On June 8, local elections were held in the Serbian towns of Kosjeric and Zajecar. Typically, these small towns do not attract much attention during election cycles, but this time was different. These elections were seen as a referendum on the popularity of the Serbian government.
These were the first regular elections since the canopy collapse at Novi Sad’s Central Railway Station, an incident that sparked months of student-led protests and shook the political leadership of President Vucic and the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
Yet once again, Vucic demonstrated his political resilience. Although SNS’s popularity has declined, the party narrowly secured victory in both towns. Symbolically, this was a crucial win for Vucic, one he arguably needed to signal that public support had not entirely eroded.
In the lead-up to these elections, protesters had been demanding snap parliamentary elections for months. However, Vucic resisted such calls, insisting that the current government still enjoys both parliamentary backing and democratic legitimacy.
Despite victories in both municipalities, the ongoing political crisis driven by student protests is beginning to take its toll. The once-dominant SNS, previously confident in leading election campaigns, is now seeking to avoid them. However, the time will come when they must face regular elections, and it remains to be seen whether they will be able to dodge that bullet as well.
A Pyrrhic Victory for the Serbian Government?
The elections in Kosjeric and Zajecar drew significant attention and were closely monitored by citizens, the media, NGOs, and political parties. Given the tense political climate and growing expectations that the SNS could be unseated, all actors were highly engaged.
In Kosjeric, the opposition was united under one list called “Ujedinjeni” (United). This list included all opposition parties, civic movements, and students. In Zajecar, the opposition ran on two lists.
The ruling SNS reportedly mobilized all available resources, including alleged misuse of social assistance, distribution of appliances for votes, and vote buying. Some citizens claimed they received between 4,000 and 6,000 dinars (€40-50) for voting SNS, while unconfirmed reports suggest amounts as high as 50,000 dinars (€430).
According to the CRTA-observation mission, Election Day was full of irregularities. Moreover, serious irregularities were recorded at 19% of polling stations, affecting and distorting the results. Election Day on June 8 saw record voter turnout with 84% in Kosjeric and 63% in Zajecar. The high voter turnout, especially in Kosjeric, raised hopes of an opposition victory. However, once the votes were counted, SNS emerged victorious in both cities.
In Kosjeric, the ruling party's margin of victory was particularly narrow, just 50 votes, or 49.23% of the total. Compared to the 2021 local elections, where the SNS secured, 69% of the vote, the 2025 results reflect a sharp decline in the party’s popularity.
Moreover, the Higher Court annulled the results at one polling station in Kosjeric following a complaint and ordered a repeat vote. Since the margin between SNS and United is just 50 votes, this gives the opposition a real chance to unseat SNS.
What are the main takeaways?
Although SNS won the elections, the question remains: at what cost? The party mobilized all available resources, including voter pressure, vote buying, and Election Day irregularities.
Replicating this in general elections will be far more difficult—both due to the scale of required resources and international oversight. Most importantly, SNS faces a deeper challenge: a steady decline in support after over a decade in power.
In this context, the elections in Kosjeric and Zajecar offer several important takeaways:
The first key takeaway is that the popularity of the SNS is clearly weakening. Although the opposition did not win, it managed to double its number of votes in both Kosjeric and Zajecar, an outcome that can be considered a significant and encouraging result.
Second, this election marked the first successful cooperation between students, opposition parties, and civic movements in a coordinated effort. Their joint mobilization demonstrated the potential of unified action in challenging the ruling party’s dominance.
Third, the opposition must be more vigilant and better prepared to detect election irregularities and corruption in future electoral cycles, particularly with the next elections expected in 2027.
Fourth, the loss in Kosjeric and Zajecar has not discouraged or weakened the protest; on the contrary, another large protest has been announced for June 28 in Belgrade. If it draws as many people as the previous one in March, it will showcase the strength of the student movement and pose further challenges for Vucic.
Finally, this could signal the beginning of a broader consolidation of the opposition in Serbia—something that has been largely absent in recent years. Such unity is not only promising but also a necessary precondition for regime change in the future.
