During a rally of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Belgrade on 27 June, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic announced that he would resign in the coming weeks, less than a year before the expiration of his presidential mandate. At the same time, he declared his intention to run for prime minister, confirming one of my recent predictions that Serbia is heading toward snap elections this year.
Although Vucic has repeatedly floated the possibility of snap elections since the beginning of 2025, particularly following the expansion of the student protests and the resignation of then-Prime Minister Milos Vucevic, those statements largely served as political messaging aimed at his supporters.
This time, however, the announcement is different. By publicly committing to resign from the presidency, Vucic has effectively set the stage for early presidential elections.
The snap elections could provide a way out of the political crisis that has gripped Serbia since November 2024. For nearly two years, avoiding elections was a logical strategy for Vucic because of mass protests, blockades, and declining public support.
This raises several important questions. Why call early presidential elections when the student movement has demanded early parliamentary elections? What is Vucic's political calculation? And does this election pose the greatest challenge to his rule in more than a decade?
Vucic’s Electoral Gamble
First of all, continuing to postpone elections would increasingly weaken Vucic’s image as a leader, especially in a context of prolonged protests, blockades, and growing political fatigue. Over time, the absence of elections becomes harder to justify and easier for the opposition to frame as avoidance.
Second, regular presidential elections must be held by May 1, 2027, but since EXPO 2027 opens on May 15, Vucic is unlikely to risk elections so close to the launch of one of his flagship projects. Considered a project of national importance and worth €18 billion, EXPO 2027 includes major infrastructure such as railways, highways, and a national stadium, among others.
Third, since the constitution bars Vucic from seeking a third presidential term, he is expected to call concurrent elections, run for the position of prime minister, and leverage coattail effects to help the future SNS candidate secure the presidency.
Finally, this is an all-or-nothing game for Vucic. He is likely to discourage undecided voters by stressing the risks of political change. This can be effective, as polls show up to one-third of citizens remain undecided. He may also count on external support, since key EU member states have been closely engaged with his government and may prefer continuity to secure long-standing commitments.
What to Expect from Serbia’s Potential Snap Elections
Serbia’s 2026 snap elections are likely to be among the most consequential in decades, arguably the most significant since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. They come at a moment of political tension, prolonged protests, and deep uncertainty about the country’s democratic trajectory and future leadership.
The biggest challenge to Vucic may not come from traditional opposition parties, but from the student list, an unregistered political movement of Students in Blockade, whose political strategy is not to reveal its leaders nor to officially register until elections are officially called and scheduled.
Even polling agencies considered close to the ruling party estimate its support at around 30 percent. This suggests that, for the first time, Vucic could be facing a strong and credible challenger outside the established party system.
What works in favor of the Student List is that SNS lacks a strong candidate apart from Vucic, who is instead expected to run for prime minister. This exposes a key vulnerability of the ruling party. The rector of the University of Belgrade, Vladan Djokic, is widely seen as a potential presidential candidate. He has gained significant popularity and could emerge as a serious contender.
The Historical Pattern Behind Serbia's Early Presidential Elections
Historically, major political change in Serbia has come through presidential elections. Slobodan Milosevic lost the presidency in 2000, while Boris Tadic lost in 2012. Both leaders called early elections believing they were in a strong position, but both were defeated.
Milosevic had a stable parliamentary majority and had even changed the constitution before unexpectedly calling early elections. Tadic, meanwhile, underestimated public dissatisfaction and lost to Tomislav Nikolic.
The common thread is that both took the gamble of calling early elections, the same strategy Vucic is pursuing today. This raises the key question many political analysts in Belgrade are asking: Is Vucic making the same mistake?
Vucic’s hopes for a quick win lie in the fragmentation of the opposition, multiple competing lists, some of which may fail to pass the 3% electoral threshold, along with the presence of weaker candidates, potential fake lists, and broader pressures and irregularities that could secure him just enough support for a narrow victory.
Serbia's anticipated snap elections could mark a decisive turning point. While Vucic seeks to preserve his grip on power through a strategic reshuffle, the emergence of a credible challenger and growing public discontent make the outcome more uncertain than at any point since 2000.
The elections will test not only the resilience of his rule but also the future of Serbia's democracy.
