p\u00ebrderisa kalojn\u00eb n\u00ebp\u00ebr zon\u00ebn e saj t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsis\u00eb ose jan\u00eb t\u00eb vendosura aty p\u00ebr periudha t\u00eb shkurt\u00ebra p\u00ebr st\u00ebrvitje dhe operacione.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Gjat\u00eb gjasht\u00eb viteve t\u00eb fundit, anijet n\u00ebn komand\u00ebn e Flot\u00ebs s\u00eb Gjasht\u00eb kan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb vizita rutinore p\u00ebrgajt\u00eb Mesdheut dhe Detit t\u00eb Zi, si n\u00eb Algjeri, Bullgari, Qipro, Gjeorgji, Greqi, Izrael, Franc\u00eb, Rumani dhe Spanj\u00eb. Ato kan\u00eb qen\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb aktive n\u00eb angazhimin me flotat rajonale se sa homologet e tyre ruse. P\u00ebrve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, Shtetet e Bashkuara kan\u00eb aset\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha ajrore n\u00eb Itali dhe Turqi. N\u00eb rast t\u00eb ndonj\u00eb krize t\u00eb madhe n\u00eb teatrin europian, flota do t\u00eb rritej me p\u00ebrforcime prej rajoneve t\u00eb tjera.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Aft\u00ebsit\u00eb detare dhe ajrore t\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb aleanc\u00ebs n\u00eb krahun jugor duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshihen gjithashtu n\u00eb ekuilibrin ushtarak mes NATO-s dhe Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe. STANAVFORMED-i i NATO-s p\u00ebrb\u00ebhet zakonisht nga tet\u00eb shkat\u00ebrrues dhe fregata prej Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, Mbret\u00ebria e Bashkuar, Hollanda, Gjermania dhe disa aleat\u00eb t\u00eb tjer\u00eb n\u00eb krahun jugor.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00c7\u2019\u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme, gjasht\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebt jugor\u00eb t\u00eb NATO-s posedojn\u00eb af\u00ebrisht 90 luftarake dhe mbi 1300 avion\u00eb ushtarak\u00eb, duke p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb edhe aviacionin detar. Asetet ajrore ruse n\u00eb Mesdhe jan\u00eb modeste n\u00eb krahasim me k\u00ebto forca. Rusia nuk baz\u00eb ajrore jasht\u00eb Siris\u00eb dhe fuqia e saj ajrore n\u00eb rajon p\u00ebrb\u00ebhet prej m\u00eb pak se 50 avion\u00eb luftarak\u00eb dhe bombardues.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">V\u00ebmendje mjaft e madhe i \u00ebsht\u00eb kushtuar n\u00eb vitet e fundit p\u00ebr dislokimin e sistemit raketor kund\u00ebrajror rus A2\/AD p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb Krimes\u00eb dhe n\u00eb Siri. K\u00ebto aft\u00ebsi p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb sistemet m\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrparuara p\u00ebr mbrojtje ajrore dhe raketore S-400 me rreze t\u00eb gjat\u00eb veprimi prej 400 kilometrash, si dhe sistemi mbrojt\u00ebse raketore t\u00eb rrezs s\u00eb shkurt\u00eb dhe bregdetare. Ushtria ruse ka p\u00ebrdorur raketa balistike Iskander me rreze t\u00eb shkurt\u00ebr dhe familjen Kalibr t\u00eb raketave subsonike n\u00eb luft\u00ebn e Siris\u00eb, duke demonstruar aft\u00ebsit\u00eb godit\u00ebse kund\u00ebr caqeve tok\u00ebsore dhe detare.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Kalibr mund t\u00eb mbartin mbushje b\u00ebrthamore dhe mund t\u00eb paraqesin k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim serioz p\u00ebr asetet tok\u00ebsore dhe detare amerikane dhe t\u00eb aleat\u00ebve. Megjith\u00ebk\u00ebt\u00eb, kur merret n\u00eb kontekstin e p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm t\u00eb aft\u00ebsie ruse n\u00eb Mesdhe, misioni i tyre \u00ebsht\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb paraqes\u00eb rrezik p\u00ebr anijet e NATO-s n\u00eb rast t\u00eb nj\u00eb pasigurie n\u00eb teatri europian, ose t\u00eb frenoj\u00eb \u00e7do p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb sfiduar pranin\u00eb ruse n\u00eb Siri.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Pavar\u00ebsisht shqet\u00ebsimeve p\u00ebr A2\/AD ruse, disa studime sugjerojn\u00eb se aft\u00ebsit\u00eb e tyre dhe sfida q\u00eb mund t\u00eb paraqesin p\u00ebr NATO-n mund t\u00eb jen\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb pak t\u00eb rrezikshme se sa q\u00eb druhej fillimisht. Sado mbres\u00ebl\u00ebn\u00ebse q\u00eb t\u00eb jen\u00eb, k\u00ebto asete detare, ajrore dhe tok\u00ebsore p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb nj\u00eb aft\u00ebsi relativisht mesatare p\u00ebr t\u00eb treguar fuqin\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe; ato mund t\u00eb nd\u00ebrlikojn\u00eb aft\u00ebsin\u00eb e flotave dhe forcave ajrore t\u00eb NATO-s p\u00ebr t\u00eb operuar p\u00ebrbrenda sfer\u00ebs s\u00eb tyre dhe k\u00ebshtu t\u00eb ofrojn\u00eb nj\u00eb mas\u00eb mbrojtjeje p\u00ebr bazat ajrore ruse n\u00eb Krime dhe Siri.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Megjithat\u00eb, n\u00eb munges\u00eb t\u00eb aseteve serioze ajrore dhe detare p\u00ebrtej k\u00ebtyre hap\u00ebsirave t\u00eb vogla, Rusia duket se tejkalohet nga prania shum\u00eb m\u00eb superior detare dhe ajrore e NATO-s p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb rajonit. Marr\u00eb parasysh aft\u00ebsit\u00eb dhe mund\u00ebsit\u00eb e kund\u00ebrmasave q\u00eb posedon NATO, pyetja kryesore nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb se a mundet, por se si do t\u00eb tejkaloj\u00eb aleanca sistemet A2\/AD t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>Konkluzioni dhe implikimet p\u00ebr interesat dhe politikat e SHBA-s\u00eb<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00cbsht\u00eb shkruar mjaft p\u00ebr ambiciet ekspansive t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb dhe \u201cushtrimin e fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe\u201d n\u00eb Mesdhe. Megjith\u00ebk\u00ebt\u00eb, aft\u00ebsit\u00eb dhe shtrirja e saj e kufizuar n\u00eb rajon l\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb kuptohet se sado q\u00eb Rusia mundt\u00eb d\u00ebshiroj\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebhet prani mbizot\u00ebruese gjeopolitike dhe ushtarake atje, ajo nuk i posedon mjetet p\u00ebr ta arritur k\u00ebt\u00eb. K\u00ebto aft\u00ebsi tregojn\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb q\u00ebllim tjet\u00ebr m\u00eb t\u00eb kufizuar: n\u00eb vend se t\u00eb orvatet ta mbizot\u00ebroj\u00eb at\u00eb, m\u00eb shum\u00eb ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me t\u00eb mos lejuarit e mund\u00ebsis\u00eb q\u00eb NATO t\u00eb mbizot\u00ebroj\u00eb Mesdheun, ashtu si\u00e7 b\u00ebri pas t\u00ebrheqjes s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb fund t\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Marr\u00eb parasysh mjetet e pakta n\u00eb dispozicion, rikthimi i Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe duhet t\u00eb shihet si sukses. Kremlini ka qen\u00eb i vendosur, i duruar, i aft\u00eb dhe oportunist n\u00eb k\u00ebrkimin dhe kapjen e mund\u00ebsive t\u00eb krijuara nga zhvillimet e brendshme n\u00eb rajon, sikurse kryengritjet e nxitura nga Pranvera Arabe, si dhe nga politikat e Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebve t\u00eb saj, n\u00eb ve\u00e7anti d\u00ebshira p\u00ebr t\u00eb reduktuar zotimet n\u00eb rajon dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb shmangur ngat\u00ebrresa m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha n\u00eb Siri apo Libi. Rusia ka nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb risqe t\u00eb llogaritura mir\u00eb, por ka shmangur investimin e resurseve, prestigjit dhe besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb n\u00eb ndjekje t\u00eb q\u00ebllimeve jorealiste si dhe provokimin e ballafaqimit t\u00eb hapur me Shtetet e Bashkuara.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb rishfaqur sip rani ushtarake serioze n\u00eb Mesdheun Lindor. Ajo ka nd\u00ebrlikuar planifikimet dhe operacionet e SHBA-s\u00eb dhe NATO-s, ka shfaqur pretendimin e fuqish\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb rikthyer pozicionin e saj n\u00eb Detin e Zi, \u00ebsht\u00eb konsoliduar sip rani madhore n\u00eb Siri dhe Libi, ka nd\u00ebrtuar marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie t\u00eb mira me Izraelin dhe marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie t\u00eb arsyeshme, ndon\u00ebse t\u00eb ngathta me Turqin\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb rilidhur me Algjerin\u00eb dhe Egjiptin dhe ka lustruar kredencialet e saj t\u00eb fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe. K\u00ebto jan\u00eb fitore t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme ruse.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sido q\u00eb t\u00eb jet\u00eb, k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi q\u00eb paraqet rikthimi i Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe p\u00ebr interesat themelore t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb nuk duhet t\u00eb ekzagjerohet. Shtetet e Bashkuara jan\u00eb ende n\u00eb pozit\u00eb unike n\u00eb rajon p\u00ebr t\u00eb parandaluar sulmet terroriste kund\u00ebr atdheut; marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet ruso-izraelite nuk d\u00ebmtojn\u00eb p\u00ebrkushtimin amerikan ndaj siguris\u00eb s\u00eb Izraelit; nd\u00ebrsa prania detare e Rusis\u00eb nuk ka paraqitur ndonj\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim p\u00ebr lirin\u00eb e navigimit n\u00eb Mesdhe. R\u00ebnd\u00ebsia e sistemit A2\/AD t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb p\u00ebr Sirin\u00eb me raste \u00ebsht\u00eb ekzagjeruar \u2013 k\u00ebto asete jan\u00eb t\u00eb kufizuara dhe n\u00eb rast t\u00eb nj\u00eb konflikti me Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj t\u00eb NATO-s, ato do t\u00eb ishin t\u00eb c\u00ebnueshme ndaj arm\u00ebve t\u00eb rrezeve t\u00eb gjata t\u00eb hedhura prej platformave tok\u00ebsore, ajrore e detare.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Rusia p\u00ebrballet me mjaft shtr\u00ebngesa afatgjate p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbajtur ndikimin dhe kapacitetin e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb treguar fuqi n\u00eb Mesdhe. Ajo nuk ka interes apo aft\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u2019u b\u00ebr\u00eb partnere me ato vende p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur lloj-lloj sfidash q\u00ebp\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb, stabilitetin dhe prosperitetin e tyre, t\u00eb cilat do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkonin zotime t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb resurseve dhe p\u00ebrfshirje m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe n\u00eb konfliktet e rajonit, me t\u00eb gjitha rreziqet q\u00eb do t\u00eb p\u00ebrmbanin ato. Nu ka shenja q\u00eb Rusia po p\u00ebrgatitet t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb k\u00ebsolloj investimesh. Qasja e saj transaksionale ndaj marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve me vendet tjera nj\u00ebkoh\u00ebsisht ndihmon dhe kufizon shtrirjen dhe fuqin\u00eb e saj. N\u00eb fund, megjith\u00eb retorik\u00ebn rreth asaj se si Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb e guximshme dhe moskok\u00eb\u00e7ar\u00ebse, ajo ka vepruar me kujdes dhe p\u00ebrmbajtje t\u00eb shtuar n\u00eb rajon, si dhe ka treguar jotoleranc\u00eb t\u00eb konsiderueshme ndaj rrezikut.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Ky vler\u00ebsim i Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe ka nxjerr\u00eb tre konkluzione qendrore: s\u00eb pari, aft\u00ebsit\u00eb e Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb rajon jan\u00eb modeste dhe ajo p\u00ebrballet me pengesa t\u00eb v\u00ebshtira n\u00eb arritjen e ambicieve t\u00eb saj. S\u00eb dyti, arsyetimi kryesor p\u00ebr rikthimin e Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe ka qen\u00eb prospekti i nj\u00eb ballafaqimi ushtarak n\u00eb teatrin europian, e jo d\u00ebshira p\u00ebr t\u00eb rifituar statusin e fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe; prandaj rajoni \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb aren\u00eb n\u00ebnrendit\u00ebse ndaj ballafaqimit kryesor mes Rusis\u00eb dhe Per\u00ebndimit. Fare n\u00eb fund, rikthimi i Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb Mesdhe ka p\u00ebr q\u00ebllim t\u00eb shtie n\u00eb dor\u00eb, sado me resurse t\u00eb vogla, nj\u00eb pik\u00ebmb\u00ebshtetje t\u00eb til\u00eb q\u00eb ka pasur gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb, t\u00eb nxitur nga q\u00ebllimet e kahershme t\u00eb ballafaqimit t\u00eb saj me Per\u00ebndimin.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Rikthimi i Rusis\u00ebn\u00eb Mesdhe vazhdon nj\u00eb trash\u00ebgimi t\u00eb gjat\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshirjes n\u00eb at\u00eb rajon, t\u00eb shtyr\u00eb nga ambiciet, interesat dhe p\u00ebrceptimet e k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimin q\u00eb kan\u00eb mbijetuar me shekuj. Nuk ka arsye t\u00eb pritet q\u00eb ky qendrim t\u00eb ndryshoj\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen e af\u00ebrt ose t\u00eb larg\u00ebt. Rusia s\u2019e ka mendjen t\u00eb largohet nga Mesdheu dhe vendosm\u00ebria e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjeruar pranin\u00ebn e saj detare, ajrore dhe tok\u00ebsore n\u00eb at\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00eb do t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">***<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Hulumtimi origjinal nga Eugene Rumer dhe Richard Sokolsky i botuar nga <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/files\/Rumer_Sokolsky_Russia_in_the_Med_Updated.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Carnegie Endowment<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, m\u00eb 27 maj 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">***<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Ky artikull mb\u00ebshtetet nga &#8220;Sbunker&#8221; p\u00ebrmes projektit t\u00eb financuar nga Ambasada Amerikane. Mendimet e shprehura k\u00ebtu jan\u00eb t\u00eb autorit dhe jo medoemos pasqyrojn\u00eb q\u00ebndrimet e Departamentit t\u00eb Shtetit.<\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Aft\u00ebsia \u00ebsht\u00eb ajo q\u00eb vlen Pas konsolidimit t\u00eb pranis\u00eb detare n\u00eb Mesdhe m\u00eb 2012 dhe themelimit zyrtar t\u00eb task forc\u00ebs s\u00eb saj detare m\u00eb 2014, Ruisa ka pasur pak sukses n\u00eb zgjerimin e qasjes s\u00eb saj n\u00eb aranzhime t\u00eb besueshme e konsistenste p\u00ebr task forc\u00ebn e saj p\u00ebrtej Siris\u00eb. Kjo ngjan p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb faktor\u00ebve [&hellip;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":8141,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[1260],"ppma_author":[266],"class_list":["post-8335","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analize","tag-kremlinshah"],"authors":[{"term_id":266,"user_id":0,"is_guest":1,"slug":"eugene-rumer-richard-sokolsky","display_name":"Eugene Rumer &amp; Richard Sokolsky","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Eugene-Rumer-Richard-Sokolsky.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Eugene-Rumer-Richard-Sokolsky.jpeg"},"user_url":"","last_name":"","first_name":"","description":"Eugene Rumer \u00ebsht\u00eb ish oficer i inteligjenc\u00ebs komb\u00ebtare p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb dhe Euroazin\u00eb n\u00eb K\u00ebshillin Komb\u00ebtar t\u00eb Inteligjenc\u00ebs s\u00eb SHBA, \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb an\u00ebtar i lart\u00eb dhe drejtor i Programit t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb dhe Euroazis\u00eb s\u00eb Carnegie.\r\n\r\nRichard Sokolsky \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb bashk\u00ebpun\u00ebtor i lart\u00eb jorezident n\u00eb Programin e Carnegie p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb dhe Euroazin\u00eb. Puna e tij p\u00ebrqendrohet n\u00eb politik\u00ebn e SHBA ndaj Rusis\u00eb n\u00eb prag t\u00eb kriz\u00ebs n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb."}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8335","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8335"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8335\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8336,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8335\/revisions\/8336"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8141"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8335"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8335"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8335"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sbunker.org\/sr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=8335"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}