The most profound change in Kosovo over the past few years has not been economic, social, or institutional, but political—more precisely the change in the perception and conduct of politics. Once grounded in a clear set of formal and informal rules, politics in Kosovo is now increasingly mirroring broader global and regional trends: populism, majoritarianism, and deep polarization.
These shifts have significantly reshaped ethnic dynamics in Kosovo, most visibly in public perceptions and political attitudes toward the links between Kosovo Serbs and Serbia. The traditional pattern of political organization among Kosovo Serbs, based on close cooperation with Belgrade, is now heavily scrutinized, institutionally delegitimized, and at times treated as suspicious.
Of course, the autocratic, corrupt, and manipulative nature of the current government in Belgrade makes this dynamic easier to sustain. Yet, this pattern would likely persist even under a democratic government in Serbia, simply because, in today’s Kosovo, it generates electoral support.
Rather than defending what many Kosovo Serbs, including myself, see as natural ties with Serbia, I will try to explain the underlying logic, historical causality, and complexity of the political relationship between Kosovo Serbs and Serbia, a relationship whose underlying dynamics may be surprising to parts of the Kosovo public.
To begin with, one of the least understood political realities in Kosovo is the growing opposition among Kosovo Serbs toward Vucic’s SNS government in Serbia. I would even argue that a tacit majority of Kosovo Serbs oppose many of its policies, both in Serbia itself and regarding Kosovo.
To begin with, one of the least understood political realities in Kosovo is the growing opposition among Kosovo Serbs toward Vucic’s SNS government in Serbia. I would even argue that a tacit majority of Kosovo Serbs oppose many of its policies, both in Serbia itself and regarding Kosovo.
The answer lies not only in institutional leverage, as is often argued, but also in a long-established political pattern. This pattern suggests that, regardless of ideological orientation, Kosovo Serbs have historically overwhelmingly supported the parties in power in Serbia, from Milosevic to Djindjic, Kostunica, Tadic, and now Vucic.
An entire spectrum of political ideologies has come and gone in Belgrade, each met with a remarkably similar level of support among Kosovo Serbs.
The reason for this lies in the fact that the electoral choices of Kosovo Serbs are made primarily through the lens of ethnic conflict with Kosovo Albanians. The economy, social progress, democracy, and the usual factors shaping voter preferences are secondary concerns. Instead, questions of collective security, political representation, and institutional protection take precedence, a reality in which Kosovo Serbs, as a minority in Kosovo, have historically sought and relied on protection from Belgrade.
This dynamic can only begin to change once Pristina is no longer perceived as a political opponent and its policies as a threat for Kosovo Serbs. As Pristina’s recent actions are increasingly seen as harmful, they are producing the opposite effect by perpetuating support for, and dependence on, Belgrade.
Take, for example, the growing support for Srpska Lista despite the fiasco of its policies over the past few years. Amid increasingly forceful policies coming from Pristina, Kosovo Serbs are beginning to see Srpska Lista as their only line of defense, despite all their flaws and manipulations.
In that sense, the Kurti government has, intentionally or not, accelerated the political homogenization of Kosovo Serbs precisely at the moment when the first signs of political pluralism were beginning to emerge. A missed opportunity.
Another important element that needs to be understood is the political importance of Kosovo Serbs within political dynamics in Serbia itself.
For decades, Kosovo has been, if not the central political issue, then certainly one of the most dominant themes in Serbia’s political life, carrying strong national symbolism and significant electoral capital. In such a context, despite their relatively small numbers, Kosovo Serbs, as the most direct embodiment of the Kosovo issue itself, exercise a disproportionately large influence on public opinion and political decision making in Serbia.
Control over the Kosovo Serb political space has therefore always been important for governments in Belgrade, at times maintained through aligned political interests and at other times through various forms of problematic privileges and dependency.
In such a constellation, the genuine interests of the Serb community have too often been subordinated to the interests of the ruling party in Belgrade. Partisan loyalty has frequently taken precedence over community interests and democratic accountability, creating fertile ground for endemic corruption, nepotism, and democratic dysfunctions. This has had a direct and lasting impact on the vitality of the Kosovo Serb community.
The gap between political propaganda and realities on the ground is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Judging by official figures and budget allocations coming from Serbia, one could easily conclude that Kosovo Serbs live in conditions of prosperity and abundance. In reality, however, much of these resources never meaningfully reach the community itself, becoming trapped in layers of corruption, clientelism, and political misuse. A Potemkin village in a excel spreadsheets.
This represents another missed opportunity for Pristina, to reduce the growing distance with Kosovo Serbs. Instead of relying primarily on punitive and populist policies, Pristina could, for example, have offered concrete economic and institutional support to Kosovo Serbs.
Instead, investments from the Kosovo budget in the Kosovo Serb community are sporadic and entirely disproportionate to both stated commitments and actual needs. Moreover, they increasingly appear to follow the same pattern: politically motivated and directed almost exclusively toward those actors within the Serb community who support the ruling party in Pristina.
The same pattern repeats itself: political loyalty is rewarded more than accountability and abuses are often overlooked as long as they yield political gains. Democracy is not a political buffet for Kosovo Serbs. The choice is rarely between good and bad options, but between those perceived as more or less harmful. And that is precisely how many Kosovo Serbs vote.
